Social conflict and growth

Despite the predictions of the neoclassical theory of economic growth, we observe that poor countries have invested at lower rates and have not grown faster than rich countries. To explain these empirical regularities we provide a game-theoretic model of conflict between social groups over the distribution of income. Among all possible equilibria, we concentrate on those that are on the constrained Pareto frontier. We study how the level of wealth and the degree of inequality affects growth. We show how lower wealth can lead to lower growth and even to stagnation when the incentives to domestic accumulation are weakened by redistributive considerations.     

Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics

Do societies choose inefficient policies and institutions? An extension of the Coase theorem to politics would suggest the answer is no. This paper discusses various approaches to political economy and develops the argument that there are strong empirical and theoretical grounds for believing that inefficient policies and institutions are prevalent. We conclude that these inefficient institutions and policies are chosen because they serve the interests of politicians or social groups that hold political power at the expense of the rest. The theoretical case depends on commitment problems inherent in politics; parties holding political power cannot make commitments to bind their future actions because there is no outside agency with the coercive capacity to enforce such arrangements. Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003) 620–652.     

Violent conflict and economic growth: Some time-series evidence

This paper uses time-series methods to examine interrelationships between growth and violent conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. Results show bidirectional causalities, but the key determinant of conflict risk is prior conflict experience, not fluctuations in economic growth.     

Habit,aggregation and long memory: evidence from television audience data

Many economic outcomes appear to be influenced by habit or commitment, giving rise to persistence. In cases where the decision is binary and persistent, the aggregation of individual time series can result in a fractionally integrated process for the aggregate data. Certain television programmes appear to engender commitment on the part of viewers and the decision to watch or not is clearly binary. We report an empirical analysis of television audience data and show that these series can be modelled as I(d) processes. We also investigate the proposition that temporal aggregation of a fractionally-integrated series leaves the value of d unchanged.     

Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence

Can a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerge among strangers? We investigate this question by examining behavior in an experiment where subjects repeatedly play a two-player binary “trust” game. Players are randomly and anonymously paired with one another in each period. The main questions addressed are whether a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerges under the most extreme information restriction (anonymous community-wide enforcement) or whether trust and reciprocity require additional, individual-specific information about a player’s past history of play and whether that information must be provided freely or at some cost. In the absence of such reputational information, we find that a social norm of trust and reciprocity is difficult to sustain. The provision of reputational information on past individual decisions significantly increases trust and reciprocity, with longer histories yielding the best outcomes. Importantly, we find that making reputational information available at a small cost may also lead to a significant improvement in trust and reciprocity, despite the fact that most subjects do not choose to purchase this information.     

Trade and civil conflict: Revisiting the cross‐country evidence

We revisit and expand the evidence on the impact of trade shocks on intra‐state conflict by using a large sample of developing countries in the 1960–2010 period. The results suggest that increases in the price of a country's exported commodities raise the country's risk of civil conflict and its duration. The effect on conflict risk is mainly driven by the price of point‐source commodities, in line with the rapacity effect theory of conflict. Intense trading with contiguous countries is associated with lower duration of conflict, consistent with the idea that such trade reduces the incentive of these countries to fuel conflict in their neighbor. Trading with neighbors is also associated with a lower risk of conflict when such trade occurs under trade agreements. On the other hand, we find no support for the opportunity cost theory via exported and imported commodities, nor via the economic cycle in export markets. We also identify a number of conditions under which the changes in the value of exported commodities cease to matter for conflict probability.     

Social motives in intergroup conflict: Group identity and perceived target of threat

We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the perceived target of threat—groups or individuals—and the symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on one׳s own influence on the outcome of the out-group. The perceived target of threat dramatically alters decisions to participate in conflict. When people perceive their group to be under threat, they are mobilized to do what is good for the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally under threat, they are driven to do what is good for themselves and withhold their contribution. The first phenomenon is attributed to group identity, possibly combined with a concern for social welfare. The second phenomenon is attributed to a novel victim effect. Another social motive—reciprocity—is ruled out by the data.     

