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有限理性下的金融创新与金融监管博弈分析
引用本文:崔晓蕾,徐龙炳.有限理性下的金融创新与金融监管博弈分析[J].上海金融,2011(1).
作者姓名:崔晓蕾  徐龙炳
作者单位:1. 上海财经大学金融学院,上海,200433;南通大学商学院,江苏南通,226019
2. 上海财经大学金融学院,上海,200433
摘    要:金融创新与金融监管间的动态博弈关系一直是人们关注的焦点,尤其在这次美国次贷危机引发的全球性金融危机发生后,两者都饱受质疑。本文从有限理性的角度,运用进化博弈的方法,分别对金融机构间的对称博弈关系和金融机构与监管机构间的非对称博弈关系进行分析,得出长期均衡点,并对其进行分析,为我国的金融创新与金融监管实践提出一些政策建议。

关 键 词:有限理性  金融创新  金融监管  进化博弈  

A Game Analysis of Financial Innovation and Financial Supervision based on Bounded Rationality
Cui Xiaolei,Xu Longbing.A Game Analysis of Financial Innovation and Financial Supervision based on Bounded Rationality[J].Shanghai Finance,2011(1).
Authors:Cui Xiaolei  Xu Longbing
Institution:Cui Xiaolei/ Xu Longbing
Abstract:The dynamic game relation between financial innovation and financial supervision has attracted much attention for long.After the international financial crisis triggered by the sub-prime crisis,both of them are doubted and criticized.This article uses evolutionary game theory based on bounded rationality to analyze symmetric game model among financial institutions and asymmetric game model between financial institutions and supervisors,and then get the evolutionary equilibrium.By analyzing the equilibrium o...
Keywords:Bounded Rationality  Financial Innovation  Financial Supervision  Evolutionary Game  
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