| 交易所问询与企业过度投资
——基于沪深交易所年报问询函的经验证据 |
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| 引用本文： | 聂萍,徐筱.交易所问询与企业过度投资
——基于沪深交易所年报问询函的经验证据[J].财经理论与实践,2021,42(1):48-54. |
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| 作者姓名： | 聂萍 徐筱 |
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| 作者单位： | 湖南大学 工商管理学院,湖南 长沙 410082;湖南大学 工商管理学院,湖南 长沙 410082 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目;湖南省自然科学基金项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 基于证券交易所问询函件频发以及重点关注企业投资行为的背景,采用2015-2018年A股上市公司年报及其年报问询函数据,探讨交易所年报问询函对企业过度投资的影响效力.研究发现:年报问询函监管能够在一定程度上抑制公司的过度投资;且当上市公司收到的问询函中涉及"投资"事项问题时,对公司过度投资的抑制作用更明显;管理层权力对问询函监管与过度投资关系具有调节作用.
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| 关 键 词： | 问询函监管 过度投资 管理层权力 信息披露 |
Inquiry Letter Supervision and Corporate Over-investment: Empirical Evidence from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange of Annual Report Inquiry |
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| NIE Ping,XU Xiao.Inquiry Letter Supervision and Corporate Over-investment: Empirical Evidence from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange of Annual Report Inquiry[J].The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics,2021,42(1):48-54. |
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| Authors: | NIE Ping XU Xiao |
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| Abstract: | Based on frequent circulars of inquiry letters and focus on the enterprise''s investment behavior, this paper adopts the A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2018 as samples to investigate the effect of inquiry letters supervision on corporate over-investment. The study shows that the annual report inquiry letter supervision inhibit the over-investment behavior of the company. And when the inquiry letter involves the issue of "investment", the inhibitive effect on the over-investment of the company is more obvious. Management power has a moderating effect on the relationship between inquiry regulation and over-investment. |
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| Keywords: | inquiry letter supervision over-investment management power information disclosure |
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