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Boundaries of the firm: evidence from the banking industry
Authors:James A Brickley  James S Linck  Clifford W Smith  Jr
Institution:a William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA;b Department of Banking and Finance, Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602-6253, USA
Abstract:Agency theory implies that asset ownership and decision authority are complements. Using 1998 data from Texas commercial banks, we test whether the likelihood of local ownership of bank offices increases with the importance of granting local managers greater decision authority (for example, due to location or customer base). Our empirical evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. It suggests that complementarities between strategy and organizational structure can foster differentiation among firms in terms of location, customers, and products. It also supports the growing view that small locally-owned banks have a comparative advantage over large banks within specific environments.
Keywords:Boundaries of the firm  Banking  Economics of organizations  Ownership incentives  Agency theory  Decision authority  Locational decisions  Riegle–  Neal Act  Community banks  Interstate branching
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