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生命周期视角下非效率投资的影响动因研究
引用本文:刘焱,张胜强,田甜.生命周期视角下非效率投资的影响动因研究[J].财经理论与实践,2015(1):52-58.
作者姓名:刘焱  张胜强  田甜
作者单位:辽宁大学 商学院,辽宁 沈阳,110036
基金项目:国家自然科学基金青年科学基金,辽宁省教育厅人文社会科学重点研究基地专项项目,辽宁省科技厅项目
摘    要:以2009~2012年沪深 A 股上市公司为样本,从企业发展动态的角度检验非效率投资的影响动因。研究表明:成长期和成熟期上市公司的过度投资行为由管理者代理冲突所致,衰退期国有企业的过度投资由大股东代理矛盾所致,非国有企业的过度投资行为由管理者代理冲突和大股东代理矛盾共同所致;成长期上市公司投资不足主要由融资约束所致,成熟期和衰退期公司投资不足由融资约束和两类代理冲突共同所致,且非国有公司比国有公司面临更加严格的融资约束。

关 键 词:企业生命周期  过度投资  投资不足  影响动因

The Motivation of Inefficient Investment under the Perspective of Corporate Life Cycle
LIU Yan,ZHANG Sheng-qiang,TIAN Tian.The Motivation of Inefficient Investment under the Perspective of Corporate Life Cycle[J].The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics,2015(1):52-58.
Authors:LIU Yan  ZHANG Sheng-qiang  TIAN Tian
Institution:(Business School, Liaoning University, Shenyang, Liaoning110136, China)
Abstract:The paper examines the motivation of inefficient investment from the perspective of business dynamic development,based on the sample of 2009 -2012 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.The results show that:A company's over-investment in growth and maturity stage is caused by the conflict of manager agent;over-investment in state-owned enterprises in recession stage is caused by major shareholder proxy conflicts;over-invest-ment in non-state-owned enterprises in recession stage is caused by both manager agency conflicts and major shareholder agency conflicts;under-investment of listed companies in growth stage is caused by financing constraints;under-investment of listed companies in maturity and recession stage is caused by both financing constraints and the two types of agency conflicts,and non-state-owned companies face more financing constraints than state-owned companies.
Keywords:Corporate life cycle  Over-investment  Under-investment  Influence motivation
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