审计委员会制度与中国上市公司治理创新

本文研究中国上市公司现行治理结构中的企业会计事务控制权安排及其缺陷,并提出改进措施。我们研究发现,在中国上市公司现行治理结构中,企业经理人不仅拥有企业内部会计事务的积极权力,而且实质拥有企业外部会计事务的积极权力,其中的作为董事会下设专门委员会的审计委员会不是我们所设计的本原性质的审计委员会,而是接近于美国现行公司治理结构中的审计委员会。这一安排不符合关于现代企业会计事务控制权安排的分权制衡原则,难以保证注册会计师审计的独立性。我们在分析中国上市公司治理中的监事会监督为什么会流于形式的基础上,提出应进行中国上市公司治理的创新,即取消监事会(制度),设立独立于董事会与之平行的符合本原性质的审计委员会,或将监事会改造为符合我们界定的本原性质的审计委员会。

The Audit Committee System and Innovation of Listed Companies' Governance in China

This paper researches the institutional arrangement of accounting affairs control rights within listed companies' existing corporate governance and its deficiency in China,and suggests the improving measures.We document that,in China's existing corporate governance,executives control not only the internal accounting affairs but also the external accounting affairs(i.e.,the independent auditing affairs).As one of the subcommittee of the board of directors,the existing audit committee is not the audit committee of normative nature suggested by Xie(2005b), its nature is close to the audit committee of American style.But the institutional arrangement is not in conformity with the control rights separa- ting and balancing principle regarding accounting affairs control rights in modem enterprises.As a result,the institutional arrangement can't en- sure the independence of CPA auditing.Based on the analyses concerning ineffectiveness of the monitoring function of the board of supervisors in China's existing corporate governance,we suggest that China should innovate the corporate governance.In particular,China should cancel the board of supervisors and establish the audit committee of normative nature,or reform the existing system of the board of supervisors to be in conformity with the audit committee of normative nature.