信息不对称和报酬方案对预算松弛的影响研究

本文用实验方法研究预算的激励功能和计划功能需要同时发挥时,在预算参与的情况下,信息不对称和报酬方案对预算松弛的影响。本文的研究发现,信息不对称和报酬方案都会影响预算松弛:无论是否存在信息不对称,编制松弛在真实诱导报酬方案下要低于松弛诱导报酬方案;无论是否存在信息不对称,真实诱导报酬方案下的业绩要好于松弛诱导报酬方案下的业绩;信息不对称时不同诱导报酬方案下的业绩差异大于没有信息不对称时不同诱导报酬方案下的业绩差异;无论是否存在信息不对称,松弛诱导报酬方案下的报酬要大于真实诱导报酬方案下的报酬。上述结果表明,必须以系统思维来进行预算管理,将预算管理置于整个管理体系中考虑,做到与管理体系中的其他内容协调配套,只有这样才能充分发挥预算管理的功能。

An Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Information Asymmetry and Pay Scheme on Budget Slack

With experimental approach,this paper researched effects of pay scheme and information asymmetry on budget slack when functions of inspiriting and planning of budget were exerted at the same time with budget participant.The results show that budget slack was lower and performance was higher and pay was lower in truth-inducing pay scheme than in slack-inducing pay scheme regardless of information asymmetry.The performance difference was higher on information asymmetry than on the information symmetry with different inducement pay scheme.All discovers indicate that information asymmetry and slack-inducing pay scheme would effected budget slack.