Real options,agency conflicts,and optimal capital structure

We examine the impact of a stockholder–bondholder conflict over the timing of the exercise of an investment option on firm value and corporate financial policy. We find that an equity-maximizing firm exercises the option too early relative to a value-maximizing strategy, and we show how this problem can be characterized as one of overinvestment in risky investment projects. Equityholders’ incentive to overinvest significantly decreases firm value and optimal leverage, and significantly increases the credit spread of risky debt. Numerical solutions illustrate how the agency cost of overinvestment and its effect on corporate financial policy vary with firm and project characteristics.     

The Disciplining Role of Leverage in Dutch Firms

In this study we investigate the role of leverage indisciplining overinvestment problems. We measure the relationships between leverage, Tobin's qand corporate governance characteristics for Dutch listed firms. Besides, ourempirical analysis tests for determinants of leverage from tax and bankruptcy theories. Representinggrowth opportunities, q is expected to be an agency-based determinant of leverage.Simultaneously, q represents firm value, which is determined by leverage and governancestructures. We test a structural equations model in which we deal with this simultaneousnature of the relation between leverage and q. Our results indicate that Dutch managersavoid the disciplining role of debt, when they are most likely to overinvest. Leverage is mainlydetermined by tax advantages and bankruptcy costs. In addition, we test the impact ofleverage on excess investment. We do not find a difference in the influence of leverage oninvestment between potential overinvestors and other firms. This confirms that the disciplinary roleof leverage in Dutch firms is absent.     

The Effects of Reversible Investment on Capital Structure and Credit Risks

We propose a structural model with an optimal switching of diffusion regimes that integrates a wide range of investment reversibility. The default boundary and switching thresholds are endogenously determined, and they enable us to comprehend the interrelated problems of the investment decision, capital structure, and credit risks. We examine not only the under/overinvestment but also the under/overdisinvestment. The leverage ratio decreases when the firm has an option to invest in a reversible project, which can alleviate the capital structure puzzle. Furthermore, the model significantly reduces the wide dispersion of yield spreads depending on the credit grade of bonds.     

Interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions: The effects of agency conflicts

We examine interactions between flexible financing and investment decisions in a model with stockholder–bondholder conflicts over investment policy. We find that financial flexibility encourages the choice of short-term debt thereby dramatically reducing the agency costs of under- and overinvestment. However, the reduction in agency costs may not encourage the firm to increase leverage, since the firm's initial debt level choice depends on the type of growth options in its investment opportunity set. The model has a number of testable predictions for the joint choice of leverage and maturity, and how these choices interact with a firm's growth opportunities.     

Do Leverage,Dividend Payout,and Ownership Concentration Influence Firms' Value Creation? An Analysis of Brazilian Firms

This study uses a sample of 213 Brazilian firms listed between 1995 and 2004 to examine the effect of the presence or absence of growth opportunities on the subsequent effect of leverage, dividend payout, and ownership concentration on firm value. First, we find that leverage plays a dual role: whereas it negatively affects the value of firms with growth opportunities (i.e., underinvestment theory), it positively affects the value of firms without growth opportunities (i.e., overinvestment theory). Second, we find that dividends play a disciplinary role in firms with fewer growth opportunities by reducing free cash flow under managerial control. Finally, the results show that ownership structure has a nonlinear effect—that is, ownership concentration initially improves the value of most firms. However, after a certain threshold, in firms with growth opportunities, the risk increases that large shareholders expropriate wealth at the expense of minority shareholders.     

Debt,Diversification, and Valuation

The separate associations between financial leverage and valuation and between diversification and valuation have been widely researched. The joint function of leverage, diversification, and valuation, however, has received much less attention. Previous research shows that compared to specialized firms, diversified firms tend to have higher free cash flows and fewer high net present value investment opportunities. Consequently, the agency costs associated with potential overinvestment are greater for diversified firms. The literature also proposes that financial leverage should reduce agency costs. Consequently, we expect that the values of diversified firms increase with leverage. Our tests provide strong support for the hypothesis that the values of diversified firms increase with leverage. This tendency is not observed for specialized firms.JEL Classification:     

A leverage ratio rule for capital adequacy

This paper studies the economic foundations for maximum leverage ratio capital adequacy rules. The paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, we show how to determine the maximum leverage ratio such that the probability of insolvency is less than some predetermined quantity. Two, we show that a leverage ratio rule controls for the same risks as does a Value-at-Risk (VaR) capital adequacy rule. Third, we argue that leverage ratio rules are better than VaR rules because they are more intuitive and easier to compare across firms.     

