Does consumption inequality track income inequality in Italy?

This paper presents stylized facts on labor supply, income, consumption, wealth, and several measures of consumption and income inequality drawn from the 1980–2006 Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) conducted by the Bank of Italy. The SHIW provides information on consumption, income and wealth, and a sizable panel component that allows econometricians to estimate sophisticated income, consumption, and wealth processes and to analyze labor market and portfolio transitions. We find that over the sample period income inequality is higher and has grown faster than consumption inequality. Most of the increase in income inequality is related to an increase in the degree of earnings' instability rather than to shifts in the wage structure. We suggest that, in particular, the labor market reforms of the 1990s and 2000s are the most plausible explanation of the increased earnings inequality.     

Wage,income and consumption inequality in Japan, 1981–2008: From boom to lost decades

In this paper we document the main features of the distributions of wages, earnings, consumption and wealth in Japan since the early 1980s using four main data sources: the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS), the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (NSFIE) and the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC). We present an empirical analysis of inequality that specifically considers the path from individual wages and earnings, to household earnings, after-tax income, and finally consumption. We find that household earnings inequality rose substantially over this period. This rise is made up of two distinct episodes: from 1981 to 1996 all incomes rose, but they rose faster at higher percentiles; from 1996 to 2008 incomes above the 50th percentile remained flat but they fell at and below the 50th percentile. Inequality in disposable income and in consumption also rose over this period but to a lesser extent, suggesting taxes and transfers as well as insurance channels available to households helped to insulate household consumption from shocks to wages. We find the same pattern in inequality trends when we look over the life cycle of households as we do over time in the economy. Additionally we find that there are notable differences in the inequality trends for wages and hours between men and women over this period.     

Inequality trends for Germany in the last two decades: A tale of two countries

In this paper we first document inequality trends in wages, hours worked, earnings, consumption, and wealth for Germany from the last twenty years. We generally find that inequality was relatively stable in West Germany until the German reunification, and then trended upwards for wages and market incomes, especially after about 1998. Disposable income and consumption, on the other hand, display only a modest increase in inequality over the same period. These trends occurred against the backdrop of lower trend growth of earnings, incomes and consumption in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. In the second part of the paper we further analyze the differences between East and West Germans in terms of the evolution of levels and inequality of wages, income, and consumption.     

股票财富、信号传递与中国城镇居民消费

本文尝试在消费者最优选择模型基础上,通过引入居民的借贷约束和预防性储蓄,推导出能够检验股市的财富效应、信号传递效应和不对称效应的实证分析框架,并利用中国的季度数据考察中国股市变动对居民消费的影响。与国内相关文献所得结论不同,本文的研究表明:如果不仅考虑股票价格变动的财富效应,而且考虑其信号传递效应,那么中国股票市场对城镇居民消费存在着较为明显的影响。分析也表明,如果用工资而不是人均可支配收入度量人力资本回报,中国股票市场同样存在正的财富效应,且这种财富效应具有明显的不对称性,反映经济基本面变化的股价变动对中国居民消费具有长期影响,投机因素引起的股价变动对中国居民消费的影响甚微。     

The National Wealth–Income Ratio in Greece, 1974–2013

Can the rise of wealth–income ratios observed in rich economies be found in the case of Greece as well? This paper uses a generalization of a two‐good wealth accumulation equation to estimate the evolution of the national wealth–income ratio, and finds that, similarly to the European evidence, the ratio rises from about 280 percent in the 1970s to about 500 percent on the eve of the current financial crisis. On average, during 1974–96, the saving‐induced wealth growth cancels out the capital losses, whereas in the subsequent decade, 1997–2007, the balance changes considerably when the saving effect vanishes and the prolonged capital gains result in a rising wealth–income ratio. During the recession, income falls faster than wealth. The results remain robust to several alterations of the benchmark framework.     

Inequality and the business cycle: A consumption viewpoint

Using Consumer Expenditure Survey data, we obtain summary measures of the distributions of income and consumption for each quarter between 1980 and 1994. We find that the trends in the distribution of income and consumption and the response of these trends to changes in inflation and unemployment were similar during this period. We find that unemployment does not significantly affect the inequality measures and that inflation has a progressive effect, i.e., that a decrease in inflation is associated with an increase in inequality. Finally, we find that the relationship between inequality and macroeconomic variables during the 1990s may be similar to the relationship that existed prior to 1980. First version received: September 1996/final version received: September 1997     

Consumption,Income, and Wealth: Evidence from Age,Cohort, and Period Elasticities

This paper examines the relationship between non‐durable consumption, income, and wealth (housing and financial) allowing explicitly for generational heterogeneity. A framework is proposed to disentangle cohort, age, and period effects and the empirical analysis is based on the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey data. We find that there are significant generational differences and the results highlight the range of elasticities implicit in results presented, thus far, by age groups. Moreover, we find supporting evidence of humped shaped age profiles for the elasticity of consumption with respect to income and the importance of financial wealth for those aged 60+. The framework also allows us to generate cohort profiles which draw attention to the negative role of housing wealth for generation X, and period profiles which reinforce the role of financial wealth for the baby‐boom generation.     

