THE TIMING OF UPGRADES*

By using a durable‐goods monopolist model, this paper investigates the timing of upgrades. I consider a three‐period model where the monopolist can upgrade the product in the second and third periods by investing in R&D. I analyse the non‐commitment and commitment cases. In the latter case, the decision on the timing of upgrades is made in the first period in advance. It is shown that the time‐inconsistency problem causes the monopolist in the non‐commitment case to release a new version more rapidly than in the commitment case. Moreover, even in the non‐commitment case, the release of a new version can still be later than the optimum from the social viewpoint.     

Is there a quality bias in the Canadian CPI? Evidence from microdata

Rising consumer prices may reflect shifts by consumers to new higher‐priced products, mostly for durable and semi‐durable goods. I apply Bils’ (2009) methodology to newly available Canadian consumer price data for non‐shelter goods and services to estimate how price increases can be divided between quality growth and price inflation. I find that less than one third of observed price increases during model changeovers should be attributed to quality growth. This implies overall price inflation close to inflation measured by the official index. I conclude that, according to Bils’ methodology, the quality bias is not an important source of potential mismeasurement of CPI inflation in Canada.     

A NOTE ON DURABLE GOODS MONOPOLISTS: COMMITMENT TO FORWARD COMPATIBILITY

This note re‐examines the previous results on durable goods monopolists under the time inconsistency problem that the firm tends to make its goods less compatible as a “planned obsolescence” strategy in the presence of network effects. We find that the possibility of the commitment to forward compatibility is profitable to the monopolist, depending upon the degree of technological progress and network effects. Therefore, contractual commitments that are frequently feasible and observed in real‐world markets make the society better off.     

Repair Market Structure, Product Durability, and Monopoly

This paper shows that a durable goods monopolist makes consumers choose a level of repairs which is below the socially optimal level if it monopolises the repair market as well. This distortion occurs due to the possibility of substituting new and used goods and a time inconsistency problem concerning repair decisions. However, if the monopolist is unable to commit the repair price, it may prefer to invite competitors into the repair market. If the repair market is competitive, even when the product market is monopolistic, the socially optimal level of repairs, and thus also the socially optimal durability level is chosen.     

A note on welfare-improving ignorance about quality

Consider a monopolist that is selling a high quality product when the quality is unknown to a fraction of the consumers. If the quality cannot be signaled and the fraction is sufficiently large, then the monopolist will offer a low price to induce uninformed consumers to buy. If the fraction is sufficiently small, then uninformed consumers are irrelevant to its optimal price. If the uninformed consumers are priced out of the market as a result, then welfare can decrease. I am very grateful for the comments of two anonymous referees that have significantly improved this paper.     

DURABLE GOODS MONOPOLISTS AND BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY*

This paper provides an economic analysis on the choice of backward compatibility by a durable goods monopolist in the presence of network effects. We examine the time inconsistency problem faced by a monopolist in its dynamic provision of two compatible products. We suggest an economic reason why, and when it will be strategically optimal, for the monopolist to choose backward compatibility even though it is socially undesirable, and not to choose forward compatibility even though it is technologically possible. We also investigate the compatibility choices with and without price discrimination, and compare market outcomes with the social optimum. Two different social inefficiencies (planned obsolescence) which arise from the viewpoints of optimal consumption and optimal compatibility are discussed.     

Dynamic sorting in durable goods markets with buyer heterogeneity

In a competitive dynamic durable good market where sellers have private information about quality, I identify certain inefficiencies that arise due to heterogeneity in buyers' valuations. Even if the market induces dynamic sorting among sellers and all goods are eventually traded, inefficiency can arise because high valuation buyers buy early when low‐quality goods are sold, while high‐quality goods are allocated to low valuation buyers that buy later. This misallocation adds to the inefficiency caused by delay in trading. Under certain circumstances, high‐quality goods may never be traded as in a static market.     

