Reciprocity in the workplace

Using combined experimental and survey data, this paper provides empirical evidence that firm productivity is related to worker’s pro-social behavior in the workplace. At the firm level, we find a strong positive relationship between firm productivity and reciprocating behavior among workers. Investigating workers’ individual behavior we find a similar, strong relationship when regressing earnings, a proxy for productivity, on reciprocity. To address simultaneity we use an instrumental variable approach and find that the initial estimate was upwards biased, presumably because it did not take into account the positive feedback from earnings to reciprocity. The new coefficient remains substantially above zero, but it is statistically insignificant.      

Reciprocity Game

This paper shows that reciprocity comes from the desire to cooperate in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game. Before playing the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game, players choose the reciprocity level and commit to it, and the reciprocity level is public information. There are T equilibria if the prisoner's dilemma game is repeated for T periods, and each equilibrium is associated with different levels of cooperation. Further, if players choose their reciprocity levels sequentially, then the most cooperative equilibrium will be the unique equilibrium. However, reciprocity does not matter for the one‐period game and the infinitely repeated game.     

Consumption in the shadow of unemployment

By how much do employed households reduce their consumption when the aggregate unemployment rate rises? In Spain during the Great Recession a one point increase in the unemployment rate was related to a strong reduction in household consumption of more than 0.7% per equivalent adult. This reduction is consistent with forward-looking agents responding to downward revisions of their expectations on future income growth rates: the shadow of unemployment. Using consumption panel data that include information on physical quantities we show that the drop in consumption expenditure was truly a reduction in quantities, and not a switch to cheaper alternatives.     

Reciprocity and voting

In this paper we present a two-period model where a left-wing and a right-wing political party are solely interested in the policies they pursue. We assume that voters display reciprocal behavior. By contrast, political parties are not motivated by reciprocity. We show that reciprocity may have dramatic consequences for models of voting behavior. The incentive to be kind to the median voter may ensure that a position closer to the median voter's position is adopted even if political parties are not directly interested in being elected and cannot commit to a political stance during an election campaign. Moreover, reciprocity increases incumbency advantages.     

Reciprocity and voting

In this paper we present a two-period model where a left-wing and a right-wing political party are solely interested in the policies they pursue. We assume that voters display reciprocal behavior. By contrast, political parties are not motivated by reciprocity. We show that reciprocity may have dramatic consequences for models of voting behavior. The incentive to be kind to the median voter may ensure that a position closer to the median voter's position is adopted even if political parties are not directly interested in being elected and cannot commit to a political stance during an election campaign. Moreover, reciprocity increases incumbency advantages.     

Malnutrition in the shadow of economic growth

We formulate the consumption and wealth accumulation behavior for low‐income agents who are concerned with their relative income with respect to a reference group. Using a dynamic consumption and saving model, we show the conditions under which low‐income and status‐seeking individuals accumulate more wealth and consume less of a nutritious good than the levels in the absence of status‐seeking behavior. Our results suggest that malnutrition and economic growth may go hand in hand in developing economies.     

Reciprocity in evolving social networks

We study the viability of conditional cooperation in a dynamically evolving social network. The network possesses the small world property, with high clustering coefficient but low characteristic path length. The interaction among linked individuals takes the form of a multiperson prisoners’ dilemma, and actions can be conditioned on the past behavior of one’s neighbors. Individuals adjust their strategies based on performance within their neighborhood, and both strategies and the network itself are subject to random perturbation. We find that the long-run frequency of cooperation is higher under the following conditions: (i) the interaction radius is neither too small nor too large, (ii) clustering is high and characteristic path length low, (iii) the mutation rate of strategies is small, and (iv) the rate of adjustment in strategies is neither too fast nor too slow.

Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement

A model of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must be chosen. While agents differ in their preferences over alternatives, everybody prefers agreement to disagreement. Our model is distinguished by three features: private information regarding valuations, differing intensities in preferences, and the option to declare neutrality to avoid disagreement. There is always an equilibrium in which the majority is more aggressive in pushing its alternative, thus enforcing their will via both numbers and voice. However, under general conditions an aggressive minority equilibrium inevitably makes an appearance, provided that the group is large enough. Such equilibria invariably display a “tyranny of the minority”: the increased aggression of the minority always outweighs their smaller number, leading to the minority outcome being implemented with larger probability than the majority alternative. We fully characterize the asymptotic behavior of this model as group size becomes large, and show that all equilibria must converge to one of three possible limit outcomes.     

