Two-sided uncertainty in the monopoly agenda setter model

We extend the Romer-Rosenthal model of representative democracy to a signaling environment, in which (i) only the representatives knows the ‘status quo’ outcome resulting if her take-it-or-leave-it policy proposal is rejected by the voters, while (ii) only the voters know their true preferences over policies. A separating sequential equilibrium is shown to exist, and to uniquely satisfy a common equilibrium refinement. Furthermore, this equilibrium has the property that, relative to the environment where the status quo is known to the voter, there is a downward bias in the setter's proposal, and an associated upward bias in the probability of the proposal's acceptance by the voter.     

Large market games with demand uncertainty

We consider a market game with a continuum of consumers, where the measure of each type is stochastic. Nature selects the set of active consumers, who make bids and offers on ?−1 spot market trading posts. Existence of type-symmetric Nash equilibrium is proven. When facing price uncertainty, best responses are unique, and a Nash equilibrium to the sell-all game is typically not a Nash equilibrium to the original game. Under plausible circumstances, consumers strictly prefer to be on one side of the market.     

Sequential capacity and price choices in a duopoly model with demand uncertainty

The paper is a revised version of chapter V of my thesis (Hviid, 1987). I would like to thank Huw Dixon, Clive Fraser, Birgit Grodal, Norman Ireland, Michael Teit Nielsen, Kevin Roberts, Peter Skott, and Bente Villadsen for helpful comments and discussion, and a referee for helpful suggestions. An earlier version was presented at the Universities of Aarhus, Copenhagen, Essex and Warwick. I am grateful to participants for many helpful suggestions and comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Financial support from The Danish Social Science Research Council is gratefully acknowledged.     

Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly under demand uncertainty

This paper analyzes a Hotelling-type game in a mixed oligopoly, where firms can either enter the market in period 1, facing demand uncertainty, or postpone their entry, in order to acquire complete information. It is shown that, for a high (low) level of uncertainty, there is a pure (mixed)-strategy equilibrium. Moreover, the standard result in the literature—that uncertainty is a differentiation force, is only possible when the degree of uncertainty is small. An increase in the degree of uncertainty could force firms to delay their entry and lead to a socially optimal outcome.     

The value of information in oligopoly with demand uncertainty

This paper discusses the value of information in supermodular and submodular games, using a simple duopoly model where the level of demand is uncertain. It is shown that the value of information issuperadditive (resp.,subadditive) between players if the game issupermodular (resp.,submodular). For example, in a Bertrand (resp., Cournot) market with (possibly imperfect) substitute products, one firm's information acquisition increases (resp., decreases) the other firm's incentive to acquire the same information. Furthermore, when the game is either supermodular or submodular, the value of information is higher when the player isexpected to be informed according to the opponent's belief than when the player is expected to be uninformed; this result is reversed when the game has asymmetric modularity (i.e., one player's action is substitutional to the other's, and the latter's action is complemental to the former's). These qualitative observations have a potential to be applied to a larger class of games with uncertainty where payoffs are smooth (e.g., twice continuously differentiable) in actions and states.     

Strategic technology choice in regulated markets with demand uncertainty

This paper presents a simple model of a non-competitive market with demand uncertainty in which firms can choose their technology of production. Technology is characterised by two parameters: capacity and flexibility. The first has a strong commitment value while flexibility is needed to face uncertainty. Lack of competition requires active regulation to ensure that the price is not set at excessive level. When choosing their technology, firms take into account not only the effects of this choice on the opponent(s) but also the effect on the regulated price. In this framework, and because of regulation, firms have an incentive to strategically manipulate their cost (cost padding). This causes monopoly regulation aiming at improving allocative efficiency to be ineffective. In fact, by “tying its hand” to a low level of capacity, the monopolistic firm is able to get round the constraint imposed by the regulator. Increasing the number of firms in the market may restore regulation effectiveness. The reason is that if demand is sufficiently volatile, then firms strategically choose flexible techniques and this effect dominates over the incentive to manipulate costs in order to escape regulation. In this case, regulation is effective precisely because cost padding is hampered by firms’ non-cooperative behaviour.

Auctions with a buy price

eBay and Yahoo allow sellers to list their auctions with a buy price at which a bidder may purchase the item immediately. On eBay, the buy-now option disappears once a bid is placed, while on Yahoo the buy-now option remains in effect throughout the auction. We show that when bidders are risk averse, both types of auctions raise seller revenue for a wide range of buy prices. The Yahoo format raises more revenue than the eBay format when bidders have either CARA or DARA. Bidders with DARA prefer the eBay auction, while bidders with CARA are indifferent between the two. Part of this work was completed while Reynolds was a visitor at Instituto de Analisys Economico in Barcelona and while Wooders was a visitor at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. We are grateful to these institutions for their hospitality.     