ARE CONSUMERS MORE LOYAL TO NATIONAL BRANDS THAN TO PRIVATE LABELS?

The evolution of private labels (PLs) can be understood in terms of a strategy adopted by the retail industry with the aim of competing with national brands (NBs). In the 1990s, this strategy led to the development of ‘me too’ products, which currently represent the largest share of store brand products. Since the early 2000s, retailers have widened the range of their store brands by introducing high‐quality products. The aim of this study was to estimate consumers’ attachment to ‘me‐too’ and niche PLs respectively, as compared to NBs. We captured the degree of maturity of these PLs through their price‐elasticities, computed for three staple goods offered by three mass retail companies. It was found that price sensitivity does not differ much between the ‘me‐too’ PLs and the corresponding NBs. This result confirms that ‘me‐too’ products are now considered reliable quality brands. However, in the high quality segment, consumers remain more sensitive to the price of PLs than to that of NBs, a characteristic which may relate to their recent introduction on the market.     

Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device

In an intertemporal setting in which individual uncertainty is resolved over time, advance-purchase discounts can serve to price discriminate between consumers with different expected valuations for the product. Consumers with a high expected valuation purchase the product before learning their actual valuation at the offered advance-purchase discount; consumers with a low expected valuation will wait and purchase the good at the regular price only in the event where their realized valuation is high. We characterize the profit-maximizing pricing strategy of the monopolist. Furthermore, adopting a mechanism design perspective, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which advance-purchase discounts implement the monopolist's optimal mechanism.     

Equilibrium Effects of Superstition in the Housing Market

We investigate the interaction of product quality differentiation and consumer preference heterogeneity in durable goods markets, focusing on the effects of secondary market liquidity and consumer heterogeneity on equilibrium prices. We build an infinite‐horizon dynamic model of the apartments housing market that captures the above features. Some apartments are considered lucky, and some consumers are superstitious. Lucky apartments are valued more highly than non‐lucky ones only by superstitious consumers. Results show that the difference between the lucky apartment price and the non‐lucky apartment price becomes smaller when the secondary market becomes less liquid and when consumers’ preference heterogeneity becomes more persistent as opposed to time‐varying.     

Low prices cum selective distribution versus high prices: how best to signal quality?

We investigate the best signalling strategy for a monopoly introducing a new product with unobservable quality when second-period sales are linked to first-period ones and the firm may tailor its distribution network to exclude some consumers. When producing a high quality product rather than a low quality one is relatively costly with respect to the increase in quality, optimal signalling is by price alone. But when the cost differential is lower, it will be optimal to set a low first-period price, not to serve all would-be consumers at this price (selective distribution) and raise the price afterwards. Paradoxically, this strategy allows a larger customer base to be reached than in the case of pure price signalling.     

All you can drink: should we worry about quality?

“All you can drink” specials are forbidden by law in several places. Authorities claim that establishments tend to offer low quality drinks when they use this type of promotion. In this paper, I elaborate a model to determine whether a monopolist produces higher or lower quality goods when using buffet pricing (all you can drink) instead of a two-part tariff. I find that the more profitable strategy is usually associated with a higher quality good than the less profitable strategy. However, under certain conditions buffet pricing is more profitable and leads to lower quality goods than the alternative.      

The monopolist is not the best environmentalist’s best friend: An example

This letter addresses the second-degree price discrimination issue when a monopolized product is tied with environmental quality. The monopolist may degrade environmental quality too much when marginal valuations of environmental quality and the good itself are positively related across consumers.     

The Effect of Exchange Rate Volatility on Trade in Durables

Because durable goods have the quality of an asset, risk-averse consumers wan to pay a lower price for durable than for nondurable goods so that they are compensated for the risk of price changes; they require risk premium. Since the exchange rate is a strong source of uncertainty in import prices, exchange rate volatility has a negative effect on the demand for imported durables. In an imperfectly competitive market, the volatility of the exchange rate is predicted to reduce the relative price of imported durables. The prediction is supported by an empirical investigation of US imports.     

