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1.
Coordinating activity among members is an important problem faced by organizations. When firms, or units within firms, are
stuck in bad equilibria, managers may turn to the temporary use of simple incentives—flat punishments or rewards—in an attempt
to transition the firm or unit to a more efficient equilibrium. We investigate the use of incentives in the context of the
“minimum-effort,” or “weak-link,” coordination game. We allow groups to reach the inefficient equilibrium and then implement
temporary, flat, “all-or-none” incentives to encourage coordination on more efficient equilibria. We vary whether incentives
are positive (rewards) or negative (penalties), whether they have substantial or nominal monetary value, and whether they
are targeted to a specific outcome (the efficient equilibrium) or untargeted (apply to more than one outcome). Overall, incentives
of all kinds are effective at improving coordination while they are in place, but there is little long-term persistent benefit
of incentives—once incentives are removed, groups tend to return to the inefficient outcome. We find some differences between
different kinds of incentives. Finally, we contrast our results to other recent work demonstrating greater long-term effectiveness
of temporary incentives.
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2.
Commitment,first-mover-, and second-mover advantage 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We identify circumstances under which a firm with a first-mover advantage may get leapfrogged by a follower. At the market
stage we assume a Stackelberg structure, i.e. the leader commits to a quantity and the follower reacts to it. We allow the
owners of both firms to select the internal organization and the production technology before quantities are set. That is,
leader and follower can additionally use two commitment strategies alternatively or in combination: investing in R&D and delegating
quantity decisions to managers. Despite the symmetry of options for the two firms, we find that there is a unique equilibrium
in which both firms invest in process R&D, only the follower delegates, and the follower can overcome the first-mover advantage
of the quantity leader and obtain a higher profit than the leader. Our analysis reveals that there are some important differences
between the two commitment devices “cost-reducing R&Dt” and “delegation to managers”.
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3.
In this paper we look at the manner in which ideas coming from complexity science change our understanding of the cognitive
powers of agents that is really necessary to explain the evolution of markets and of firms. The general ideas behind complex
systems dynamics and evolution are presented and then two examples are treated in detail. The first in an evolutionary model
of a market in which some new product is developed by competing firms and their “task” is to find a strategy in terms of quality
and price that will be sustainable. This essentially requires agents/firms to discover mutually compatible strategies, and
to create thereby sustainable market niches. The second example considers the internal structure of firms, in terms of their
constituent working practices and skills. It demonstrates that it is precisely their ignorance of the consequences of adopting
any particular practice that generates diversity in the emergent capabilities of firms, exploring the dimension of potential
demand and therefore leading to a successful and sustainable business sector. The work supports the notion that the cognitive
abilities that are involved are not about deduction and logic, as a traditional view of rationality might suggest, but are
about the development and contraction of interpretive frameworks, which will be different for each player. The paper links
these examples to a general recognition of the idea that complex, multi-agent systems evolve through successive “structural
attractors”—multi-dimensional dynamical systems—with temporary structural stability. Because real systems contain both the
structure and deviations from it, then there is a constant probing of structural stability and the possibility of qualitative
change to a new structural attractor. This resembles the ideas in biological evolution related to “punctuated equilibria,”
but it also links this to the idea of emergent and evolving networks of interaction, never of course near thermodynamic equilibrium.
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4.
This paper examines the role of patent licensing in the age of outsourcing. When firms rely on outsourced inputs, a patent
holder’s decision to license has both competitive and supplier pricing effects. By issuing a license, the firm increases competition
in the product market. At the same time, the need to make royalty payments “weakens” the firm’s rival, making it more sensitive
to supplier pricing. The supplier responds by softening pricing terms, and the firm benefits by siphoning some of these gains
via the license fee. Not only can the licensor gain, but all other parties (the licensee, supplier, and consumers) can also
benefit. This role of licensing presents additional considerations for regulators shaping patent laws.
We thank Michael Crew, John Fellingham, Sharon Oster, David Sappington, Doug Schroeder, and two anonymous referees for helpful
comments. Anil Arya acknowledges support from the John J. Gerlach Chair. 相似文献
5.
Christian A. Vossler Timothy D. Mount Robert J. Thomas Ray D. Zimmerman 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2009,36(1):44-59
This paper presents the results from an auction experiment using industry professionals and student participants who compete
in a simulated wholesale market for electricity. Motivated by the intervention by FERC in response to the “meltdown” of the
California spot market, we investigate the effect of including a “soft” price cap in a uniform price auction as a means of
mitigating high prices. When prices are driven above the soft cap, offer curves become flat, in contrast to the hockey stick
shape observed in a typical uniform price auction for electricity. This flat offer curve leads to market prices that are relatively
insensitive to both generation costs and demand reductions.