To be or not to be all-equity for firms that eliminate long-term debt

Despite the advantages of debt, a significant number of firms that have an established leverage policy deliberately become all-equity. These firms eliminate a substantial amount of long-term debt as the average firm’s leverage ratio is approximately 30 percent at the year-end prior to debt elimination. Firm-level “shocks” such as CEO turnover and changes in credit ratings cannot explain the dramatic recapitalization decision. Consistent with the tradeoff theory, firms that eliminate debt have lower benefits (less tax shield benefits, agency costs) and higher costs (probability of financial distress, access to capital markets, etc.) of leverage in the three prior years compared to a matched sample. We also find that the factors influencing the decision to eliminate all debt is different from those to significantly reduce leverage or to have very low debt levels. Firms primarily finance the approximately $70 million of average long-term debt eliminated using proceeds from sales of relatively unproductive assets and from equity issues. Interestingly, over half of these firms issue significant amount of new debt within three years of becoming all-equity. Firms with lower liquidity and non-debt tax shields, higher potential overinvestment agency costs, and those that issue equity at the debt elimination year are more likely to relever quickly.     

Debt Dynamics

We develop a dynamic trade‐off model with endogenous choice of leverage, distributions, and real investment in the presence of a graduated corporate income tax, individual taxes on interest and corporate distributions, financial distress costs, and equity flotation costs. We explain several empirical findings inconsistent with the static trade‐off theory. We show there is no target leverage ratio, firms can be savers or heavily levered, leverage is path dependent, leverage is decreasing in lagged liquidity, and leverage varies negatively with an external finance weighted average Q. Using estimates of structural parameters, we find that simulated model moments match data moments.     

Are corporates' target leverage ratios time-dependent?

This paper extends the stationary-leverage-ratio model to incorporate a time-dependent target leverage ratio. The theoretical hypothesis of the existence of a time-dependent target leverage ratio reflects the movement of a firm's initial target ratio toward a long-term target ratio over time. Using some simple scenarios about the time-dependence of the target leverage ratio, the numerical results show that the incorporation of the hypothesis into the stationary-leverage-ratio model is capable of producing term structures of probabilities of default that are consistent with some empirical findings. The results provide some evidences to support the hypothesis.     

货币政策能够兼顾稳增长与防风险吗？——基于动态随机一般均衡模型的分析

为构建金融有效支持实体经济的体制机制,需平衡好稳增长、调结构和防风险三者间的关系。在此背景下,本文在两部门新凯恩斯主义动态随机一般均衡模型中引入异质性抵押约束,探讨货币政策如何兼顾稳增长和防风险,进而促进金融更好地服务实体经济。本文模拟结果显示:(1)降低利率和强化国企抵押约束可促进稳增长与稳杠杆。推动国企贷款利率趋于市场水平并降低非国企贷款成本,积极发挥结构性货币政策工具的作用,将增进其政策效果;(2)2008-2016年宏观杠杆率上升主要与国企抵押约束过松有关,2017年后利率对宏观杠杆率的调控增强;(3)宏观审慎政策框架下,货币政策盯住宏观杠杆率,并根据政策目标和经济背景适时调整利率与杠杆率的内生关系,能够优化货币政策效果。对于降低利率和强化国企抵押约束的政策组合,根据宏观杠杆率的变化同向调整利率水平有利于经济稳步增长和宏观杠杆率趋稳。     

Lead independent directors and investment efficiency

I show that the presence of a lead independent director on the corporate board is positively associated with investment efficiency. The result is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance standards, less transparent financial disclosure, and greater financial constraints. The lead director presence is negatively associated with overinvestment (underinvestment) for firms with large cash balances and low leverage (high cash flow volatility). Moreover, the lead director investment-related committee membership as well as CEO power matter in this setting. The lead director board role is also positively associated with future firm performance.     

Leverage and investment under a state-owned bank lending environment: Evidence from China

This study examines the relations between leverage and investment in China's listed firms, where corporate debt is principally provided by state-owned banks. We obtain three major findings. First, there is a negative relation between leverage and investment. Second, the negative relation between leverage and investment is weaker in firms with low growth opportunities and poor operating performance than in firms with high growth opportunities and good operating performance. Third, the negative relation between leverage and investment is weaker in firms with a higher level of state shareholding than in firms with a lower level of state shareholding. Overall, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the state-owned banks in China impose fewer restrictions on the capital expenditures of low growth and poorly performing firms and also firms with greater state ownership. This creates an overinvestment bias in these firms.     

