消费者意愿及地方政府行为对农户种植行为的影响机制

基于"经济人"假设和外部性原理,建立政府、农户及消费者之间的三方博弈模型,考量地方政府检查策略下的生态补贴与惩罚措施以及质量标签策略对农户种植行为的影响行为.结果表明:地方政府的生态补贴政策与农药超标罚款政策对农户的生态种植行为具有促进作用,其监管效率受上级政府检查力度以及社会舆论的影响;而实施质量标签策略可以提升农户选择生态种植行为的收益,促使农户种植行为的选择转变;消费者对质量安全的敏感性会提高其进行生态产品购买的动因,倒逼农户进行生态种植.

The Influence Mechanism of Consciousness of Consumers and Local Government Behavior on Farmers' Planting Behavior

Through establishing the tripartite game model among farmers, consumers and the government based on the "economic man" hypothesis and the externality principle, this paper discusses how to influence the farmers'' planting behavior through government and consumer behavior, and explores the impact of consumers'' buying decisions and superior government''s supervision on game outcomes. The results show that the ecological subsidy policy and the fine policy for excessive pesticide residues of local governments have a positive effect on the ecological planting behavior of farmers. Their regulatory efficiency is affected by the inspection efforts of higher levels of government and public opinion. Carrying out the quality labeling strategy can increase the income of farmers if their choice of ecological planting practices, then promote the changes of the choice of farmers'' planting behaviors. Consumers'' sensitivity to food quality and safety will increase their motivation to purchase ecological products, and force farmers to plant ecologically.