Effective property rights, conflict and growth

This paper shows how the interaction between conflict and growth can give rise to a nonmonotone relationship between property rights and social welfare. This interaction is illustrated in a model of endogenous growth in which equilibrium diversion of resources is the cost of securing effective property rights. A symmetric equilibrium allocation associated with more secure property rights and faster growth can be Pareto dominated by one associated with poorer property rights and slower growth. Faster growth can exacerbate the problem of diversion whenever property rights are sufficiently poor. These results call for caution before a society decides to pursue economic growth independently of the institutional structure of property rights. Furthermore, if this structure is inappropriate piecemeal reform might not be in the interest of society, and a substantial reform might be necessary if it is to be welfare-improving.     

Democracy, collective action and intra-elite conflict

We analyze a model where there is uncertainty about the future power of two ex-ante symmetric elites to appropriate surplus, and ex-ante surplus sharing agreements are not binding. We show that in an oligarchy, the stronger elite appropriates the entire available surplus, whereas a democracy results in a more balanced surplus allocation between the two elites. In a democracy, the newly enfranchised non-elite organize to act collectively, so that the weaker elite can credibly threaten to form a coalition with the organized non-elite against the stronger elite. Such a threat ensures that the more balanced surplus sharing proposal chosen by majority voting is renegotiation-proof. Therefore, sufficiently risk-averse elites unanimously choose democracy as a form of insurance against future imbalances in relative power. We emphasize that franchise extension to, and low cost of organizing collective political activity for, the non-elite are both necessary features of a democracy. Our formal analysis can account for the stylized facts that emerge from a comparative analysis of Indian and Western European democracies.     

Droughts,conflict, and the African slave trade

Historians have frequently suggested that droughts helped facilitate the African slave trade. By introducing a previously unused dataset on 19th century rainfall levels in Africa, I provide the first empirical examination of this hypothesis. I find a strong negative relationship between rainfall shocks and the number of slaves exported from a given region. I also find that extreme temperature shocks in either direction increase slave exports. Building on the detailed qualitative work of Dias (1981), Miller (1982), and others, I provide quantitative evidence for interethnic group conflict and more localized forms of violence being likely mechanisms through which these additional slaves were acquired. These results contribute to our understanding of the underlying economic conditions of the African slave trade.     

Social protection during recessions: evidence from Chile

This article analyzes the main labor market risk management strategies adopted by the Chilean Government during the 1999 recession that was initially related to the Asian financial crisis. Their successes and failures can suggest innovative social protection solutions for other countries. It seems that the 1999–2001 labor reforms and a three-year plan to increase the minimum wage intensified the recession’s effects on unemployment. Probit models indicate that households coped with the recession’s effects by increasing wives’ labor supply but not by withdrawing children from schools. The expansion of employment programs probably helped households to adopt these coping strategies.     

Social comparisons in wage delegation: experimental evidence

We make two main contributions in this article. We examine whether social comparisons affects workers’ performance when a firm can choose workers’ wages or let them choose their own. Firms can delegate the wage decision to neither, one or both workers in the firm. We vary the information workers receive, finding that social comparisons concerning both wages and decision rights affect workers’ performance. Our second contribution is methodological. We find that our treatment effects are present with both stated effort and a real-effort task, which suggests that both approaches may yield similar results in labor experiments.     

Social norms and gift behavior: Theory and evidence from Romania

In many developing and transitional countries with limited public income redistribution, inter-household transfers in general, and gifts in particular, are sizable and very important. We use unique Romanian survey data that enables us to isolate pure gifts from other private transfers. We explicitly focus on the importance of community-wide social norms, and find that they indeed play a major role for both the occurrence and the values of gifts. More exactly, our results suggest that the overall predominant gift motive among Romanian households is a norm of reciprocity. Moreover, this norm seems to be dominating for gifts to middle- and high-income households. Even though poor households receive to the same extent, norms of both impure altruism and reciprocity tend to be important. Hence, although the poor may not reciprocate gifts to the same extent as the rich, they still receive, since there is a social norm to give, especially to the poor.     