A Behavioral Model of Stock Market Investors' Impact on Consumption

This paper offers a theory of investor/consumer behavior in the context of an adaptive relationship. It shows how consumer spending and stock market gains and losses interact in a "gradual diffusion" process. The model offers predictions about likely changes in investor behavior, and the impact on the underlying economy in general and consumption in particular. These predictions are validated empirically. Specifically, the paper finds that investors/consumers gradually smooth their "wealth spending" and accelerate consumption as they become more convinced that their gains are permanent. This is somewhat reminiscent of the "income smoothing" suggested by Friedman [1957]. We present evidence that the consumption wealth spending peaks at approximately 2.5%-3% of the stock market wealth cumulative gain in the previous twelve- to twenty-four-month period, while concurrent effects are negligible. The results also provide a partial explanation for the long cycle of a strong economy in the 1990s, and point out the danger to the economy from a prolonged stock market decline.     

Wealth and Consumption in Australia

We revisit the evidence on the effect of changes in household wealth on consumption using a panel of Australian states. We find that a one per cent increase in the value of housing wealth increases consumption by about 0.16 per cent in the long-run, with half of the response occurring within two quarters. The size of this response has been stable over time and largely reflects changes in spending on motor vehicles, durable goods and other discretionary items. We then run counterfactual scenarios using the Reserve Bank of Australia's macroeconometric model, MARTIN, to assess the macroeconomic effects of changes in household wealth. We show that increases in household wealth supported household spending between 2013 and 2017, when growth in disposable income was weak.     

Estimating the marginal propensity to consume using the distributions of income,consumption, and wealth

Studies of economic inequality almost always separately examine income, consumption, and wealth inequality, and hence, miss the important synergy amongst the three measures explicit in the life-cycle budget constraint. These joint distributions, however, are important in evaluating macroeconomic impacts of changes in income because the response may differ across the wealth distribution. This heterogeneity in the response to income changes can have significant impact on the effectiveness of government fiscal policy. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from 1999–2013, we examine how the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) differs across the wealth distribution. We find that the MPC is lower at higher wealth quintiles, indicating that low wealth households cannot smooth consumption as much as other households. This implies that increasing wealth inequality likely reduces aggregate consumption, which, in turn, could limit economic growth.     

财富积累、习惯、偏好改变、不确定性与家庭消费决策

在本文中,我们建立了一个相当一般的分析家庭消费与储蓄跨期优化决策问题的理论框架。使用综合了家庭的当期消费、消费习惯、财富积累、偏好改变多种作用影响的效用函数,在家庭劳动收入具有不确定性的情况下,我们导出了家庭消费与储蓄跨期优化决策问题的闭式解,给出了家庭消费函数和欧拉方程的解析式。使用中国农村居民的住户调查数据对理论模型中导出的欧拉方程进行估计的结果表明,除了收入和家庭财富以外,消费习惯和预防性储蓄动机确实也都是影响我国农村居民家庭的消费与储蓄决策的重要因素。     

Income inequality, consumption, and social-status seeking

Using the Chinese Urban Household Survey data between 1997 and 2006, we find that income inequality has a negative (positive) effect on household consumption net of education expenditures (savings) even after we control for household income. We argue that people save to improve their social status when social status is associated with pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits. Rising income inequality can strengthen the incentives of status-seeking savings by increasing the benefit of improving status, and by enlarging the wealth level required for status upgrading. We also find that the negative effect of income inequality on consumption is stronger for poorer and younger people and that income inequality stimulates more education investment, which are consistent with the status-seeking hypothesis.     

Do retirement planning strategies alter the effect of time preference on retirement wealth?

