| 权力异化、国家审计与地方政府负债 |
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| 引用本文： | 蒲丹淋,王善平.权力异化、国家审计与地方政府负债[J].财经理论与实践,2012(5):80-85. |
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| 作者姓名： | 蒲丹淋 王善平 |
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| 作者单位： | 湖南大学工商管理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社科基金项目(08BJY025);湖南省情与决策咨询研究课题(2012ZZ62);湖南大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(10HDSK065);湖南省风险导向审计基地课题(2009KJXYYB002) |
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| 摘 要： | 地方官员权力异化和国家审计监管对地方政府负债行为有显著影响。官员权力异化越严重,地方政府债务增长速度越快,债务风险越大。但是,国家审计监管力量越强,越有可能降低官员权力异化对地方政府负债的影响程度,进而降低地方政府负债增长速度和债务风险。结果表明,较强的国家审计监管力度有助于防止地方政府官员权力滥用和寻租,规范地方政府融资行为。
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| 关 键 词： | 权力异化 国家审计 地方政府负债 |
Public Power Dissimilation, State Audit and Local Government Liabilities |
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| PU Dan-lin,WANG Shan-ping.Public Power Dissimilation, State Audit and Local Government Liabilities[J].The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics,2012(5):80-85. |
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| Authors: | PU Dan-lin WANG Shan-ping |
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| Institution: | (Management School,Hunan University,Changsha,Hunan 410079,China) |
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| Abstract: | The relationship between public power dissimilation,state audit supervision and local government liabilities has been investigated.The results show that the growth rate and the risk of local government liabilities will be increased when the power dissimilation is more serious.Moreover,strengthening state audit supervision helps reduce the adverse effects of public power dissimilation on local government liabilities and normalize local officials’ finance behavior. |
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| Keywords: | Public Power Dissimilation State Audit Local Government Liabilities |
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