After Hayek: On Theodore Burczak’s socialism after Hayek

Burczak reformulates socialism to escape Hayek’s strictures against central planning. While Hayek supports a social safety net as well as other liberal reforms, Burczak points out that these reforms fall outside Hayek’s theoretical framework. We explain that this is because Hayek narrowed the classical economists’ conception of sympathetic agency to imitation and rule following. By contrast, liberal reform proposals follow from the theoretical framework of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. For Smith and Mill, sympathy is a richer concept in which people change places imaginatively with others. Sympathetic agency allows a wide range of other regarding actions and political reforms.

The Sensory Order and other Adaptive Classifying Systems

Synopsis Hayek’s cognitive theory, which seeks to describe the operation of a particular order, in fact provides a paradigmatic account of knowledge-generating orders in general. We claim that this paradigm provides a fertile conceptual framework for exploring a variety of problems in economics and social theory. In particular, we shall show that Hayek’s conception of the ‘map’ and the ‘model’, which he uses to explain the operation of the complex adaptive classifying system called ‘mind’, are promising analytical devices with applications extending to social structures of various kinds and complexity. We use Hayek’s notion of the map and model to analyze how different social structures – regarded as classifying systems – work in terms of their input, processing, and output capabilities. The adaptive characteristics of such systems, via communicative routines, multi-level classification, and feedback, form central motifs for our discussion of markets, science, and other social structures. We show that by analyzing the knowledge-generating characteristics of such structures we are also able to gain insights about the circumstances affecting their adaptive properties.     

Hayek Reads the Literature on the Emergence of Norms

Hayek’s approach to cultural and institutional evolution has been frequently criticized because it is explicitly based on the controversial notion of (cultural) group selection. In this paper this criticism is rejected on the basis of recent works on biological and cultural evolution. The paper’s main contention is that Hayek employed group selection as a tool for the explanation of selection among several equilibria, and not as a vehicle for the emergence of out of equilibrium behavior (i.e., altruism). The paper shows that Hayek’s ideas foreshadowed some of the most promising developments in the current literature on the emergence of norms. JEL Classification: B31, B41     

The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy

This paper is organized as follows: first, we show that the reference to the notion of group selection is coherent with the other parts of Hayek’s thought. Second, we develop the idea that recent works in terms of the emergence and evolution of social norms corroborate in part Hayek’s theses in this domain. Finally, we put to the fore some drawbacks in Hayek’s approach and propose means to solve them.

Is social justice for or against liberty? The philosophical foundations of Mill and Hayek’s theory of liberty

By comparing the philosophical foundations of Mill and Hayek’s theory of liberty, this paper shows that some similarities in the economic theories of Mill and Hayek are actually based on different rationales. It follows that any attempt to find a common thread in Mill and Hayek to provide reasonable guidance for social policy can be promising only if we can find the common ground from their social philosophy. While analyzing the rationales behind their opinions regarding the role of government and taxation policies, this paper will focus on exploring the role of two philosophical ideas, liberty, and justice. This will clarify the relationship between social justice and liberty as well as their status in relation to the ultimate principle of rules in the philosophy of Mill and Hayek. This paper will offer an explanation why, in Mill’s utilitarian philosophy, the pursuit of social justice aligns with the real freedom of everyone, but in Hayek’s philosophy, it is a hindrance.     

From weight watchers to state watchers: Towards a narrative of liberalism

Alan Kahan’s Mind vs. Money: The War between Intellectuals and Capitalism (Transaction Publishers, 2010) treats intellectuals as a class and tells of intellectuals’ yearning to play the role of cleric and aristocrat. Kahan says that intellectuals are necessarily alienated from “capitalism.” In this essay, I discuss Kahan’s erudite and insightful—though sometimes exasperating—work, and I take the opportunity to develop some ideas on the topic, ideas in line with Hayek’s thought.     

F. A. Hayek’s influence on Nobel Prize winners

F.A. Hayek’s broad research program has led some to conclude that his impact on economics has been minimal. This citation study examines the frequency of Nobel laureates cited by other laureates in the official Prize Lectures to understand how elite economists influence other elite economists. It finds that Hayek is the second most frequently mentioned laureate in the Prize Lectures, and he has the second most publication citations of the laureates. Hayek’s influence on the top tier of economists is substantial.

From contract to mental model: Constitutional culture as a fact of the social sciences

This paper develops the concept of constitutional culture—the attitude, thoughts, and feelings about constitutional constraints and the nature, scope, and function of constitutionalism. Constitutional culture is approached as a complex emergent phenomenon bridging Hayekian cognitive and institutional insights. It can be studied as a mental model, a series of expectations and understandings about the constitutional order, how it is, and how it ought to be. The “map” and “model” approach from Hayek’s Sensory Order (1952) is employed to understand how individuals and (cautiously) groups of individuals at the national level approach constitutionalism. This paper goes beyond the more traditional one-size-fits-all approach where all individuals respond uniformly to incentives, as provided by the constitution qua contract. Instead, constitutionalism is tied up in the individual’s vision of the world, that is, what Hayek (1948) labels “the facts of the social sciences.” The paper concludes with four areas where constitutional culture can further the insights of constitutional political economy: comparative political economy, constitutional stickiness, constitutional maintenance, and the new development economics.     

