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| Stackelberg横向兼并博弈的分析 | |
| 引用本文： | 伍江,. Stackelberg横向兼并博弈的分析[J]. 华东经济管理, 2008, 22(3): 148-153 |
| 作者姓名： | 伍江 |
| 作者单位： | 西南财经大学,工商管理学院,四川,成都,610074 |
| 摘 要： | 文章通过增加"蛇吞象"式兼并分析,扩展了Steffen-Kai-Wieland模型,研究结果表明:无论"大鱼吃小鱼","蛇吞象","强强联合",还是"弱者联合"的兼并,四种兼并对参与企业都是有利可图的.但这些兼并都会提高市场集中度,导致消费者福利下降. |
| 关 键 词： | 兼并 消费者福利 Stackelberg竞争 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-5097(2008)03-0148-06 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007-07-02 |
Analysis of Horizontal Merger Based on Stackelberg Competition |
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| WU Jiang. Analysis of Horizontal Merger Based on Stackelberg Competition[J]. East China Economic Management, 2008, 22(3): 148-153 | |
| Authors: | WU Jiang |
| Affiliation: | Finance and Economics; Southwestern University; Chengdu 610074; China |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this paper is to extend original Steffen-Kai-Wieland model with three kinds of bilateral mergers in Stackelberg markets,by adding that a 'weak' firm incorporating a 'strong' firm under some conditions we find.We show that four kinds of mergers are profitable whether in the case of a 'strong' firm incorporating a 'weak' firm,or a 'weak' firm incorporating a 'strong' firm,or two 'strong' firm merging into one,or two 'weak' firms merging into one,but all mergers result in increasing market conce... |
| Keywords: | merger consumer's welfare Stackelberg competition |
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