Certification of corporate social responsibility activities in oligopolistic markets

Abstract We investigate the impact of alternative certifying institutions on firms’ incentives to engage in costly Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities as well as their relative market and societal implications. We find that the CSR certification standard is the lowest under for‐profit private certifiers and the highest under a Non Governmental Organization (NGO), with the standard of a welfare‐maximizing public certifier lying in between. Yet, regarding industry output, this ranking is reversed. Certification of CSR activities is welfare enhancing for consumers and firms and should be encouraged. Finally, the market and societal outcomes of CSR certification depend crucially on whether certification takes place before or after firms’ CSR activities.     

Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives

In this paper we are analyzing a mixed quantity-setting duopoly consisting of a socially concerned firm and a profit-maximizing firm. The socially concerned firm considers one group of stakeholders in its objective function and maximizes its profit plus a share of consumer surplus. Both firms have the option to hire a manager who determines the production quantity on behalf of the firm's owner. We find that in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game both firms hire a manager and delegate the production choice. If the unit production costs of the firms are similar, then the socially concerned firm has a higher market share and even higher profit. Interestingly, we observe that the relationship between the share of consumer surplus taken into account by the socially concerned firm and its profit is non-monotonic. As the share increases, the socially concerned firm's profit first increases and then decreases. The conclusion is that it pays off to take stakeholder interests into account, but not too much.     

Do food standards affect the quality of EU imports?

This paper investigates the relationship between the diffusion of EU standards and product quality upgrading using highly disaggregated import data to the EU in the food industry. Results show that, on average, the diffusion of EU voluntary standards boosts the rate of quality upgrading. However, the results are heterogeneous when moving from primary to processed foods, and from ISO to non-ISO standards.     

Network Effects on Trade in Intermediate Goods: Evidence from the Automobile Industry

Growing production fragmentation makes the analysis of network effects on trade in intermediate goods more important than ever. The present study measures network effects on auto parts exports from 6 major auto producing countries using a panel data set covering 49 destinations and 31 products from 2002 to 2008. In contrast to prior research, the present study finds that in the case of Japanese automakers, overseas production by subsidiary plants is less important in determining auto parts exports from Japan than it is for the other major auto producing countries. Such uniqueness could be led by the higher reliance on domestic procurements of overseas subsidiaries of Japanese automakers as a result of the transfer of the vertical networks between automakers and parts suppliers formed in Japan.     

Productivity effects of international outsourcing: evidence from plant-level data

Abstract.  We investigate the impact of international outsourcing on productivity using plant-level data for Irish manufacturing. Specifically, we distinguish the effect of outsourcing of materials from services inputs. Moreover, we examine whether the impact on productivity is different for plants being more embedded in international markets through exporting or being part of a multinational. Our results show robust evidence for positive effects from outsourcing of services inputs for exporters, either domestic or foreign owned. By contrast, we find no statistically significant evidence of an impact of international outsourcing of services on productivity for firms not operating on the export market.     

Determinants of vertical integration in export processing: Theory and evidence from China

This paper examines the determinants of vertical integration versus outsourcing in export processing, by exploiting the coexistence of two export processing regimes in China, which designate by law who owns and controls the imported components. Based on a variant of the Antràs-Helpman (2004) model, we show theoretically that control over imported components for assembly can affect firm integration decisions. Our empirical results show that when Chinese plants control the use of components, the export share of foreign-owned plants is positively correlated with the intensity of inputs provided by the headquarter (capital, skill, and R&D). These results are consistent with the property-rights theory of intra-firm trade. However, when foreign firms own and control the components, there is no evidence of a positive relationship between the intensity of headquarters' inputs and the prevalence of vertical integration. The results are consistent with our model that considers control over imported components as an alternative to asset ownership to alleviate hold-up by export-processing plants.     

Quantifying the impact of services liberalization in a developing country

We compare goods versus services liberalization in terms of welfare, outputs, and factor prices in Tunisia using a CGE model with multiple products, services and trading partners. Restraints on services trade involve both cross-border supply (tariff-equivalent price wedges) and on foreign ownership (monopoly-rent distortions and inefficiency costs). Goods-trade liberalization yields a modest gain in aggregate welfare. Reducing service barriers generate relatively large welfare gains and low adjustment costs. Services liberalization increases economic activity in all sectors and raise the real returns to both capital and labor. The results point to the potential importance of deregulating services provision for economic development.     

Product market competition and boundaries of the firm

Abstract .  This paper studies the effects of product market competition on firm boundaries. In a duopoly setting, each retailer is associated with a manufacturer who must decide how to allocate property rights over a retail asset. Delegating property rights over the retail asset to an indepedent retailer ('disintegration') transfers incentives from the manufacturer to the retailer and has the benefit of increasing product quality and profits, owing to the retailer's superior efficiency. However, it also forces the manufacturer to forfeit part of the profits. Competition increases the net benefit from delegation and leads to more efficient, vertically disintegrated structures.     

Economic rents in franchising: Do they exist?