Social benefit expenditures and stagflation: evidence from the United States

Stagflation refers to the terrible economic malaise associated with declining growth, hyperinflation and high unemployment. Unlike previous cost-push explanations such as an overheated labour market and oil prices, this article suggests that social benefit expenditures are a potential cause of stagflation. We investigate the impact of social benefit expenditures on stagflation in the U.S. over the 1950–2014 period by employing an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach to cointegration, which was developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith. The influence of social benefit expenditures on economic growth and inflation and unemployment rates is estimated. The empirical results from the U.S. suggest that economic growth responds negatively to social benefit expenditures, while inflation and unemployment rates are both positively associated with social benefit expenditures. Thus, government-led rigid welfare could contribute to stagflation in the U.S. Instead of increasing people’s happiness, the over-burdened welfare system could push people into economic malaise. This stagflation risk shouldn’t be ignored. These results are important for U.S. policymakers and can inform other governments characterized by high levels of well-being.     

Reputation,Social Identity and Social Conflict

We interpret the psychology literature on social identity and examine its implications. We model a population of agents from two exogenous and well defined social groups. Agents are randomly matched to play a reduced‐form bargaining game. We show that this struggle for resources drives a conflict through the rational destruction of surplus. We assume that the population contains both rational players and behavioral players. Behavioral players aggressively discriminate against members of the other social group. The existence and specification of the behavioral player is motivated by the social identity literature. For rational players, group membership has no payoff‐relevant consequences. We show that rational players can contribute to the conflict by aggressively discriminating and that this behavior is consistent with existing empirical evidence. Our paper relates to the empirical literature which finds that social heterogeneity tends to be increasing in economic variables which we interpret as indicating inefficiency. We provide an explanation that, as social groups compete for surplus, disagreement and inefficiency can result. Our work also relates to the social conflict literature, which examines the relationship between macro level factors such as unemployment and civil disturbances. This literature finds that the amount of social conflict tends to be increasing in the inequitability of the environment.     

Endogenous technological change,income distribution,and unemployment with inter-class conflict

This paper presents a Kaleckian growth model that incorporates endogenous technological change. The model endogenously determines the rate of capacity utilization, the rate of economic growth, income distribution, and the employment rate in addition to technological change. The paper shows that whether or not an increase in the relative bargaining power of workers raises the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate depends on which regime is realized in the long-run equilibrium. If, for example, the long-run equilibrium corresponds to the wage-led growth regime, a rise in the relative bargaining power of workers leads to a decline in the unemployment rate. This result is never obtained from the mainstream NAIRU model.     

Social security and demographic trends: Theory and evidence from the international experience

The worldwide problem with pay-as-you-go, defined-benefits social security systems is not just financial. Through a dynamic, overlapping-generations model where forming a family and bearing and educating children are choice variables, we show that social security taxes and benefits generate incentives to reduce both family formation and fertility, and that these effects cannot be fully neutralized by counteracting inter-temporal or intergenerational transfers within families. We implement the model using calibrated simulations as well as panel data from 57 countries over 32 years. We find that PAYG tax measures account for a non-trivial part of the downward trends in family formation and fertility worldwide, especially in OECD countries.     

Identity and group conflict

We experimentally investigate the effects of real and minimal identities on group conflict. In turn we provide a direct empirical test of the hypotheses coined by Amartya Sen that the salience of a real identity escalates conflict but that of a mere classification would not do so. In a baseline treatment, two groups – East Asians and Caucasians – engage in a group contest, but information on the racial composition of the groups is not revealed. In the minimal identity treatment each group is arbitrarily given a different color code, whereas in the real identity treatment the race information is revealed. Supporting Sen׳s hypotheses, we find that compared to the baseline, free-riding declines and conflict effort increases in the real identity treatment but not in the minimal identity treatment. Moreover, this occurs due to an increase in efforts in the real identity treatment by females in both racial groups.     

Aggregate demand, conflict and capacity in the inflationary process

This paper focuses on an alternative perspective on inflationto that of the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment(NAIRU). It indicates that there are no automatic forces leadingto a level of aggregate demand consistent with constant inflation.Inflationary pressures arise from conflict over income shares,and from cost elements, with the price of raw materials, especiallyoil, being the most important. There are supply-side factorsimpinging on the inflationary process, which arise from thelevel of productive capacity (relative to aggregate demand).The supply-side constraints are viewed as arising from capacityconstraints, rather than from the operation of the labour market.