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Capital gains lock-in and governance choices
Authors:Stephen G Dimmock  William C Gerken  Zoran Ivković  Scott J Weisbenner
Institution:1. Nanyang Technological University, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798, Singapore;2. University of Kentucky, 335H Gatton Building, Lexington, KY 40506, United States;3. Michigan State University, 315 Eppley Center, East Lansing, MI 48824, United States;4. University of Illinois, 515 East Gregory Drive, Champaign, IL 61820, United States
Abstract:Differences in accrued gains and investors’ tax-sensitivity induce variation in a capital gains lock-in effect across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Exploiting this variation, we show this effect influences funds’ governance decisions: higher capital gains decrease the likelihood a fund exits prior to contentious votes and increase the likelihood a fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivation, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. Further, high aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predict a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed.
Keywords:Mutual fund  Proxy voting  Corporate governance  Capital-gains tax  Lock-in effect  G34  G23  H20
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