Is H.A. Simon a theoretician of decentralized planning? A comparison with F.A. Hayek on planning,market, and organizations

Herbert A. Simon acknowledged Friedrich A. Hayek as a founder of the notion of bounded rationality; yet Simon considered Hayek’s perspective incomplete, and, more in general, their views on market mechanisms, planning, and organization exhibit considerable differences. The comparison between these authors sheds light on Simon’s interpretation of planning, which emerges within his theory of organization (and not in traditional debates on socialism). Contrary to Hayek, he maintained that planning, in specific circumstances, is more advantageous than the market; and in both administration and organization, it involves a decentralized structure based on near independent sub-units. Decentralization of decisions also appears in social planning, which evolves through continuous interactions among planners (i.e., agents and institutions), and it is a process connoted by the absence of “fixed goals”. Finally, Simon defined modern economies more in terms of “organizational economies” than in those of “market economies” and this highlights a further difference with respect to the Austrian economist. This leads to analysis of the nature of organizations as hierarchical and “near-decomposable” structures, which refers to Simon’s theory of complexity and gives an epistemological explanation to the relation between centralization and decentralization.     

Specialists and citizens all: A reply to Boettke,Koppl, and Holcombe

Peter Boettke (2007) argues that economists need not act pluralistically in order for pluralism to thrive in the marketplace of economic ideas. From a market process perspective, Boettke sees intellectual diversity and openness as catallactic outputs, not inputs—emergent by-products of academic specialization and trade. To expect individual scholars to behave in a pluralistic manner is unnecessary and “completely inappropriate” since it detracts from their central task: “to commit themselves to an approach and pursue it doggedly, even in the face of great doubt and resistance by one’s peers” (Boettke 2007). This paper proposes a Smithian revision of Boettke’s position. The author argues that scholarly pluralism is best understood as a constitutional rule of academic life—a virtue ethic that promotes learning and intellectual freedom by mitigating tyranny and autarky in the republic of science. Drawing from the writings of Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek, Deirdre McCloskey, Bruce Caldwell, James Buchanan, Don Lavoie, and Boettke himself, the author argues that scholarly pluralism has been, and continues to be, a necessary condition for the flourishing of Austrian economists as free, responsible, efficacious thinkers.     

Choosing one’s own informal institutions: on Hayek’s critique of Keynes’s immoralism

In the main, Hayek favored rules that apply equally to all and located such rules in tradition, beyond conscious construction. This led Hayek to attack Keynes’s immoralism, i.e., the position that one should be free to choose how to lead one’s life irrespective of the informal institutions in place. However, it is argued here that immoralism may be compatible with Hayek’s enterprise since Hayek misinterpreted Keynes, who did not advocate the dissolving of all informal rules for everybody. By avoiding this misinterpretation, immoralism can be seen as institutional experimentation at the margin, which Hayek himself favored.

Preference for flexibility in the absence of learning: the risk attitude effect

Individuals’ preferences over opportunity sets may display “preference for flexibility” which prescribes to gradually eliminate alternatives from a given set until a final choice is made. One rationale for this preference for flexibility is individuals’ incentive to postpone the final choice in order to better learn their underlying preferences over basic alternatives. In this paper we show that even in the absence of learning, preference for flexibility arises if individuals are risk-averse or, at least, are not very risk-seeking. Thus, individual’s attitude towards risk provides yet another rationale for preference for flexibility. One of our results is that in the absence of learning, risk-neutral as well as risk-averse individuals display the same, maximal preference for flexibility. We thank Han Bleichrodt, Robert Dur, Chaim Fershtman, Maarten Janssen, Peran van Reeven, Peter Wakker, and Timothy van Zandt for helpful comments to and inspiring discussions. We are very grateful to the anonymous referee for very constructive comments and suggestions.     

Knowledge shifts and the business cycle: When boom turns to bust

Informational cascades can be used to augment the existing Austrian business cycle theory. As first-order users of knowledge know the direct causes of a price change, they transmit this knowledge to second-order users through the price system. Banks with direct knowledge of the sources of the fresh liquidity during a credit-induced boom have knowledge of the boom’s artificial and unsustainable nature. Higher order users lack this direct knowledge and hence continue investing largely ignorant of underlying developments. When first-order users of knowledge sense the boom has run its course, they exit the market, sending a strong signal to higher order knowledge users that the boom has ended—a fragile situation built upon an informational cascade begins collapsing. Simultaneously, the boom is characterized by an influx of capital and knowledge into the financial sector owing to increased profits relative to the real economy stemming from Cantillon effects surrounding the credit injection. As knowledge pertaining to real production has also exited, the bust commences with a misallocated productive structure requiring equilibration to become consistent with consumers’ wants. Actions which inhibit this knowledge from returning to the productive structure will unnecessarily lengthen the time to recovery.     

