银行危机救助策略的分析

银行危机的救助策略一直是理论界关注的焦点。本文通过构建一个两期模型,以银行危机是否会引发货币危机为评判标准,探讨政府在面对商业银行清偿能力危机时救助与不救助的抉择。经研究发现:当商业银行的不良资产率高,或商业银行在经济中起重要作用,抑或产出的价格弹性较小时,为了避免货币危机的发生,政府应该出手对商业银行提供救助。在相反的情况时,固定汇率制度下,政府为了维护其固定汇率的信誉应该出手对商业银行提供救助;浮动或管理浮动汇率制度下,考虑到商业银行的道德风险问题,政府应该不予以救助。

Analysis on Bank Recapitalization During Crisis

The paper mainly discussed the choice of the government who was faced with bank running by composing a two-stage model with the criterion of whether the bank crisis would bring out currency crises.We obtained the following conclusions.When the banks' losses are large,or the banks play an important role in the economy,or price flexibility of the output is small,the government should recapitalize the banks in order to avoid currency crises.On the contrary,the government should bailout the banks to keep its cr...