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规范广告市场的战略思考何焱张廷华根据市场学一般原理,衡量广告市场是否成熟主要有以下标志:广告市场主体是否有强烈的法律意识和自律意识;各市场主体之间是否有科学的专业化分工;市场主体的进入、竞争和经营秩序是否规范有序;广告违法行为是否得到有效制止;市场运... 相似文献
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宋代外商城市居住权探析 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
宋朝发布了不准外商在城市中居住的法律,但多数时候并没有坚决实施。从立法角度看,前者不是统治者的突发奇想;从执法角度看,后者不是统治者无力驾驭社会的表现。本文从中国古代政治、文化和法律制度等方面分析了上述看似互相矛盾的现象。 相似文献
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商业广告对市场集中度的影响历来存在两种争论:广告通过信息传递功能向市场提供更多可供选择的产品来促进市场竞争;广告通过规模经济进入壁垒、产品差别化壁垒和品牌效应壁垒促成垄断。以中国房地产业为例,在对广告与市场集中度之间关系进行理论探讨的基础上,选取2000_2012年中国房地产业的时间序列数据进行多元回归分析,得出广告投入强度对中国房地产业市场集中度产生不强烈的负效应的结论。最后提出应积极协调广告投入与房地产业市场集中度之间关系的政策建议。 相似文献
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广告是现代市场经济生活中最常见的商业文化现象,各种各样的广告通过多种媒体和多种途径向受众传播,形成了当代社会一大文化景观。而语言又是广告最直截了当的表达方式。广告语言的丰富不仅推动了商业社会的经济发展,也推动了语言文化的发展。但是,当广告语言四面八方袭来之时,我们不能不从广告语言表达与广告市场影响度和经济目标实现的关系中,去思考这一具有特质的语言文化现象与其社会运用目的实现状态。从某种意义上看,广告语言发展的社会目的不在于语言本身,而在于经济的要求。通过语言加工一次次展示于社会的广告,其主要目的是让人们… 相似文献
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企业总是追求以最少的广告费用投入产生最大的广告效果这个目标,合理、科学地进行广告预算的分配,使有限的广告经费达到最好的广告效果,使得广告经费的使用范围和分配方法更为明确.本文构建了企业在预算约束下多个市场广告投入模型,研究了企业在多市场的最优广告投入策略及最优广告预算.最后通过算例验证了模型. 相似文献
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唐光海 《技术经济与管理研究》2013,(12):102-106
作为第三方支付的重要组成部分,城市一卡通具有典型的双边市场特性,其持卡人和接入企业的顾客价值是一卡通平台创新的动力和源泉。文章针对一卡通顾客价值创新战略涉及的几个关键问题,对城市一卡通顾客价值创新机制、影响因素进行分析,提出了基于双边顾客价值感知下的城市一卡通顾客价值创新能力培育规划的主要内容:顾客功能价值创新、顾客品牌价值创新、顾客关系价值创新以及顾客价值创新风险。最后针对我国城市一卡通现阶段发展状况和问题提出了一卡通顾客价值创新对策和政策支持建议,为我国各城市发展区域性城市一卡通支付工具提供参考。 相似文献
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We present a model of entry and exit with Bayesian learning and price competition. A new product of initially unknown quality is introduced in the market, and purchases of the product yield information on its true quality. We assume that the performance of the new product is publicly observable. As agents learn from the experiments of others, informational externalities arise.
We determine the Markov Perfect Equilibrium prices and allocations. In a single market, the combination of the informational externalities among the buyers and the strategic pricing by the sellers results in excessive experimentation. If the new product is launched in many distinct markets, the path of sales converges to the efficient path in the limit as the number of markets grows. 相似文献
We determine the Markov Perfect Equilibrium prices and allocations. In a single market, the combination of the informational externalities among the buyers and the strategic pricing by the sellers results in excessive experimentation. If the new product is launched in many distinct markets, the path of sales converges to the efficient path in the limit as the number of markets grows. 相似文献
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Economic institutions determine prospects for growth and development. This paper examines necessary conditions for an economy to support institutions that implement markets. Agents differ in land holdings, skill, and power. A competitive market assigns land to the skilled, not necessarily to the powerful. Therefore a market?allocation needs to be robust to coalitional expropriation. In a dynamic setting, market payoffs may induce sufficient inequality in next period??s endowments for markets to alternate with expropriation in a limit cycle, decreasing efficiency and amplifying macroeconomic fluctuations. Long run stability of markets is favored by higher social mobility, more initial equality, and less mismatch between skill and land. 相似文献
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We extend Akerlof's “Market for Lemons” (1970, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488–500) by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is on display for sale. Overconfident buyers do not update according to Bayes' rule but take the noisy signal at face value. We show that the presence of overconfident buyers can stabilize the market outcome by preventing total adverse selection. However, this stabilization comes at a cost: rational buyers are crowded out of the market. 相似文献
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Wilfred Dolfsma 《Journal of economic issues》2019,53(2):341-348
How markets and firms function is critically related to what knowledge and information is exchanged between whom, how quickly. Exchange of (symbolic) information needs to be properly institutionalized in order to be understood by others, on the one hand, but, on the other hand, cannot avoid being ambiguous to some degree as well (Dolfsma et al. 2011). Ambiguity allows for the dissent that allows for innovation in the broadest sense of the term. Institutionalization of communication is community-specific. The tension between institutionalization of and ambiguity in communication explains why innovations cannot depart too much from what is known and accepted in a community to be (ultimately) accepted as a legitimate novelty. The view of markets and firms as settings for institutionalized communication and knowledge exchange offers a perspective that institutional economists are well positioned for to offer insights on. 相似文献