| 高级经理激励机制:财务视角 |
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| 引用本文： | 于由. 高级经理激励机制:财务视角[J]. 华东经济管理, 2004, 18(6): 157-158 |
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| 作者姓名： | 于由 |
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| 作者单位： | 浙江林学院,旅游学院,浙江,杭州,311300;浙江林学院,旅游学院,浙江,杭州,311300 |
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| 摘 要： | 所有者只所以要聘用高级经理,是因为其自身能力缺陷,无法实现其最大期望。以增长与利润为基础对高级经理进行激励可能会破坏所有者价值,企业可以采取出让所有权或者以EVA为基础的激励方式,使高级经理的决策行为与所有者最大期望相一致。
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| 关 键 词： | 高级经理 激励机制 经济增长价值 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-5097(2004)06-0157-02 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-05-08 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-05-08 |
Incentive Mechanism of Executives: Financial Inspect |
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| YU You,Zhang Yi. Incentive Mechanism of Executives: Financial Inspect[J]. East China Economic Management, 2004, 18(6): 157-158 |
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| Authors: | YU You Zhang Yi |
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| Affiliation: | Tourism School, Zhejiang Forestry University,Hangzhou 311300,China) |
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| Abstract: | The reason to employ executives is that owners cannot acquire the biggest results of expectations by themselves. It will destroy the owners' value to incent executives by profits or increase. Executives will make decisions according to owners' expectations, if they are incented by EVA or giving ownership. |
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| Keywords: | executives incentive mechanism value of economic increase |
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