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6.
Merger profitability in mixed oligopoly 总被引:2,自引:2,他引:0
José Méndez-Naya 《Journal of Economics》2008,94(2):167-176
We analyse merger profitability in a mixed-oligopoy Cournot model. The “merger paradox” is qualified by showing that there
are profitable gains for the firms participating in a horizontal merger that is not a merger to a monopoly. In particular,
it is shown that merger sustainability depends on both, the privatization degree of the mixed firm and the number of non-merging
firms.
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7.
8.
Firm reputation with hidden information 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Steven Tadelis 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):635-651
Summary. An adverse selection model of firm reputation is developed in which short-lived clients purchase services from firms operated
by overlapping generations of agents. A firm's only asset is its name, or reputation, and trade of names is not observed by
clients. As a result, names are traded in all equilibria regardless of the economy's horizon The general equilibrium analysis
links the value of a name to the market for services. This causes a non-monotonicity that precludes higher types from sorting
themselves through the market for names, and leads to “sensible” dynamics: reputations, and name prices, increase after success
and decrease after failure.
Received: July 31, 2001; revised version: December 20, 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" I thank Jon Levin, Eric Maskin and Drew Fudenberg for valuable discussions, and Heski Bar-Isaac for comments on an
earlier draft. Financial support from the National Science Foundation (NSF grants SBR-9818981 and SES-0079876) is gratefully
acknowledged. This paper replaces an older (and incomplete) working paper titled “Reputation with Hidden Information”. 相似文献
9.
This paper, which builds on Chipman (The economist’s vision. Essays in modern economic perspectives, 131–162, 1998), analyzes a simple model formulated by Hurwicz (Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) of two agents—a polluter and a pollutee—and two commodities: “money” (standing for an exchangeable private good desired
by both agents) and “pollution” (a public commodity desired by the polluter but undesired by the pollutee). There is also
a government that issues legal rights to the two agents to emit a certain amount of pollution, which can be bought and sold
with money. It is assumed that both agents act as price-takers in the market for pollution rights, so that competitive equilibrium
is possible. The “Coase theorem” (so-called by Stigler (The theory of price, 1966) asserts that the equilibrium amount of pollution is independent of the allocation of pollution rights. A sufficient condition
for this was (in another context) obtained by Edgeworth (Giorn Econ 2:233–245, 1891), namely that preferences of the two agents be “parallel” in the money commodity, whose marginal utility is constant. Hurwicz
(Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) argued that this parallelism is also necessary. This paper, which provides an exposition of the problem, raises some questions
about this result and provides an alternative necessary and sufficient condition. 相似文献
10.
Harutaka Takahashi 《Economic Theory》2008,37(1):31-49
I will study a multi-sector endogenous growth model with general constant returns to scale technologies and demonstrate the
existence, uniqueness and the saddle-path stability of the balanced growth equilibrium. I will first demonstrate the existence
of a balanced growth equilibrium, by showing that the balanced growth rate associated with the balanced growth equilibrium
is solely determined by solving a Frobenius root problem of the price equations derived from the Euler equations and the property
of the nonsubstitution theorem. Then I will show the saddle-path stability of the balanced growth equilibrium without any
capital intensity conditions, which is a generalized property proved in the two-sector endogenous growth models by de Guevara
et al. (J Econ Dyn Control 21, 115–143, 1997), Bond et al. (J Econ Theory 68, 149–173 1996) and Mino (Int Eco Rev 37, 227–251
1996). The theorem clearly implies that the balanced growth equilibrium has a transition path in the neighborhood of the balanced
growth equilibrium.
The paper was presented at the conferences “Irregular Growth: Beyond Balanced Growth” held on June 19–21, 2003 in Paris and
“Economic Growth and Distribution: On the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” held on June 16–18, 2004 in Lucca, Italy.
From the discussion with Alain Venditti at CNRS-GREQAM, Gerhard Sorger at University of Vienna and the conference participants,
I have been benefited much by writing this paper. Especially Alain Venditte had given me a chance to take a look at his unpublished
paper titled ” Indeterminacy and the Role of Factor Substitutability” jointly written with Kazuo Nishimura at Kyoto University
and published in Macroeconomic Dynamics, Vol. 8. The author also would like to thank an anonymous referee for useful suggestions. 相似文献
11.
