| 基于多层级委托代理的金融机构内部道德风险模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 曹元芳.基于多层级委托代理的金融机构内部道德风险模型[J].上海金融,2008,51(1):53-56. |
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| 作者姓名： | 曹元芳 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津财经大学,天津,300040 |
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| 摘 要： | 道德风险问题是我国金融业普遍存在的问题,许多金融案件的发生无不与金融从业人员的职业道德水平有关。而目前金融系统实行的多层级委托代理经营管理模式存在制度缺陷和道德风险隐患。本文通过建立三方两阶段的博弈模型,对我国金融业中多层级委托-代理存在的道德风险给出实证分析,提出具有实践意义的建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 金融机构 委托代理 道德风险 博弈模型 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-1428（2008）01-0053-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-11-16 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年11月16 |
An internal moral hazard model derived from multi-tier principal-agent relation in financial institutions |
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| Cao Yuanfang.An internal moral hazard model derived from multi-tier principal-agent relation in financial institutions[J].Shanghai Finance,2008,51(1):53-56. |
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| Authors: | Cao Yuanfang |
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| Institution: | Cao Yuanfang |
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| Abstract: | Moral hazard problem is a common problem existing in China's financial industry. Many financial crimes are caused by low morality level in staff. Multi-tier principal-agent management mode operating in financial system has deficiency and potential moral hazard. This paper builds a game model based on multi-tier principal-agent relations, and puts forward some feasible suggestions to warn against internal financial moral hazard. |
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| Keywords: | Financial Institution Principal-Agent Moral Hazard Game Model |
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