Corporate divestitures and family control |
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| Authors: | Emilie R. Feldman Raphael Amit Belén Villalonga |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Management Department, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.;2. Management and Organizations Department, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, New York, U.S.A. |
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| Abstract: | This paper investigates the relationship between divestitures and firm value in family firms. Using hand‐collected data on a sample of over 30,000 firm‐year observations, we find that family firms are less likely than non‐family firms to undertake divestitures, especially when these companies are managed by family rather than non‐family‐CEOs. However, we then establish that the divestitures undertaken by family firms, predominantly those run by family‐CEOs, are associated with higher post‐divestiture performance than their non‐family counterparts. These findings indicate that family firms may fail to fully exploit available economic opportunities, potentially because they pursue multiple objectives beyond the maximization of shareholder value. These results also elucidate how the characteristics of corporate owners and managers can influence the value that firms derive from their corporate strategies. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
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| Keywords: | family firms divestitures corporate strategy agency theory CEOs |
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