| 大股东“隧道挖掘”下的审计合谋历程审视 |
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| 引用本文： | 管亚梅.大股东“隧道挖掘”下的审计合谋历程审视[J].财经理论与实践,2013,34(1):63-66. |
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| 作者姓名： | 管亚梅 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京财经大学会计学院,江苏南京,210046 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社科基金项目，江苏省高校哲学社会科学项目，江苏省哲社项目，南京财经大学预研究项目，江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 大股东与中小股东间的利益冲突是一个世界性公司治理难题。大股东在特定状态下会成为企业剩余控制者而选择与审计师进行合谋,购买审计意见。文章在对股权结构与外部审计监督相关的中外文献进行梳理的基础上,针对大股东"隧道挖掘"下的审计合谋的博弈过程、演化历程进行剖析,从需求方和供给方分别提出了审计合谋的规制策略。
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| 关 键 词： | 隧道挖掘 审计合谋 代理冲突 |
The Research of Audit Collusion based on the Big Shareholder's Tunneling |
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| GUAN Ya-mei.The Research of Audit Collusion based on the Big Shareholder''s Tunneling[J].The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics,2013,34(1):63-66. |
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| Authors: | GUAN Ya-mei |
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| Institution: | GUAN Ya-mei (Accounting School,Nanjing University of Finance and Economics,Jiangsu Nanjing 210046,China) |
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| Abstract: | The conflict between big shareholders and small shareholders is a big problem in the governance field. In some status, the big shareholders would manipulate the audit report when they become the controllers of the enterprise surplus. After a meticulous literature review, the internal control, audit quality and large shareholder tunneling are researched in the paper, then the monitoring strategy has been discussed from the demand-side and the supply-side. |
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| Keywords: | Tunneling Audit collusion Agent conflict |
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