Predicting systematic risk: Implications from growth options

In accordance with the well-known financial leverage effect, decreases in stock prices cause an increase in the levered equity beta for a given unlevered beta. However, as growth options are more volatile and have higher risk than assets in place, a price decrease may decrease the unlevered equity beta via an operating leverage effect. This is because price decreases are associated with a proportionately higher loss in growth options than in assets in place. Most of the existing literature focuses on the financial leverage effect: This paper examines both effects. We show, with a simple option pricing model, the opposing effects at work when the firm is a portfolio of assets in place and growth options. Our empirical results show that, contrary to common belief, the operating leverage effect largely dominates the financial leverage effect, even for initially highly levered firms with presumably few growth options. We then link variations in betas to measurable firm characteristics that proxy for the fraction of the firm invested in growth options. We show that these proxies jointly predict a large fraction of future cross-sectional differences in betas. These results have important implications on the predictability of equity betas, hence on empirical asset pricing and on portfolio optimization that controls for systematic risk.     

The causes and consequences of securities class action litigation

We examine the impact of securities class action lawsuits on firms' investment and financing choices. Firms which overinvest are more likely to be sued. After a lawsuit, firms on average decrease overinvestment activity, and they decrease payouts while increasing leverage, cash holdings, and firm-specific risk. Additionally, we find some evidence that firms decrease diversification post-suit. Overall, these changes are consistent with a post-suit decrease in agency problems which lead to significant changes in real investment policies. The evidence is consistent with the notion that security class action lawsuits draw attention to agency problems which are then at least partly resolved.     

A New Perspective on the International Evidence Concerning the Book-Price Effect

Finance theory implies equity returns should be positively related to financial leverage. However, a recent article decomposes the book-price ratio into financing and operating components and report a negative association between financial leverage and returns. We shed new light on this puzzle by examining a region in which previous research has established that firms’ financial leverage choices are motivated by factors other than maximizing shareholders’ wealth: we hypothesize that this must be reflected in both how financial leverage is priced and the book-price ratio. We show that the relationship between equity returns and financial leverage for stocks in our sample is indeed very different to the findings of previous research, and this is reflected in the decomposed elements of the book-price ratio.     

储蓄率与杠杆率:一个U型关系

近年来,中国呈现典型的“高储蓄—高杠杆”特征,高储蓄率也被认为是中国杠杆率偏高的主要原因之一。能否通过降低储蓄率的方式来去杠杆成为了广泛讨论的问题。为此,本文构建了一个含有融资约束的动态宏观模型,研究了储蓄率对杠杆率的影响机理。并且,基于41个代表性经济体1966-2017年的面板数据,对储蓄率与杠杆率之间的关系进行了实证分析,主要有两点研究发现:(1)虽然高储蓄率会导致高杠杆率,但是储蓄率与杠杆率不是简单的正相关关系,而是呈现显著的U型关系。结合测算的U型曲线拐点值与中国实际情况,预计储蓄率下降在降低杠杆率方面的作用效果有限。(2)高杠杆下,较高的储蓄率可以有效降低发生金融危机的概率,而储蓄率下降则会加大发生金融危机的概率。基于此,本文认为中国不能通过降低储蓄率的方式来降低杠杆率,反而需要对近年来储蓄率下滑的现象予以高度重视,从而更好地守住不发生系统性金融风险的底线。     

我国居民杠杆率现状及影响因素研究

近年来,我国居民部门杠杆率的快速上升引起社会各界关注。本文使用货币信贷和城镇储户调查数据,对我国居民部门杠杆率和偿债能力现状进行了分析,并运用各省住户贷款数据计算各省的居民杠杆率,使用面板数据模型对居民杠杆率上升的原因进行了实证分析。结果表明,房价的快速上涨和住房销售的增长都对居民部门杠杆率的上升有显著正向影响,其中房价上涨的影响程度更大。此外,金融发展水平和老年人抚养比对居民杠杆率有正向影响,少年人抚养比对居民杠杆率有负向影响。     

我国居民杠杆率现状及影响因素研究

近年来,我国居民部门杠杆率的快速上升引起社会各界关注。本文使用货币信贷和城镇储户调查数据,对我国居民部门杠杆率和偿债能力现状进行了分析,并运用各省住户贷款数据计算各省的居民杠杆率,使用面板数据模型对居民杠杆率上升的原因进行了实证分析。结果表明,房价的快速上涨和住房销售的增长都对居民部门杠杆率的上升有显著正向影响,其中房价上涨的影响程度更大。此外,金融发展水平和老年人抚养比对居民杠杆率有正向影响,少年人抚养比对居民杠杆率有负向影响。