Naoki Shintoyo 《Journal of Economics》2008,93(2):145-176
We offer a search and matching model with firms that create job vacancies and are willing to sponsor general skills training.
The spillover of skilled labor between firms has the dual effect of increasing job vacancies and enhancing firms’ incentives
for free riding. The former effect is combined with a reduction in search costs to cause a positive feedback between the supply
of skilled labor and the creation of job vacancies, suggesting that firms encourage each other. On the other hand, with the
latter effect, search costs are reduced, inducing firms to take a free ride on each other’s investments, thereby decreasing
the supply of skilled labor and the creation of job vacancies. A reduction in search costs can lead to different results depending
on which of the two mechanisms is actualized. Additionally, our analysis allows for “labor poachers,” or firms absorbing skilled
labor in the market, to consider direct competition between training firms and poaching firms.
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12.
A resource-based view of Schumpeterian economic dynamics 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
John A. Mathews 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2002,12(1-2):29-54
This paper seeks to offer a theoretical platform where the modern “resource-based view” of the firm might meet with evolutionary
economics and the study of entrepreneurship, and with the economics of industrial organization. It does so by proposing the
concept of the “resource economy” within which productive resources are produced and exchanged between firms. This is presented
as the dual of the mainstream goods and services economy – where the “resource economy” captures the dynamic capital structure
of the economy. The paper is concerned to bring out the distinctive principles governing resource dynamics in the resource
economy, capturing competitive dynamics in such categories as resource creation, replication, propagation, exchange and leverage;
evolutionary dynamics in terms of resource variation, selection and retention; entrepreneurial dynamics in terms of resource
recombination and resource imitation, transfer and substitution; and industrial organizational dynamics in terms of resource
configuration, resource complementarities and resource trajectories. 相似文献
13.
Encouraging firms to develop voluntarily more comprehensive environmental management systems (EMSs) is touted as a policy
tool to augment mandatory environmental regulations. Using a unique dataset of environmental management practices of Japanese
manufacturers and controlling for self-selection bias in survey responses, we find that proxies for regulatory pressures and
consumer pressures are the most important factors that motivate firms toward more comprehensive EMSs. Despite the oft-claimed
“voluntary” nature of EMS development, our results show that the government may have a role to play in both directly and indirectly
affecting EMS development by firms.
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14.
Summary. We study the core and competitive allocations in exchange economies with a continuum of traders and differential information.
We show that if the economy is “irreducible”, then a competitive equilibrium, in the sense of Radner (1968, 1982), exists.
Moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the “private core” (Yannelis, 1991). We also show
that the “weak fine core” of an economy coincides with the set of competitive allocations of an associated symmetric information
economy in which the traders information is the joint information of all the traders in the original economy.
Received March 22, 2000; revised version: May 1, 2000 相似文献
15.
Makoto Tanaka 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2012,51(1):61-77
This paper presents a multi-sector model of tradable emission permits, which includes oligopolistic and perfectly competitive
industries. The firms in oligopolistic industries are assumed to exercise market power in the tradable permit market as well
as in the product market. Specifically, we examine the effects of the initial permit allocation on the equilibrium outcomes,
focusing on the interaction among these product and permit markets. It is shown that raising the number of initial permits
allocated to one firm in an oligopolistic industry increases the output produced by that firm. Under certain conditions, raising
a “clean” (less-polluting) firm’s share of the initial permits can lead to reductions in both the product and permit prices.
We discuss criteria for the socially optimal allocation of initial permits, considering the trade-off between production inefficiency
and consumer benefit. 相似文献
16.
It has often been claimed that firms’ compliance to environmental regulations is higher than predicted by standard theory, a result labeled the “Harrington paradox” in the literature. Enforcement data from Norway presented here appears, at first glance, to confirm this “stylized fact”: firms are inspected less than once a year, detected violators are seldom fined, but still, serious violations seem relatively rare. However, at a closer look, the pattern seems less paradoxical: enforcement of minor violations is lax, but such violations do flourish; serious violations, on the other hand, are subject to credible threats of harsh punishment, and such violations are more uncommon. This seems quite consistent with predictions from standard theory. We argue that the empirical existence of the Harrington paradox is not well documented in the international literature. The claim that firms’ compliance with environmental regulations is generally higher than predicted by standard theory should thus be regarded as a hypothesis rather than an established fact. 相似文献
17.
