市场势力、技术创新与价格歧视

本文从反垄断视角出发, 将纵向交易互动关系中的价格歧视与市场势力问题纳入到上游制造商工艺创新决策研究框架中, 比较分析不同定价模式下买方市场势力对上游创新程度、厂商利润以及消费者剩余的影响情况。研究结果表明： 当下游市场中存在买方市场势力时, 上游制造商在歧视定价策略下攫取最大利润; 统一定价策略下的创新程度最大。对于具有买方市场势力的零售市场而言, 三种定价模式下的消费者福利相同, 且均高于下游两个市场无买方势力的消费者福利。对于不具有买方势力的零售市场而言, 采取统一定价策略能够实现消费者福利最大化。     

势力经济研究

“势力经济”是企业生产要素增加对市场控制能力放大的过程效应，“势力经济”的“临界点”体现在企业达到对某一区域市场的绝对垄断地位。在市场经济环境下，企业生产规模大小是由市场规模大小决定的，并不是自己拥有人、财、物等内部资源多少决定的，企业之间竞争客观存在，“势力经济”规律必然客观存在，认定并追求“势力经济”是企业的必然选择。     

电力市场中的市场势力及其治理

电力市场中市场势力受供给和需求刚性、市场竞争政策和制度安排，以及输电堵塞等因素影响表现出特殊性。电力市场势力不仅受到主导企业市场份额的影响，还更多地受企业之间战略相互作用或博弈效应、市场需求弹性、竞争性边缘企业供给弹性、边缘企业的市场份额等因素的影响。这些因素与电力生产经营过程中的技术性结合在一起，使规制很难有效进行，在电力市场中产生了明显的市场势力结果。限制电力市场中市场势力的根本途径是设计特别的市场竞争政策和交易制度。     

论全球价值链中我国企业创新与市场势力构建的良性互动

当代国际新分工是以进出口诸方在产品生产的多个环节上混合使用多种要素从而组成全球价值链为特征的,由于我国企业普遍缺乏市场势力致使发达国家跨国公司通常在国际竞争中处于主导地位,而我方则面临低端锁定、利益扭曲、引进依赖等不利格局。我国企业若能构建、强化市场势力,则可提升自主创新的动力与能力,扭转不利局面。本文从理论上探索了企业创新与市场势力良性互动的机理,进而在“环”、“链”、“群”三个层次上就如何构建“良性互动”提出了思路与对策。     

制造业外资进入与市场势力波动:竞争还是垄断

对外资市场效应的评估和计量是处理好外资政策、产业政策和反垄断政策关系的重要问题。本文采用中国1999—2010年28个两位数和447个四位数代码制造业面板数据,首先估计了两位数代码制造业的市场势力水平,然后进一步考察外资进入的市场效应,并测度外资引致的福利变动。研究表明:制造业各行业存在显著的市场势力,但金融危机前后市场势力溢价水平波动较大。全样本结果显示制造业市场势力溢价约为6.2%,但金融危机前样本证实市场势力溢价高达22.1%。细分产业中,外资的竞争效应占主导,但在部分产业中外资表现出了反竞争效应。制造业总体层面上,外资进入与市场势力波动之间呈现U形非线性关系,拐点稳定在外资比重为47.3%—54.0%的区间内。从福利角度看,外资进入的竞争效应,使得垄断带来的无谓损失减少了3334.70亿元;但FDI的反竞争效应使得相应行业垄断福利损失增加2407.45亿元。     

电信主导运营商价格压榨的竞争效应

在纵向相关市场结构下,电信在位主导运营商的价格压榨行为是一种恢复纵向垄断市场势力和获取纵向一体最大化垄断利润的策略性行为,它会严重伤害下游市场的竞争,并降低社会总福利。在反垄断执法中,判定反竞争的价格压榨行为需要分析市场结构条件和进行竞争伤害检验,本文提出了基础的归因检验规则和具体的四种不同类型价格压榨检验方法。基于上述分析,对中国电信和中国联通网络接入价格歧视行为反垄断审查的结构条件和归因检验进行了分析,并认为不合理接入管制政策是价格压榨长期存在的重要原因。     

系统市场中企业策略性排他行为分析

本文将系统竞争和组件竞争结合起来，分析系统市场中的企业策略性行为及其对市场竞争和创新的影响。在系统市场上．开放的系统竞争结构是较优的，但是企业并不一定会选择与社会福利目标相一致的组织形式．而是更多地基于策略性需要来进行选择。在系统市场中．创新主导企业有激励通过策略性地选择许可比例来操纵市场竞争。在邻近市场结构中．在位创新垄断企业有激励通过排他性行为将关键技术市场的垄断势力延伸到邻近竞争市场．这些市场封锁行为通常会严重地伤害市场竞争，并阻碍技术创新。     

