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管理层股权激励是否降低了公司过度投资——来自股权分置改革的经验证据
引用本文:强国令.管理层股权激励是否降低了公司过度投资——来自股权分置改革的经验证据[J].投资研究,2012(2):31-43.
作者姓名:强国令
作者单位:上海财经大学;新疆财经大学
基金项目:上海财经大学第六批研究生科研创新基金项目(CXJJ-2011-335)的资助
摘    要:本文从股权分置制度变迁的角度研究管理层股权激励有效性及内在机理。以2005年股权分置改革为结构断点进行Chow检验,发现股权激励治理效应回归方程在2003—2009年全样本期间发生了显著的结构性变化,股权分置改革改善了管理层股权激励的治理效应,减少了过度投资。进一步研究表明,股权分置制度变迁对国有公司管理层股权激励效应影响显著,缓解了公司代理问题,但是对非国有公司没有显著影响。上述研究对于解决国有公司过度投资具有重要的现实意义。

关 键 词:股权分置改革  股权激励  过度投资

Does Managerial Stock Holding Alleviate Corporate Overinvestment:Empirical Evidence from Share Holder Structure Reform
Qiang Guoling.Does Managerial Stock Holding Alleviate Corporate Overinvestment:Empirical Evidence from Share Holder Structure Reform[J].Investment Research,2012(2):31-43.
Authors:Qiang Guoling
Institution:Qiang Guoling
Abstract:Based on the institutional change background of ownership-split,the paper studies the effectiveness of managerial stock incentives and its mechanism.It is found that the structural change took place in 2005 with the Chow test in the regress equation in the period of 2003-2009.The ownership-split reform improves the effectiveness of managerial stock incentives and reduces overinvestment.Furthermore,it has significant impact on managerial stock incentives effect and mitigates agency problem in state-owned firms,but has nothing in non-state-owned firms.It is of vital realistic significance to solve overinvestment in state-owned firms.
Keywords:Ownership-split Reform  Stock Incentives  Overinvestment
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