Gianfranco Giulioni 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2011,21(4):595-618
In this paper, we explain GDP dynamics through an analysis of the forces that modify the structure of the economy. These forces
are represented by the entry of new firms and product innovations. Our model is inspired by Bak’s sand pile model, and the
entry of a new firm or innovation is comparable to dropping a grain of sand in Bak’s model. The resulting model involves the
insights of both Keynes and Schumpeter. It could be defined as Keynesian because the aggregate output is demand driven. That
said, the model can mainly be labeled as Schumpeterian for several reasons: (i) innovations have a key role, (ii) credit is
involved in supporting the innovation process, (iii) innovations partially destroy old industries, and finally (iv) without
innovations, the system gradually approaches its stationary state. In this simple model, the change in the number of sectors
(products) of the economy is the decisive factor with the following results: (1) the aggregate production has an increasing
trend; (2) fluctuations are asymmetric; (3) recessions have a “creative destruction” explanation; (4) “classical” cycles are
gradually replaced by “growth” cycles. 相似文献
18.
Summary. We provide a “computable counterexample” to the Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium existence theorem [2]. In particular,
we find an exchange economy in which all components are (Turing) computable, but in which no competitive equilibrium is computable.
This result can be interpreted as an impossibility result in both computability-bounded rationality (cf. Binmore [5], Richter
and Wong [35]) and computational economics (cf. Scarf [39]). To prove the theorem, we establish a “computable counterexample”
to Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem (similar to Orevkov [32]) and a computable analogue of a characterization of excess demand
functions (cf. Mas-Colell [26], Geanakoplos [16], Wong [50]).
Received: September 9, 1997; revised version: December 17, 1997 相似文献
19.
David Ellerman 《Forum for Social Economics》2000,29(2):33-48
I argue that math, like love, can cover a multitude of sins, and I use the neoclassical object of adoration, the Arrow-Debreu
model, as the case in point. It is commonplace that the Arrow-Debreu (AD) model of general equilibrium does not describe the
real world, but it is equally commonplace to accept it as representing the pure logic of the competitive capitalist economy
in an idealized world free of transactions costs. I show that the AD model fails even as an idealized model; it actually mistakes
the logic of pure capitalism. Unlike McKenzie’s model of idealized general equilibrium under constant returns to scale, Arrow
and Debreu claim to have shown the existence of competitive equilibrium under decreasing returns to scale and positive pure
profits. The AD model (again unlike the McKinzie model) needs to assign the profits to individuals and this is done using
the notion of “ownership of the production set.” But this notion suffers from a fatal ambiguity. If Arrow and Debreu interpret
it to mean “ownership of a corporation” then a simple argument in the form “labor can hire capital or capital can hire labor”
defeats the alleged necessity of assigning residual claimancy to the corporation. A given corporation may or may not end up
exploiting a set of production opportunities (represented by a production set) depending on whether it hires in labor and
undertakes production or hires out its capital to others (all by assumption at the parametrically given prices). In the latter
case, residual claimancy is elsewhere. There is no such property right as “ownership of a production set” in a private property
market economy. The legal party which purchases or already owns all the inputs used up in production has the defensible legal
claim on the outputs: there is no need to also “purchase the production set.” At any set of prices that allow positive pure
profits, anyone in the idealized AD model could bid up the price of the inputs and thus try to reap a smaller but still positive
profit. Therefore,pace Arrow and Debreu, there could be no equilibrium with positive pure profits. In the Appendix, the property rights fallacy
that afflicts the AD model is shown to also afflict orthodox capital theory and corporate finance theory.
World Bank
The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed
in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations or to the members of its Board of Directors or the countries
they represent. 相似文献
20.
The bidirectional causal links between high-skilled emigration and poverty can give rise to multiple equilibria and coordination
failures. Two countries sharing identical characteristics may end up in either a “low poverty-low brain drain” equilibrium
or in a “high poverty-high brain drain” equilibrium. In this paper, we build a model which endogenizes high-skilled emigration
and economic performances in order to derive the conditions under which multiplicity occurs. After identifying country-specific
parameters, we find that in the majority of developing countries, the best equilibrium is selected and that the observed brain
drain is inevitable. In 22 small developing countries however, the worse equilibrium prevails, implying that poverty and brain
drain are increased by coordination failure. These countries require appropriate development policies, such as a temporary
subsidization of the repatriation of their high-skilled expatriates. Our results are robust to the inclusion of a brain gain
mechanism. 相似文献