An individual’s willingness to accumulate retirement wealth is influenced by their preference for intertemporal consumption. People with a strong preference for current consumption (high personal discount rate) may choose to save less and face the risk of decreased retirement preparedness. A negative relation between a high personal discount rate and retirement wealth may be reduced when individuals engage in some form of retirement planning. Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we provide evidence that respondents with a high personal discount rate accumulated 37% less retirement wealth, on average, between 2004 and 2008, when compared with respondents with a low personal discount rate. However, when retirement planning strategies were included in the model, there was no statistical difference in retirement wealth between people with high and low personal discount rates. The retirement planning strategies included calculating a retirement income need, hiring a financial planner for retirement or engaging in both of these activities.     

Private Wealth in a Developing Country:Evidence from South Africa

The point of departure of Piketty's influential Capital in the Twenty‐First Century (2014) was the dramatic growth of private wealth‐income ratios in advanced economies between 1970 and 2010. Using official balance sheet data for South Africa—the first country to publish such data in the developing world—, this paper examines to what extent this re‐emergence of private wealth was also experienced in the developing‐country context. First, we find that the South African current wealth‐income ratio is very close to its 1975 level, and much lower than those of Piketty's sample of advanced economies. Second, we show that the discrepancy is explained not only by South Africa's relatively low savings rates, but also by the reduction of wealth before and during the transition to democracy in the 1990s. Since then, private wealth recovered significantly, but the U‐shaped relationship does not support the argument that there is a clear correlation between the capital‐income ratio and capital share.     

国债融资能否影响居民消费需求——基于城镇居民经验数据的实证分析

“传统的政府债务观点”与“李嘉图等价观点”对国债融资的消费效应存在很大的争议.本文基于生命周期假说,将国债幻觉引入基本消费函数,区分私人部门持有的国债资产和其他资产两部分,运用中国宏观经济数据实证分析了国债对城镇居民消费的影响.实证结果表明:国债对城镇居民具有一定的“财富效应”;人均可支配收入仍是居民消费的基础;其他金融资产对城镇居民具有“负”的财富效应,而住房资产对城镇居民而言具有“正”的财富效应.     

Measuring lnequality in the Middle East 1990–2016: The World’s Most Unequal Region?

In this paper we combine household surveys, national accounts, income tax data and wealth data in order to estimate income concentration in the Middle East for the period 1990–2016. According to our benchmark series, the Middle East appears to be the most unequal region in the world, with a top decile income share as large as 64 percent, compared to 37 percent in Western Europe, 47 percent in the US and 55 percent in Brazil (see Alvaredo et al. 2018). This is due both to enormous inequality between countries (particularly between oil‐rich and population‐rich countries) and to large inequality within countries (which we probably under‐estimate, given the limited access to proper fiscal data). We stress the importance of increasing transparency on income and wealth in the Middle East, as well as the need to develop mechanisms of regional redistribution and investment.     

Sticky Consumption and Wealth Effects in Switzerland

When assessing the effect of changes in wealth on household expenditures, most empirical studies have used cointegration‐based approaches. These approaches rely on the existence of a stable long‐run relationship among consumption, wealth, and income. However, in Switzerland no such relationship seems to be present after 2001. Motivated by this issue, this paper applies a recently suggested approach to estimating long‐run wealth effects on consumption that does not rely on cointegration. This new approach relies on sticky consumption growth, which can be motivated by consumption habits or sticky expectations. In both cases, long‐run wealth effects are the result of short‐run reactions of households to changes in wealth which become long‐lasting. Using this methodology, the estimated wealth effects on consumption in Switzerland are larger than suggested by cointegration‐based estimates. Furthermore, the results show that there seems to be a remarkably high degree of consumption stickiness in Switzerland.     

CHANGES IN CANADIAN FAMILY INCOME AND FAMILY CONSUMPTION INEQUALITY BETWEEN 1978 AND 1992

This paper uses Canadian cross-sectional income and expenditure data to examine changes in the distribution of family income and family consumption during the period 1978 to 1992. Family consumption data are analyzed because in the presence of intertemporal consumption smoothing, the cross-sectional distribution of consumption may characterize the distribution of lifetime wealth. I find that both Canadian family income inequality and Canadian family consumption inequality moved countercyclically. In addition, both Canadian family income inequality and Canadian family consumption inequality trended upward over the period; however, the change in family consumption inequality was much smaller than the change in family income inequality, suggesting that inequality in the distribution of lifetime wealth may have changed much less than is suggested by changes in the distribution of income.     

Consumption and Wealth in Australia

This paper examines the relationship between consumption and wealth in Australia. We find a steady-state relationship between non-durables consumption, labour income and aggregate household wealth for the period 1988–1999. We also find that changes in both non-financial and financial assets have significant but different short-run and long-run effects in dynamic consumption models. Finally, we place our results within the broader empirical literature and examine whether they are consistent with standard theories of consumption.