Consumer preferences,the demand for Divisia money,and the welfare costs of inflation

This paper uses neoclassical demand theory to calculate the welfare costs of inflation. It considers the demand interactions between money, consumption goods, and leisure, relaxes the assumption of fixed consumer preferences, and addresses the inter-related problems of estimation of money demand functions, instability of money demand relations, and monetary aggregation. It makes full use of the relevant economic theory and econometrics and generates inference in terms of long-run welfare costs of inflation that is internally consistent with the data and models used.     

Currency substitution,inflation, and welfare

Currency substitution affects the mapping between social welfare and inflation by altering the underlying money demand function and influencing interest rates. In order to explore the essence of this effect, I build a model with working capital under which foreign currency is substituted with the less liquid components of domestic money. The framework closely mimics the actual pattern of currency substitution across varying rates of inflation and enables the study of an additional channel that works through the impact of currency substitution on interest rates. It is found that there is a threshold inflation rate, which turns out to be 44% under baseline calibration, below which currency substitution decreases welfare and vice versa. A practical implication is that, at inflation rates lower (greater) than the threshold, the potential welfare gains from disinflation to a near-zero inflation rate are higher (lower) if there is currency substitution than otherwise.     

Search, money, and inflation under private information

I study monetary exchange and inflation when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay for certain goods. Introducing imperfect information in the Lagos-Wright [A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis, J. Polit. Economy 113(3) (2005) 463-484] economy shows that the existence of monetary equilibrium is a more robust feature of the environment. In general, my model has a monetary steady state in which only a proportion of the agents hold money. Agents who do not hold money cannot participate in trade in the decentralized market. The proportion of agents holding money is endogenous and depends (negatively) on the level of expected inflation. As in Lagos and Wright's model, in equilibrium there is a positive welfare cost of expected inflation, but the origins of this cost are very different.     

Endogenous growth, welfare and budgetary regimes

Within an optimizing endogenous growth model with productive public capital and government debt, we derive and characterize on the balanced growth path a set of welfare-maximizing fiscal rules under different budgetary regimes. It is shown that optimal fiscal policy depends on the specific budgetary stance considered.     

Demand for money and expected inflation

The role of the expected rate of inflation in the demand for money has been highly controversial both at the theoretical and the empirical level. This note critically discusses these issues and puts forward a hypothesis accounting for the significance of expected inflation in money demand equations which is corroborated by an empirical investigation of the Italian experience, particularly suited for this specific experiment.     

Tight money policies and inflation revisited

In this paper we reconsider the link between tight money policies and inflation in the spirit of Sargent and Wallace's (1981) influential paper, 'Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic.' A standard neoclassical model with capital, bonds, and return-dominated currency is used. The potential for tight-money policies to be inflationary (unpleasant arithmetic) exists, even when the real interest rate is below the growth rate of the economy. Additionally, the likely observability of unpleasant arithmetic in real world economies is shown to depend crucially on the type of monetary policy rule that is used. JEL Classification: E52, E63
Un autre coup d'œil sur la relation entre politiques monétaires restrictives et inflation. Ce mémoire ré-examine la relation entre politiques monétaires restrictives et inflation dans l'esprit du travail de Sargent et Wallace (1981) 'Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic'. Les auteurs utilisent un modèle néo-classique standard avec capital, débentures et une monnaie dont les rendements sont dominés par ceux d'autres réservoirs de valeur. La possibilité que les politiques monétaires restrictives soient inflationnistes existe même quand le taux d'intérêt réel est plus petit que le taux de croissance de l'économie De plus on montre que l'obtention de ces résultats déplaisants dans les économies concrètes dépend fondamentalement du type de règle monétaire qu'on utilise.     

Endogenous skill heterogeneity and inflation

This paper examines the implications of ex ante skill heterogeneity for long run inflation. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which there are two types of labor (skilled and unskilled), two types of capital (human and physical), and money is introduced via a cash in advance constraint on consumption purchases. Skill heterogeneity is characterized in terms of (i) a parameter governing the ease with which the two types of labor can be substituted for each other in production; and (ii) the “productivity” of human capital in the production of skill. The model includes the accumulation of human capital which in turn creates skill heterogeneity among workers through an efficiency wage mechanism. Numerical experiments indicate that there is a range of parameter estimates in which the Friedman Rule may not be optimal. Furthermore, our quantitative experiments also indicate that there is a range of parameter values in which a greater degree of skill heterogeneity may be associated with a greater preference for inflation. Empirically, we also find that the inflation and heterogeneity correlation is positive.     