Quality uncertainty and time inconsistency in a durable good market

In a durable good monopoly where consumers cannot observe quality prior to purchase and product improvement occurs exogenously over time, I show that uncertainty in quality may resolve the time inconsistency problem (even for low levels of product improvement). Higher dispersion in quality creates greater demand for future product by increasing the incentive of buyers with inferior quality realizations to repeat purchase and this, in turn, reduces the incentive of the seller to cut future price. For various levels of product improvement, I characterize the range of quality uncertainty for which the market equilibrium is identical to one where the monopolist can credibly precommit to future prices. I also show that the presence of quality uncertainty can lead to no trading in the primary good market. Further, in contrast to the literature on the Coase conjecture, inability to precommit to future prices can reduce social welfare as a result of the market closure.     

Intertemporal self-selection with multiple buyers

Summary We consider a monopolist selling durable goods to consumers with unit demands but different preferences for quality. The seller can offer items of different quality at the same time to induce buyers to self-select, as in Mussa-Rosen (1978), but is not artificially constrained to offer only one such menu. Instead the seller can offer without precommitment asequence of menus over time. In the two-buyer case where the seller has complete information about each buyer's marginal valuation for quality, the seller's profits exceed what can be obtained from a single menu and sometimes approximate the profits of a perfectly discriminating monopolist. In companion papers (Bagnoli et al., 1990, 1992), we show that these conclusions continue to hold (1) in the infinite-horizon case with any finite number of buyers and (2) in two-period examples where the seller has incomplete information about buyer preferences.     

Piracy and limited liability

This paper analyzes the effects of end-user piracy on a monopolized software industry with network effects in which consumers have heterogeneous income and limited liability. Limited liability produces a piracy cost which increases with income. The monopolist thus may be able to exploit the network effect brought about by the piracy of low-income consumers to charge a higher price to high-income consumers thereby earn a higher profit, especially when the monopolist can prevent the network effect from spilling over to the high-income consumers. If intellectual property rights policies are severe enough, then the monopolist can avoid the spillover. Otherwise it may become a case where each high-income buyer benefits from the piracy but the monopolist is hurt. However, a severe policy may bring about a high piracy rate since it invites the monopolist to raise the price.      

环境信息披露机制与企业发展——以日常耐用品生产企业为例

日常耐用消费品与人们的生活息息相关,其环保程度,对大众的身体健康有着重要影响。企业通过信息披露机制反映自身关于企业污染、治理方面的信息,可反映企业产品的环保程度,有利于消费者更好地了解企业,更好地反映产品的品质信息。企业披露高质量的环境信息,有利于建立良好的社会形象,有利于发展与消费者、政府间的互信机制,有利于强化企业产品的差异化程度,增强产品市场竞争力。     

On requiring the durable goods monopolist to sell

Requiring a monopolist to sell its output (rather than renting it) my lead to beneficial output adjustments or harmful quality adjustments. In a durable goods model, we show that requiring sales decreases welfare in only a small fraction of cases, but it strictly increases welfare in a majority of cases.     

Complementarity of willingness to pay and cost heterogeneity under vertical product differentiation: A welfare analysis

Due to the fact that a consumer’s willingness to pay differs between segments, many unregulated industries are price constrained, although the specific costs of market segments also differ. If the product quality is endogenously chosen, we find that third-degree price discrimination increases welfare if a sufficiently pronounced complementarity between the willingness to pay and variable cost heterogeneity is given. This is due to the fact that the monopolist’s incentive for employing a pronounced price dispersion strategy is directly influenced by the consumers’ willingness to pay for the quality of a product. With endogenous product quality, the paper shows that the standard welfare result of third-degree price discrimination compared to uniform monopoly pricing (e.g. that total welfare and consumer surplus both fall if total output does not rise) can be only reversed given the complementarity is sufficiently pronounced.