国有银行贷审委的分离决策均衡激励约束机制探讨

目前的银行贷审委集体决策的体制往往导致贷款责任难以划分,集体负责实际变成无人负责。本文提出一个贷审委的分离决策均衡激励约束机制,使每个贷审委委员每次信贷决策均得到奖惩,从而解决贷审委集体决策无人负责的激励困境问题,决策基金帐户的设置则使贷审委委员无论调到何处,均需为他的每一次决策负责。

A Study of Incentive Mechanism for Loan Review Committee in State-owned Commercial Banks: a Separated Decision-making Equilibrium

At present, state-owned commercial banks make loan decisions collectively by a loan review committee, which easily makes it difficult to determine responsibility, collective responsibility degenerated into irresponsibility by each member of the committee. This paper develops an incentive mechanism characterized by separated decision-making equilibrium, in which each member of the committee is either punished or rewarded as a result of each separated loan decision. Thus incentive dilemma of collective decision making by the committee is resolved. The establishment of decision-making fund account makes each member accountable for all of his decisions wherever he is transferred.