State-dependent pricing, inflation, and welfare in search economies

We investigate the welfare effects of inflation in economies with search frictions and menu costs. We first analyze an economy where there is no transaction demand for money balances: Money is a mere unit of account. We determine a condition under which strictly positive inflation is desirable. We relate this condition to a standard efficiency condition for search economies. Second, we consider a related economy in which there is a transaction role for money. In the absence of menu costs, the Friedman rule is optimal. In the presence of menu costs, the optimal inflation rate is negative for our numerical examples provided menu costs are small. A deviation from the Friedman rule can be optimal depending on the extent of the search externalities.     

The relationship between government deficits, money growthm and inflation

We model the time-series relationship between Federal government deficits, base-money growth, and inflation as a trivariate autoregressive process. The technique is a generalization of Hsiao's (1979; 1981) bivariate autoregressive modeling method, but also incorporates several recent contributions by Caines, Keng, and Sethi (1981) and Lutkepohl (1982). The results indicate that for the 1960s, both government deficits and inflation are econometrically exogenous. But, for the 1950s and the 1970s, government deficits, money growth, and inflation are all causally related.     

Deficit spending,money, and inflation: Some international empirical evidence

An attempt is made, in this study, to examine the monetarist propositions regarding the effects of budget deficits on money growth and inflation for ten industrialized countries. To this end, a two-equation econometric model consisting of the money supply growth and inflation equations has been specified and estimated. Based on the results, it is concluded that, in general, the government budget deficit is not a determinant of money supply growth or of inflation (directly or indirectly). The U.S. is an exception with some statistical evidence of direct and indirect effects of the budget deficit on inflation.     

Endogenous money and the business cycle

The theory of endogenous money has tended to reduce to a debate over the slope of the LM. This is because endogenous money is a dynamic phenomenon, and its implications are masked in static models such as ISLM. This paper examines the role of endogenous money in credit-driven business cycles. A key distinction concerns that between bank and direct credit. The former is more expansionary because it involves creation of new money balances, whereas the latter involves transfer of existing money balances. The paper provides a simulation revealing instability emerges at a lower debt-income ratio as the share of bank debt in total debt rises.     

Review article. Kalecki on imperfect competition, inflation and money

This paper reviews the final two volumes of Kalecki's CollectedWorks. It first discusses, based on the papers in Vol. VI, hiscontributions on cartels, on Nazi Germany, the development ofindices of business fluctuations and of national income accounts,and the movement of prices and costs over the business cycle.Drawing on the papers reproduced in Vol. VII, this paper continuesby discussing Kalecki's writings on rationing, inflation, imperfectcompetition and unemployment, money and finance, the nationaldebt and the welfare state, international economic arrangements,the post-war American economy and econometrics and methodology.     

Budget deficits,money growth and inflation: the Turkish evidence

The paper investigates the long-run relationships between budget deficits, inflation and monetary growth in Turkey considering two alternative trivariate systems corresponding to the narrowest and the broadest monetary aggregates. While the joint endogeneity of money and inflation rejects the validity of the monetarist view, lack of a direct relationship between inflation and budget deficits makes the pure fiscal theory explanations illegitimate for the Turkish case. Consistent with the policy regime of financing domestic debt through the commercial banking system, budget deficits lead to a growth not of currency seigniorage but of broad money in Turkey. This mode of deficit financing, leading to the creation of near money and restricting the scope for an effective monetary policy, may not be sustainable, as the government securities/broad money ratio cannot grow without limit.     

Endogenous supply of fiat money

We consider whether reputation concerns can discipline the behavior of a long-lived self-interested agent who has a monopoly over the provision of fiat money. We obtain that when this agent can commit to a choice of money supply, there is a monetary equilibrium where it never overissues. We show, however, that monetary equilibria with no overissue do not exist when there is no commitment. This happens because the incentives this agent has to maintain a reputation for providing valuable currency disappear once its reputation is high enough. More generally, we prove that in the absence of commitment overissue happens infinitely often in any monetary equilibrium. We conclude by showing that imperfect memory can restore the positive result obtained with commitment.     