The origins of meso economics

The paper starts from Schumpeter’s proposition that entrepreneurs carry out innovations (the micro level), that swarms of followers imitate them (meso) and that, as a consequence, ‘creative destruction’ leads to economic development ‘from within’ (macro). It is argued that Schumpeter’s approach can be developed into a new—more general—micro-meso-macro framework in economics. Center stage is meso. Its essential characteristic is bimodality, meaning that one idea (the generic rule) can be physically actualized by many agents (a population). Ideas can relate to others, and, in this way, meso constitutes a structure component of a ‘deep’ invisible macro structure. Equally, the rule actualization process unfolds over time—modelled in the paper as a meso trajectory with three phases of rule origination, selective adoption and retention—and here meso represents a process component of a visible ‘surface’ structure. The macro measure with a view to the appropriateness of meso components is generic correspondence. At the level of ideas, its measure is order; at that of actual relative adoption frequencies, it is generic equilibrium. Economic development occurs at the deep level as transition from one generic rule to another, inducing a change of order, and, at the surface level, as the new rule is adopted, destroying an old equilibrium and establishing a new one.     

Violence against women, social learning, and deterrence

We develop a simple model of sexual and domestic violence. By assumption, the potential victim’s threat to report if she is victimized is not credible, which implies that the only sequential equilibrium involves violence. However, a realistic social learning process converges to a non-sequential equilibrium without violence from all nearby states if the expected punishment for offenders whose victims report to the police is sufficiently high. A policy to increase the sentences for sexual and domestic violence convictions could therefore substantially reduce such violence in the long run, even if it is powerless to make women’s threats to report credible.

Regulation—the corridor to liberalization: the experience of the Israeli phone market 1984–2005

The paper follows the regulatory experience of the Israeli communications industry over the last 20 years, and specifically the impact of the regulatory regime introduced in 1990. Since its initiation phone rates declined sharply, placing them among the lowest in Europe, the incumbent’s profits tripled, and the company’s labor force was slashed by 40 percent. What makes the Israeli experience unique is that throughout the period the monopoly was government owned and the regulatory process has been under government control. The Israeli regulator’s experience, though often running counter to conventional wisdom, seems relevant to two central themes in the new economics of regulation: the impact of the institutional environment on regulatory outcomes, and the effect of the asymmetry in information on the regulatory regime. The author was a member of the second phone-rates review committee, and headed the third and fourth committees.     

Schumpeter’s ‘conduct model of the dynamic entrepreneur’: scope and distinctiveness

Schumpeter formulated a ‘conduct model’ of entrepreneurial behaviour. Received wisdom has emphasised the economic functions of Schumpeter’s entrepreneur, neglecting behavioural aspects. Schumpeter’s model is examined; it posits a continuum of behaviours which are ‘entrepreneurial’, that rely on socially situated, tacit knowledge and are expressions of conscious, subjective rationality. Schumpeter’s model excluded unconscious optimisation and decision rules derived from bounded rationality. Comparisons are drawn with modern neoclassical, Austrian, and the older behavioural characterisations of entrepreneurial behaviour. The newer ‘effectuation’ model of entrepreneurial behaviour is also contrasted with Schumpeter’s approach. We find, among other things, that modern Schumpeterian economics associated with Nelson and Winter is not a natural continuation of Schumpeter’s model. However, some developments in neo-Schumpeterian economics, including the effectuation model deriving from the older behavioural tradition, are congruent with both the original ‘conduct model’ and Schumpeter’s directions for further research.     

增长失衡与政府责任:基于社会性支出角度的分析

There exists a kind of growth imbalance in China’s current development process, which is essentially characterized by the imbalance between the nation’s wealth and the people’s welfare. This paper points out that growth imbalance results mostly from insufficient government social spending on people’s welfare. Consequently, the government should shoulder the basic responsibility for the provision of education, health and social security, quicken the transformation of government expenditure structure and increase the share of social spending, in order to improve the people’s welfare and achieve the rebalancing of growth. The increase in social spending can also promote the accumulation of human capital, which will help the conversion of economic growth pattern and the realization of sustainable and healthy economic development. Translated from Jingji Yanjiu 经济研究 (Economic Research Journal), 2006, (10): 4–17     

Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms

We use a large-scale internet experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers that are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We explore how subjects’ performances depend on their opponents’ learning algorithm. Furthermore, we test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation.     

Liberty and national security in Adam Smith’s possible world

Thomas P. M. Barnett argues that globalization’s spread presents the United States and other liberal democracies with two unprecedented national-security problems, and proposes an ambitious military strategy for their solution. This work argues that a successful strategy to solve one of these problems must also include rational policy, public policy that makes Adam Smith’s simple system of natural liberty a reality. Thus, Barnett’s military strategy and rational policy become complementary elements of a more comprehensive strategy to solve this national-security problem. Knowledge that Smith’s simple system of natural liberty moves the world toward peace can create a need for rational policy among voters.