| 融资融券、终极控制人两权分离与大股东掏空抑制 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 洪 昀,李婷婷,姚靠华.融资融券、终极控制人两权分离与大股东掏空抑制[J].财经理论与实践,2018(4):67-72. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 洪 昀 李婷婷 姚靠华 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 湖南大学 工商管理学院,湖南 长沙,410082 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金(71602054)，湖南省自然科学基金(2017JJ3043) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 采用2010-2016年沪深两市A股上市公司数据,考察融资融券机制、终极控制人两权分离对大股东掏空行为的影响.研究发现:两权分离度越高,大股东掏空越严重.而融资融券抑制了终极控制人两权分离引起的大股东掏空.进一步分析发现:在投资者保护环境更差、信息披露质量较低、内部治理机制更差的公司中,融资融券的掏空治理效应更加明显.
|
| 关 键 词： | 融资融券 两权分离 掏空 |
Margin Trading, Separation of Two Rights and Restrain of Tunneling Behavior of Major Shareholders |
| |
| HONG Yun,LI Tingting,YAO Kaohua.Margin Trading, Separation of Two Rights and Restrain of Tunneling Behavior of Major Shareholders[J].The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics,2018(4):67-72. |
| |
| Authors: | HONG Yun LI Tingting YAO Kaohua |
| |
| Institution: | (Business School, Hunan University, Changsha,Hunan 410082,China) |
| |
| Abstract: | Using the data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange during 2010-2016, we exam the impact of the margin trading and the separation of two right control and ownership right control and ownership right of ultimate controller on the tunneling behavior. The results show that margin trading refrain the tunneling behavior arising from the separation of two rights of ultimate controller, and this governance effect is more pronounced for firms from regions with worse investor protection environment, for firms with lower information disclosure quality and weaker corporate governance. |
| |
| Keywords: | margin trading separation of control and ownership tunneling |
| 本文献已被 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
| 点击此处可从《财经理论与实践》浏览原始摘要信息 |
| 点击此处可从《财经理论与实践》下载免费的PDF全文 |
|