纵向一体化企业的理性策略:价格压榨

本文分析了在纵向相关市场结构下的一体化企业价格压榨的激励,为科学认定价格压榨提供了一定的理论基础。我们提出上游市场结构决定了纵向一体化企业是否采用价格压榨来获取单一垄断利润。当上游为寡头市场时,纵向一体化企业有价格压榨激励。相反,当上游为垄断市场时,没有实行价格压榨的激励。此时一体化企业的价格压榨虽然抬高了市场价格,但仍不能给其带来最大利润。另外,虽然价格压榨被普遍认为具有反垄断性质,但我们的分析表明当上游为寡头市场时,价格压榨却能增加消费者福利。本文的分析为反垄断法中的价格压榨案例和纵向合并案例,尤其是网络行业案例提供了一定的执法理论性依据。     

产品异质条件下市场势力估计与垄断损失测度——运用新实证产业组织方法对白酒制造业的研究

作为政府经济管制和反垄断的基础,市场势力的定量测度以及福利损失的有效估算是至关重要的基本问题。由于产品异质性带来的模型设定陷阱,之前陈甬军,周末(2009)使用的新实证产业组织模型仅适用于测度少数产品差异很小的产业的市场势力。本文在Klette和Desouza的基础上给出了一种更具一般性的,可以在异质性产品市场测度市场势力和垄断损失的方法,克服了不可观测的产品异质性和技术冲击导致的影响。随后,采用全国规模以上工业企业数据库数据,估计了产品差异非常大的白酒制造业市场势力溢价,并以此为依据,计算了由于市场势力溢价带来的福利净损失,验证了模型的有效性和稳健性。计量结果证明尽管白酒制造业市场结构较为分散,但是具有极强的市场势力,2008年白酒制造企业运用市场势力带来的福利净损失高达180.97亿元。     

企业集团规制政策:德隆危机的反思

本文在反思德隆危机的基础上,探讨了企业集团的特性、不当市场行为及其根源。认为企业集团具有“企业”与“市场”双重属性,这一本质属性决定了在企业集团内部企业间边界模糊。企业间边界模糊容易滋生转移定价、逃废债务、操纵股市等不当市场行为。而企业间边界模糊与市场势力相结合更容易导致企业集团产生垄断行为。企业集团规制政策需要从企业集团的特性及不当行为产生的根源入手。     

基于贝叶斯理论的供电公司购电风险决策研究

将“供电公司如何从合约市场和实时市场中购买电力,以使自己的收益最大,风险最小”理解为一个风险型决策问题,应用贝叶斯分析理论,求得已知先验概率情况下供电公司的最小期望损失,改进了供电公司设定的先验概率,减少了期望损失,给出了供电公司应选择的决策方案,可供供电公司根据自身实际情况和电力市场相关信息做出正确的估计,保证供电公司做出正确的决策,从而实现收益最大化的目标。     

The environment and its impact on satisfaction with supplier performance: An investigation of the mediating effects of control mechanisms from the perspective of the manufacturer in the U.S.A.

An important question for manufacturers relates to how to conduct exchanges with suppliers when the interaction is done in an uncertain environment. Existing literature suggests the use of unilateral control (i.e., vertical control over the supplier) to reduce the negative effects of environmental uncertainty, whereas recent research on relational norms suggests bilateral control mechanisms (i.e., the norm of information sharing) as an alternative. We propose that in order to secure satisfactory performance from suppliers, manufacturers rely on different control mechanisms depending upon the level of environmental uncertainty on one hand, and the nature of interdependence in the manufacturer-supplier relationship on the other. Our empirical results based on 162 manufacturers indicate the following: 1) manufacturers' reliance on vertical control increases as environmental uncertainty and power asymmetry increase; 2) by contrast, reliance on the bilateral information sharing increases as interdependence magnitude increases and as environmental uncertainty decreases; 3) suppliers' performance, as perceived by manufacturers, increases with the use of bilateral information sharing.     

Vertical Enclosure: Vertical Integration and the Reluctance to Purchase from a Competitor

Vertical integration can reduce integrating firms' trading opportunities and, contrary to predictions of two-firm models, this loss of trade can make integration unprofitable. If downstream units must commit to suppliers before contracting on the final terms of trade, then suppliers will have ex-post monopoly power. This monopoly power reduces the quality that an integrated supplier will provide to its competitors. Expectations of this quality reduction can prevent firms from purchasing from an integrated supplier even though the supplier would be better off if it could commit to provide its downstream competitors with sufficient quality to retain their business.     

