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论房地产市场调控中的中央与地方政府的博弈
引用本文:周建军,代支祥.论房地产市场调控中的中央与地方政府的博弈[J].财经理论与实践,2012(1):78-82.
作者姓名:周建军  代支祥
作者单位:湘潭大学商学院
基金项目:国家社科基金项目“金融危机背景下我国房地产价格波动及其调控机制研究”(10BJL018);中国博士后科学基金“房地产价格波动性研究”(20110491261);湖南省教育厅高校创新平台开放基金“调控房价过快上涨背景下的中央与地方政府合作博弈”(11K065)
摘    要:针对中国房地产市场异常情况,政府出台一系列措施进行调控,由于中央与地方利益的博弈,政策执行效果却不尽如人意,应在中央政策在地方没有得到有效的贯彻落实。通过考量房地产市场调控中中央与地方政府利益的对立与统一基础上,求得二者之间博弈的均衡解。

关 键 词:房地产市场  中央与地方政府  博弈

The Game between Central and Local Governments on the Regulation of the real Estate Market
ZHOU Jian-jun,DAI Zhi-xiang.The Game between Central and Local Governments on the Regulation of the real Estate Market[J].The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics,2012(1):78-82.
Authors:ZHOU Jian-jun  DAI Zhi-xiang
Institution:(Business School,Xiangtan University,Xiangtan,Hunan 411105,China)
Abstract:In order to regulate the real estate market,the central government has issued a series of polices.However,these policies have not been effectively implemented at the local regions due to the existence of interest conflicts between the central and local governments.Considering their different interest based on the law of unity of opposites,the equilibrium point is found in the paper.
Keywords:Real estate market  The central and local governments  Game
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