Reciprocity and economics in historical perspective

There is now compelling evidence to suggest that people respond in kind to helpful or hostile behaviour, so much so that some have been led to suggest that the subject of economic behaviour is not so much homo economicus as homo reciprocans. This recent interest in the phenomenon of reciprocity is part of a wider (and very welcome) rethinking of the basic attributes of the economic actor. On the basis of this recent work, economic theorising has moved some distance from the traditional modern-economic approach—an approach that simply assumes a strategically rational, egotistical actor and develops elaborate theorems therefrom—and towards a richer, more complex conceptualisation of the economic actor and her acts. On revisiting a remarkably similar debate that took place some 250 years earlier, however, we wonder whether this re-conceptualisation has yet moved far enough.     

Reciprocity and practical comparability

Reciprocity does not require exactness but only a certain equilibrium in the things reciprocated: it is often overabundant. In addition, reciprocity may be fulfilled by returning something of a different kind that may be heterogeneous and incommensurable with the thing received. The reason of this “uneven response” of reciprocity is that in these situations the exchange of means aims at manifesting some values that are ends for the persons involved. Hence, the consideration of reciprocity supposes a reinsertion of ends in economics. The paper firstly defines reciprocity. Next, it summarizes a variety of arguments for a reconsideration of ends in economics. After that, it explains the differences between the rationalities of means and ends. A key difference lies in the problem of incommensurability of ends. This problem will be then tackled and a possible way to overcome it will be proposed. It will be finally sustained that practical comparability allows for incommensurable fair reciprocation.     

Reciprocity and matching frictions

The ability of search and matching models to replicate stylized facts—such as volatilities and correlations—has been a center of attraction over the last couple of years. This paper introduces the Akerlof (Q J Econ 97:543–569, 1982) fair wage approach into an endogenous separation search and matching model. Within a RBC general equilibrium context, we show that the efficiency wage model outperforms its benchmark Nash bargaining pendant. In particular, the model generates the empirically observed volatilities in response to a productivity shock and replicates a strong Beveridge curve. Furthermore, we derive the Solow condition in a search environment and discuss the interactions of search and efficiency wage frictions. We show that search frictions create a wedge between the optimal wage/effort solution in the search and the competitive equilibrium. The efficiency wage consideration adds an additional margin to the firm's decision problem. As effort varies over the cycle, it changes the firm's optimal response to exogenous disturbances and amplifies the response to shocks.     

Relative performance pay in the shadow of crisis

We analyze whether incentives from relative performance pay are reduced or enhanced if a department is possibly terminated due to a crisis. Our benchmark model shows that incentives decrease in a severe crisis, but are boosted given a minor crisis since efforts are strategic complements in the former case but strategic substitutes in the latter one. We tested our predictions in a laboratory experiment. The results confirm the effort ranking but show that in a severe crisis individuals deviate from equilibrium significantly stronger than in other situations. This behavior contradicts the benchmark model and leads to a five times higher survival probability of the department. We develop a new theoretical approach that might explain players׳ behavior.     

Unemployment and the shadow economy

Current research links the shadow economy (SE) and the unemployment rate either indirectly or by means of a preliminary estimate. This article establishes and empirically implements a methodology for estimating the size of the SE as a direct function of the tax and unemployment rates. This link is found to be extremely relevant in countries with high unemployment rates (such as Greece and Spain) and less relevant in countries with moderate unemployment rates (such as Germany and Italy). Unemployment’s contribution to the SE is shown to be significant, especially in the years following the economic downturn of 2008. The calculation of the variance and distribution of these estimates is another significant contribution. The common criticism that SE estimates are unreliable is addressed by calculating the variance and the distribution of the estimates, and the large size of the SE in Greece and Spain is once again confirmed.     

Rural-to-urban migration and the shadow wage in LDCs

"This paper discusses the amount of rural-to-urban migration which will be forthcoming when a new urban job is created for which an institutionally fixed wage above the market-clearing level is offered. A simple formula is proposed to estimate migration response. It can be used to calculate the shadow wage in cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in less developed countries (LDCs)."     

Interbranch cooperation and the shadow of the future

Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) experiments confirm and extend Axelrod’s (The evolution of cooperation. Basic Books, New York, 1984) Shadow of the Future hypothesis: subjects cooperate in infinitely repeated PD, but they also cooperate until near the end in finitely repeated PD. So the extended hypothesis is that cooperation depends on the probability of continued play. Observational tests of this hypothesis, or even applications, have been rare at best. Here we not only apply but test it for interbranch cooperation under separated-powers constitutions, specifically those of the American states, using the end of governors’ final terms as end points and the rate of overridden vetoes as the extreme case of a breakdown in interbranch cooperation. Controlling for a variety of factors, including divided government, we find support for the hypothesis, whose explanation of interbranch interaction fills a gap left open by Madison’s Federalist 51: how republican government can control itself when what is needed is “energy” more than safeguards.