Fixed income conference calls |
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| Institution: | 1. A.B. Freeman School of Business, Tulane University, USA;2. Lally School of Management, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, USA;1. University at Buffalo, SUNY, USA;2. University of California, Berkeley, USA;3. University of Virginia, USA;1. SKK Business School, Sungkyunkwan University, South Korea;2. College of Business Administration, University of Seoul, South Korea;1. Yale School of Management, Yale University, USA;2. BYU Marriott School of Business, Brigham Young University, USA;3. Lundquist College of Business, University of Oregon, USA |
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| Abstract: | We study the determinants and the informational role of firms' fixed income conference calls, a unique form of voluntary disclosure that deviates from the traditional multi-purpose firm disclosures intended for all stakeholders. We find that fixed income calls are more likely to be held by firms that have more debt, lack credit ratings or have publicly traded equity, are foreign, or are experiencing losses. In a content analysis using a sample of public firms, we find that these calls discuss debt-equity conflict events, such as share repurchases, to a greater degree relative to a matched sample of earnings conference calls. Finally, we document that credit markets react to these calls, consistent with the calls providing investors new information. Overall, these results are consistent with fixed income calls meeting the differential informational demands of debt versus equity investors. |
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| Keywords: | Conference calls Corporate bonds Corporate debt Debt-equity conflict events Debt investors Fixed income G12 G14 G32 M49 |
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