首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

审计收费、审计师变更与意见购买
引用本文:唐跃军.审计收费、审计师变更与意见购买[J].财经理论与实践,2009,30(5).
作者姓名:唐跃军
作者单位:复旦大学,管理学院,上海,200433
基金项目:上海市哲学社会科学规划青年课题,上海市教育发展基金会晨光计划项目,复旦大学青年科学基金 
摘    要:实证研究表明,虽然变更审计师增加了上市公司年报被出具非标准审计意见和审计意见恶化的可能性,但是审计师变更更为显著地提高了审计意见改善的可能性;审计收费异常增加与被出具非标准审计意见和审计意见恶化的可能性负相关.公司管理层在一定程度上可以成功实现审计意见购买的动机.此外,异常审计收费、审计收费异常增加和异常降低与审计师变更之间不存在显著的交互效应.

关 键 词:异常审计收费  审计意见购买  审计师变更  交互效应

Audit Fees, Auditor Switching and Audit Opinion Shopping:Test for Interaction Effect based on Evidences of Chinese Stock Market
TANG Yue-jun.Audit Fees, Auditor Switching and Audit Opinion Shopping:Test for Interaction Effect based on Evidences of Chinese Stock Market[J].The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics,2009,30(5).
Authors:TANG Yue-jun
Institution:TANG Yue-jun (School of Management,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China)
Abstract:Empirical analyses indicate that auditor switching increase the likelihood of receiving modified audit opinions and deteriorating audit opinions of annual financial reports,however it much more significantly increase the possibility of the improvement of unfavorable audit opinions;and abnormal increase of audit fees is negatively related with the likelihood of receiving modified audit opinions and deteriorating audit opinions,which both imply that management of Chinese listed companies to some extent can re...
Keywords:Abnormal Audit Fees  Audit Opinion Shopping  Auditor Switching  Interaction Effect  
本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《财经理论与实践》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《财经理论与实践》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号