Population ageing and inflation with endogenous money creation

This paper models a mechanism through which population ageing may induce a deflationary process. We propose an overlapping-generations model (OLG) with money created by credits (inside money) and intergenerational trade. The model links demographic factors, such as fertility rates and longevity, to prices. We show that lower fertility rates lead to smaller demand for credit and lower money creation, which in turn cause a decline in prices. Changes in longevity affect prices through real savings and the capital market. Furthermore, a few links between interest rates and inflation are addressed; they arise in the general equilibrium and are not thoroughly discussed in literature. Long-run results are derived analytically; short-run dynamics are simulated numerically.     

Endogenous uncertainty and the non-neutrality of money

Summary. We study some implications of the Theory of Rational Beliefs to monetary policy. We show that monetary policy in a Rational Beliefs environment can have an important effect on the characteristics of economic fluctuations. In Rational Beliefs Equilibria money is generically non-neutral unlike Rational Expectations Equilibria in which money is neutral and monetary policy is ineffective. Under Rational Beliefs Equilibria nominal prices and real output change not only in response to changes in the exogenous growth rate of money but also in response to changes in the state of beliefs. In Rational Beliefs Equilibria monetary shocks have real effects even when they are observed but are not fully anticipated. Furthermore, the non-neutrality of money results in a short run Phillips curve. When money “flutters, real output sputters” [8]. We show that Endogenous Uncertainty and the distribution of market beliefs are the major explanatory variables of such fluctuations. Under Rational Expectations monetary policy is ineffective because agents neutralize it by predicting correctly the effect of the policy. Under Rational Beliefs it is shown instead that inflation and recessions can be substantially aggravated by the distribution of market beliefs. Received: January 14, 2002; revised version: April 5, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I would like to thank Mordecai Kurz for his constant help and support. Most of the ideas developed hereby have been inspired by innumerable and fruitful discussions with him. I have also greatly benefited from helpful comments by Stanley Black, Luigi Campiglio, Carsten Nielsen and Ho-Mou Wu. I also received valuable remarks from participants at the V meeting of “The Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory” held in Ischia, Italy, on July 2-8, 2001, where an initial draft of the present work was presented.     

On Hayek's denationalization of money,free banking and inflation targeting 1

Abstract

Recent central bank experience with inflation targeting is used to restate Hayek's reform proposal as a performance contract. This requires banks to first state an explicit inflation target and then promise to perform a set of actions whenever an independent forecast departs from target. Making such actions explicit and observable makes the promise of price stability offered by competing banks operational and enforceable. Competition among banks then leads to convergence on current best practice in the short term and to faster performance evolution as the incentive to innovate induces improvements over the long term.     

Optimal inflation in a model of inside money

There are several models of outside money in which some inflation accomplished through lump-sum transfers is optimal. It is shown here that inflation can be optimal in a model of inside money, essentially the model in Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999). The possibility of inflation comes about via the trades between people who can issue inside money, monitored people, and those who cannot, nonmonitored people. Inflation occurs at the optimum if the monitored people spend more in such meetings when they are buyers than they receive in such meetings when they are sellers.     

A long-run,short-run,and politico-economic analysis of the welfare costs of inflation

The long-run, short-run, and politico-economic welfare implications of inflation are assessed in a Bewley model of money demand. All agents produce and consume every period, and hold money to self-insure against idiosyncratic risk. The model is calibrated so the equilibrium monetary distribution shares features with US data. The long-run welfare costs of inflation are shown to be large because inflation reduces the ability of money to mitigate risk. However, the beneficial redistributive effect of inflation is magnified along the short-run transition and reduces the overall costs. These short-run benefits result in a majority-rule inflation rate above the Friedman Rule.     

Endogenous neighborhood effects on welfare participation

This article examines the impact of neighborhood welfare participation on individual welfare participation, that is, the endogenous neighborhood effects. Endogenous neighborhood effects generate social multipliers. Few existing empirical studies on neighborhood effects distinguish between endogenous neighborhood effects and exogenous neighborhood effects, that is, the effects of neighborhood characteristics. This article constitutes an early attempt to identify and estimate endogenous and exogenous neighborhood effects separately. I construct an instrumental variable for neighborhood welfare participation rate based on the variation in welfare benefits and neighborhood demographic composition to address the reflection problem and the omitted neighborhood variables problem. A two-step method is proposed to separately estimate endogenous and exogenous neighborhood effects. The results show that neighborhood welfare participation plays an important role in a woman’s welfare participation both before and after the welfare reform in 1996.