The two economics of vertical restraints

This paper reviews the economics of vertical restraints. There are two economics of these restraints where the different explanations follow from different sets of motivating factors. The first economics presumes that these restraints are imposed by manufacturers on their distributors. Free rider arguments fall in this category. In contrast, the second economics presumes that retailers and other distributors have substantial power over their suppliers. One means to exercise this power is to require supplying manufacturers to enforce vertical restraints. In these circumstances, vertical restraints increase prices and restrict outputs, and thereby have the same economic effects as horizontal restraints.     

Formal governance mechanisms, relational governance mechanisms, and transaction-specific investments in supplier-manufacturer relationships

This study addresses the question of how to design governance mechanisms so that local suppliers are encouraged to make transaction-specific investments in foreign manufacturing firms. Suppliers' transaction-specific investments can increase the efficiency of production for foreign manufacturing firms operating in a host country. However, it can be difficult to induce suppliers to make specialized investments, because of the numerous hazards associated with such investments. Basing its conclusions on the results of a survey of Taiwanese firms using Chinese suppliers, this study examines the effectiveness of both formal governance mechanisms (i.e., contractual agreements and financial commitments) and relational governance mechanisms (i.e., calculative and benevolent trust) in inducing suppliers to make specialized investments. We find that both formal governance and relational governance mechanisms affect suppliers' tendencies to make specialized investments. Additionally, we find that calculative trust acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between formal governance mechanisms and transaction-specific investments.     

Power and firm profitability in supply chains: french manufacturing industry in 1993

The paper examines the relationships between the power of suppliers and buyers and the profitability of sellers who are situated in supply chains between both sets of firms. A review of the literature on power in exchange relations shows there are several power concepts which may have a different impact on seller profitability and whose impact possibly can offset each other. This may be the source of the conflicting evidence on this topic. A failure to distinguish among the concepts may also lead to an underestimation of industry effects relative to resource effects as drivers of firm profitability. The paper uses a new data base of the Banque de France on French manufacturing industry. The anlayses examine whether different power concepts may be empirically identified and what their relationships are with seller profitability. The findings point to the existence of multiple power concepts and indicate that, in the sample, industry effects are more important than firm effects (as measured by relative market share) in explaining seller profitability. The findings also suggest that buyer power explains a much larger percentage of the variance in seller profitability than supplier power. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

关停小火电机组对“十一五”规划电网的影响分析

大多数小火电机组处在电网的负荷中心,对电网起着提供灵活有功和无功电源的作用。通过分析可知,按照要求关停的小火电规模,对国家电网公司经营范围内的"十一五"电网规划总体影响不大,对局部电网供电能力、网架结构、动态无功和网损将产生一定影响,需要增加部分配套的电网建设项目和适当调整原规划中某些电网项目的建设时序,以满足"上大压小"方案实施后安全、可靠供电的需要。     

西北区域自备电厂情况调查分析

西北区域企业自备电厂发展迅速，在保证电力供应、促进地方经济发展、吸引投资等方面发挥了重要作用。同时自备电厂立项建设和运行管理失序，也对电力行业健康发展造成较大的负面影响。在对西北区域自备电厂基本情况进行分析的基础上，指出其目前在运营中存在的问题，并给出了改进建议。     

OK you are now an approved supplier—but you still do not get orders: Understanding the case of the P-Card

The purchase card (P-Card) was introduced in the 1990s as a payment mechanism for smaller value items so that purchase paperwork is reduced, itemized reporting and control become possible, and purchasing and payment are decentralized at the user level. Since the late 1990s, with E-procurement and B-to-B E-commerce, the possibilities of P-Card use have magnified exponentially. However, the adoption and success of P-Cards in organizations has been short of initial expectations.Using P-Cards with approved suppliers is an ideal situation for both buyers and sellers. In practice however, many P-Card users seem to buy many items from suppliers who are not on the approved supplier list. To make payments to these “new” suppliers, organizations need to make exceptions resulting in paperwork, costs, and loss of business for approved suppliers. However, there are many P-Card users who indeed follow the company-approved list and these users may be called “P-Card conforming users.”This article takes a knowledge-based approach and presents a model for conforming P-Card use (CPU). The model is tested in an organization, and results are used to derive managerial and research implications. While orientation training of P-Card users is important, both business marketers and purchasing departments need to reach out directly to the P-Card user to ensure that approved supplier lists work well in an electronic age.