This work demonstrates the very existence of economic rents in franchising using, for the first time, the franchisees’ actual financial statements. This finding makes franchising more appealing for applicants and supports the hypothesis that rents are efficient devices to motivate franchisees.     

Paying not to sell

In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.     

Incentives,supervision, and sharecropper productivity

Though sharecropping remains widespread, its determinants are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. We address both issues by analyzing the role of landlord supervision. When landlords vary in their cost of supervision, otherwise identical share-tenants can have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from share-tenants in rural Pakistan confirms that, controlling for selection, ‘supervised’ tenants are significantly more productive than ‘unsupervised’ ones. Also, landlords' decisions regarding monitoring and incentives offered to tenants depend importantly on the cost of supervision.     

Unemployment Benefits and Entrepreneurship

Several recent empirical papers show that unemployment benefits crowd out nascent entrepreneurs. In the present paper provide theoretical support in favour of this interesting result. Over fairly general preference patterns we obtain a measure of the opportunity cost of entrepreneurs in the presence of unemployment benefits and derive conditions under which potential entrepreneurs suffer as unemployment benefits rise. We formulate a clear transmission mechanism in the labour market that links unemployment benefits to occupational choice for a group of risk‐averse individuals.     

On intrabrand and interbrand competition: The strategic role of fees and royalties

We examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition. We characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty (or wholesale price) and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms. Royalties control competition between own downstream firms at the expense of making them passive against rivals. When the number of downstream firms is endogenous, each upstream firm chooses to have only one downstream firm. This result is in sharp contrast to previous literature where competitors benefit by having a larger number of independent downstream firms under only fixed fee payments. We discuss why allowing upstream firms to charge per-unit payments in addition to fixed fees dramatically alters their strategic incentives.     

Subcontractors for tractors: Theory and evidence on flexible specialization,supplier selection,and contracting

Buyer–Seller networks are pervasive in developing economies yet remain relatively understudied. Using primary data on contracts between the largest tractor assembler in Pakistan and its suppliers we find large variations in prices and quantities across suppliers of the same product. Surprisingly, “tied” suppliers – those that choose higher levels of specific investments – receive lower and more unstable orders and lower prices. These results are explained by developing a simple model of flexible specialization under demand uncertainty. A buyer faces multiple suppliers with heterogeneous types to supply customized parts. Specific investments raise surplus within the relationship but lower the seller's flexibility to cater to the outside market. Higher quality suppliers have a greater likelihood of selling outside and so this cost is greater for them. Therefore even if a buyer typically prefers high types, some low type suppliers might be kept as marginal suppliers because of their greater willingness to invest more in buyer-specific assets. Further empirical examination shows that the more tied suppliers are indeed of lower quality.     

Beyond the average effects: The distributional impacts of export promotion programs in developing countries

Do all exporters benefit the same from export promotion programs? Surprisingly, no matter how obvious this question may a priori be when thinking of the effectiveness of these programs, there is virtually no empirical evidence on how they affect export performance in different parts of the distribution of export outcomes. This paper aims at filling this gap in the literature. We assess the distributional impacts of trade promotion activities performing efficient semiparametric quantile treatment effect estimation on assistance, total sales, and highly disaggregated export data for the whole population of Chilean exporters over the 2002-2006 period. We find that these activities have indeed heterogeneous effects over the distribution of export performance, along both the extensive and intensive margins. In particular, smaller firms as measured by their total exports seem to benefit more from export promotion actions.     

Vertical integration, raising rivals’ costs and upstream collusion

This paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of the input is linear. As a first step, the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest discount factor in the infinitely repeated game when one firm is vertically integrated. It turns out this is the joint-profit maximum of the colluding firms. The discount factor needed to sustain this equilibrium is then shown to be unambiguously lower than the one needed for collusion in the separated industry. While the previous literature has found it difficult to reconcile raising-rivals’-costs strategies following a vertical merger with equilibrium behavior in the static game, they are subgame perfect in the repeated game studied here.     

Forward contracts and competition

This paper examines the strategic use of forward contracts in an industry where downstream firms must buy an essential input from imperfectly competitive upstream suppliers. When a single large firm and a fringe of firms exist downstream, the large firm buys forward contracts from the fringe, i.e. there is horizontal subcontracting from the large firm to the firms on the fringe, in order to make the spot market less competitive. Hence our paper argues that horizontal subcontracting becomes an anti-competitive device. We also compare the strategies of buying forward contracts and purchasing productive capacity and we find that both are equivalent tools. When the downstream industry has instead several large firms, they have a “horizontal” incentive to sell forward contracts in order to gain market share, but the former “vertical” incentive to buy them persists. In this case, forward contracting may then lead to less competition in the spot market. We are indebted to Ramon Faulí-Oller, José Manuel Ordó?ez and Juan Carlos Reboredo for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. We also gratefully acknowledge the valuable observations made by two anonymous referees and a Co-Editor that led to substantial improvements. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies. Antelo acknowledges financial support from the Xunta de Galicia (Grant PGIDIT02PXIA20101PR) and Bru that from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (Grant PB98-1402).