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从博弈看上市公司股利政策的决定
引用本文:孙茂竹,王艳茹,张祥风.从博弈看上市公司股利政策的决定[J].会计研究,2006(8):60-66.
作者姓名:孙茂竹  王艳茹  张祥风
作者单位:1. 中国人民大学商学院,100872
2. 中国青年政治学院经济系,100089
摘    要:本文从股利政策的内涵出发,运用博弈论的基本原理,分别从管理者与股东、管理者(股东)与债权人方面的利益冲突入手,建立博弈模型,列出支付矩阵,进行均衡分析,得出博弈的均衡结果——低股利支付政策,继续持有股权或债权,指出低正常股利加额外股利政策是最符合这一博弈结果的股利政策选择。

关 键 词:博弈  上市公司  现金股利政策

Dividend Policy of Listed Companies Based on Game Theory
Sun Maozhu.Dividend Policy of Listed Companies Based on Game Theory[J].Accounting Research,2006(8):60-66.
Authors:Sun Maozhu
Abstract:By using the basic principles of Game theory,this paper sets about the meaning of the dividend policy and talks about the diversity in the status and the power of each body.It sets the model games about managers vs.shareholders and managers(shareholders)vs.credi- tors,and makes the equilibrium analysis in the given pay-off.It concludes the equilibrium outcome of the game-low dividend policy, hold the securities,and states that the Regular plus Bonus Policy is the best dividend policy to a company,which accords with the equi- librium outcome of the game.
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