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经济权力与工资水平的博弈:“民工荒”的一个解释——兼论“刘易斯模型”的改造
引用本文:柯龙山.经济权力与工资水平的博弈:“民工荒”的一个解释——兼论“刘易斯模型”的改造[J].社会保障研究,2010(5):48-54.
作者姓名:柯龙山
作者单位:福建师范大学公共管理学院,福建福州350108
摘    要:农民工经济权力与工资水平的博弈是"民工荒"的问题所在,据此可知刘易斯模型是一个动态的水平面,而不仅仅是静态的水平线,中国的实际情况表明刘易斯转折点将比预期的提前到达,要求巩固民工权益保障的既定成效,产业结构优化与农民工职业培训相结合,适时适度调整计划生育人口政策。

关 键 词:经济权力  工资水平  民工荒  刘易斯模型

A Game Between Economic Power And Wages: An Explanation to The Shortage of Migrant Workers, And The Revision of Lewis's Model
KE Longshan.A Game Between Economic Power And Wages: An Explanation to The Shortage of Migrant Workers, And The Revision of Lewis's Model[J].Social Security Studies,2010(5):48-54.
Authors:KE Longshan
Institution:KE Longshan
Abstract:the game between the economic power and wages leads to the shortage of migrant workers,hereby Lewis' model is a dynamic horizontal plane,rather than a static horizontal line; the actual situation in China shows that Lewis's turning point would appear earlier than expected,which requires the consolidation of the success of migrant workers' rights and interests protection,the combination of industrial structure optimization and migrant workers vocational training,and timely and proper adjustment of the family planning policy.
Keywords:economic power  wages  the shortage of migrant workers  Lewis's model
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