On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing

Under partial responsibility, the ranking of cost shares should never contradict that of demands.The Solidarity axiom says that if agent i demands more, j should not pay more if k pays less. It characterizes the quasi-proportional methods, sharing cost in proportion to `rescaled' demands.Full responsibility rules out cross-subsidization for additively separable costs. Restricting solidarity to submodular cost characterizes the fixed-flow methods, containing the Shapley-Shubik and serial methods.The quasi-proportional methods meet—but most fixed-flow methods fail—Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents increase their demands, not all of them pay less. Serial cost sharing is an exception.     

Economic policy uncertainty and demand for money in Australia

The demand for money has received a great deal of attention in the empirical literature. This literature, however, has emphasized factors such as interest rate, income, inflation rate and exchange rate as the primary determinants of money demand. Although an emerging strand of literature examines uncertainty as a potential determinant of money demand, findings have been mixed. Using a news-based Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index and Australian quarterly data from 1998 to 2017, we study the impact of policy uncertainty on demand for money. Autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) results show that the economic policy uncertainty measure has a negative short-run effect on the demand for money, suggesting the wider public hedge against future expected inflation, and positive long-run effect, whereby the broader public hold more cash to stay liquid during times of economic uncertainty. Also, introducing nonlinearity into the money demand equation, we find an asymmetric effect, more in favour of currency appreciations, supporting the expectations effect of further appreciations in exchange rate movements.     

Nominal vs real adjustment in demand for money functions

Recently, Fair (1987) has addressd an interesting question in the areas of demand for money, namely, whether the adjustment of actual to desired demand for money is in nominal or real terms. His conclusion, based on time-seies analysis for twenty-seven countries, including a few developing countries, was that the evidence was overwhelmingly in favour of the nominal hypothesis.

The aim of this paper is to address the same issue for eleven Asian countries. In the process, a reformulation of the test procedure used by Fair is suggested. In addition, the question is also examined within the framework of the error correction model. The models are also tested for structural stability.

The scheme of the paper is as follows. The models and the tests are specified in Section I. The data and the estimation issues are dealt with in Section II. Section III presents the results. The paper is concluded with a brief summary of the major findings.     

The demand for marijuana, tobacco and alcohol: inter-commodity interactions with uncertainty

This paper analyses consumption patterns of marijuana, tobacco and alcohol. To deal with imperfect marijuana data, we exploit the interdependencies in the consumption of the three drugs identified in prior research, and introduce a Monte Carlo simulation procedure to formally account for the inherent uncertainty in marijuana-related data and parameters. To illustrate the application of the framework, we use Australian data to simulate the impact on consumption of the legalisation of marijuana, which is then subject to taxation. Under the base-case scenario and when the marijuana risk premium is 200%, taxing marijuana at the same rate as tobacco is estimated to yield additional revenue of about 24% of the pre-existing proceeds from taxation of tobacco and alcohol. The role of uncertainty surrounding marijuana is highlighted by providing the entire probability distributions of all endogenous variables in a consistent multivariate framework.     

Vertically integrated producer when a rival is also a customer: impact of demand uncertainty

When a vertically integrated producer (VIP) is also a supplier of a component for its rival firm, it was found that the profit in a decentralized structure is higher for the VIP than the profit in a centralized structure under deterministic demand. In contrast, we found that firms’ ordering decisions under uncertain demand can reverse this findings and it is more likely to happen as demand variability increases.     

Mixed pricing in oligopoly with limited monopoly

We analyze price competition between two brands. Buyers consist of switchers and two segments of customers with limited brand loyalty. We identify a unique symmetric mixed-strategy price equilibrium and find that competition is most relaxed when there exists some switchers.     

Optimal pricing of a two-sided monopoly platform with a one-sided congestion effect

This paper studies the optimal pricing of a two-sided monopoly platform when one side is affected by congestion. We show that the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy (or skewed pricing) depends not only on the relative magnitude of the sides’ price elasticities of demand but it also depends on the marginal congestion cost that an agent imposes on the others. Compared with the no-congestion case, this pricing strategy gives rise to some interesting features that violate the results of Rochet and Tirole (J Eur Econ Assoc 1:990–1029 in 2003, Rand J Econ 37:645–667 in 2006). In the case of equal price elasticities of demand, the no-congested side is charged the highest price. On the other hand, in the case of different price elasticities, the platform congestion pricing depends on a certain threshold of the marginal congestion cost. We show, under some conditions, that the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy is reversed. In the social context, the Rochet and Tirole’s (J Eur Econ Assoc 1:990–1029 in 2003) cost allocation condition is modified by the congestion cost. We show that the congestion does not only affect the buyers’ contribution to the sellers’ surplus, but it also affects the sellers’ contribution to the buyers’.