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基于内部人控制角度的我国上市银行高管高薪问题
引用本文:陈珠明,刘家鹏,李鹏程.基于内部人控制角度的我国上市银行高管高薪问题[J].上海金融,2011(2).
作者姓名:陈珠明  刘家鹏  李鹏程
作者单位:中山大学管理学院,广东,广州,510275
摘    要:本文以沪深两市上市的14家商业银行为研究对象,基于内部人控制的角度来分析我国上市商业银行高管高薪问题,并选取2005-2009年年报披露的数据进行实证分析。结果表明,高管薪酬不仅与银行的绩效、资本充足率显著相关,从内部人控制角度来看,独立董事比例与高管薪酬显著负相关,董事会中经理任职比例越高,高管薪酬也越高;同时,高管薪酬与第一大股东的持股性质显著负相关,而监事会人数对高管薪酬影响不显著,说明监事会监督乏力,监事会制度有待完善。

关 键 词:上市商业银行  高管高薪  内部人控制  

On the Top-management High Compensation in China's Listed Commercial Banks based on the Perspective of Internal Control
Chen Zhuming,Liu Jiapeng,Li Pengcheng.On the Top-management High Compensation in China's Listed Commercial Banks based on the Perspective of Internal Control[J].Shanghai Finance,2011(2).
Authors:Chen Zhuming  Liu Jiapeng  Li Pengcheng
Institution:Chen Zhuming/ Liu Jiapeng/ Li Pengcheng
Abstract:The paper studies 14 commercial banks listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets,and analyzes the issue of top management high compensation in China's commercial banks from the perspective of internal control.We select data from annual reports during 2005-2009 to conduct empirical analysis.The results show that the compensation of executives significantly relates to the performance and capital adequacy ratio of banks.From the perspective of internal control,the proportion of independent director on the b...
Keywords:Listed Commercial Bank  Top-management High Compensation  Internal Control  
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