非财务利益相关者与企业资本结构决策

财务利益相关者不能完全解释企业资本结构决策.从非财务利益相关者的角度出发,结合企业自身特征,探讨其对企业资本结构决策的影响.研究结果表明:非财务利益相关者的自身特征如负债水平和行业集中度等会对企业资本结构决策产生影响.进一步地,企业自身特征如产品异质性、行业地位等会改变非财务利益相关者对企业资本结构决策的影响程度.     

Firm Investment and Stakeholder Choices: A Top‐Down Theory of Capital Budgeting

This paper develops a top‐down model of capital budgeting in which privately informed executives make investment choices that convey information to the firm's stakeholders (e.g., employees). Favorable information in this setting encourages stakeholders to take actions that positively contribute to the firm's success (e.g., employees work harder). Within this framework we examine how firms may distort their investment choices to influence the information conveyed to stakeholders and show that investment rigidities and overinvestment can arise as optimal investment distortions. We also examine investment distortions in multi‐divisional firms and compare such distortions to those in single‐division firms.     

Capital Structure Theory and the Fisher Effect

This paper incorporates capital structure theory to model the response of nominal interest rates to expected inflation in a world with taxes. Within an otherwise common framework, the model includes Modigliani-Miller (MM) and Miller capital structure theory, as well as a variation of the Miller model with bankruptcy costs, developed by DeAngelo and Masulis. Within this framework, we derive an equation to predict the response of nominal interest rates under each capital structure hypothesis. With MM theory, our model predicts di_D/d_π value consistent with empirically observed ranges. With Miller theory, the predictions are inaccurate. With DeAngelo-Masulis, the predictions vary widely; the midpoint of the predicted range is less accurate than with Miller theory.     

The Theory of Capital Structure

This paper surveys capital structure theories based on agency costs, asymmetric information, product/input market interactions, and corporate control considerations (but excluding tax-based theories). For each type of model, a brief overview of the papers surveyed and their relation to each other is provided. The central papers are described in some detail, and their results are summarized and followed by a discussion of related extensions. Each section concludes with a summary of the main implications of the models surveyed in the section. Finally, these results are collected and compared to the available evidence. Suggestions for future research are provided.     

上市保险公司资本结构偏好与优化:基于利益相关者理论的分析视角

基于利益相关者理论,本文分析了保险公司股东、保单持有人和保险行业监管机构等三个主要利益相关者对保险公司资本结构的偏好及其影响,在此基础上运用博弈论和股东收益率模型对利益相关者影响下的保险公司资本结构进行理论分析。研究结果表明:在利益相关者的影响作用下,保险公司采用较低的财务杠杆能更好地最大化各利益相关者的效用,优化公司资本结构。这一结论也得到了我国三家A股保险公司上市前后财务杠杆变化的经验数据支持。为此,本文提出降低保险公司财务杠杆、优化资本结构的政策建议。     

Anticipated Earnings Announcements and the Customer–Supplier Anomaly

I test whether the anticipation of earnings news stimulates acquisition of customer information and mitigates returns to the customer–supplier anomaly documented by Cohen and Frazzini (“Economic Links and Predictable Returns.” The Journal of Finance 63 (2008): 1977–2011). I find that attention to a firm's publicly disclosed customers increases shortly before the firm announces earnings, and that customer stock returns predict supplier stock returns shortly before, but not after, the supplier's earnings announcement. I further find some evidence that these predictable returns are increasing in the level of customer information acquisition. These results are unique to anticipated disclosure events and suggest that anticipation of supplier earnings announcements resolves investor limited attention to customer information and accelerates price discovery of customer news.     

Capital Structure Theory and REIT Security Offerings

In this paper, we examine the stock price reactions to announcements of new security offerings by Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). REITs offer a unique setting in which to study these events because they do not pay taxes at the firm level. Theory suggests that the net tax gain to corporate borrowing is unambiguously negative for a REIT. Contrary to some recent studies, however, we find a positive stock price reaction to debt offerings, while the negative equity-issuance effect is preserved. Further empirical evidence lends support to signalling as the explanation for the positive significant debt-issuance effect.     

A Theory of Corporate Capital Structure and Investment

This article uses a general equilibrium framework to explorethe origins and limitations of financial intermediaries. Inthe model, investors have a generic lending technology thatthey can improve at a cost. Those who upgrade become intermediariesto exploit their advantage. However, conflicts with depositorswill limit the banks' market presence, and they will only lendto moderately endowed firms while bondholders will finance cash-richcorporations. The article also analyzes the extent to whichinvestors adopt the superior lending technique, the nature ofbank competition, and how corporate and bank conditions affectinterest rates and investment.     

现代资本结构理论

自Modigliani和Miller提出MM理论以来,资本结构问题一直是理论界和实务界关注的焦点.本文从MM理论及其修正--基于税差的分析、基于权衡理论的资本结构理论、信息不对称条件下的资本结构理论、资本结构的实证研究四个方面阐述了自20世纪50年代以来资本结构理论的发展和研究成果,试图为我国学者开展资本结构研究提供借鉴.     

现代资本结构理论演进探讨

本文全面介绍了现代资本结构理论的演进。     

Dynamic Capital Structure Choice: Theory and Tests

This paper develops a model of dynamic capital structure choice in the presence of recapitalization costs. The theory provides the optimal dynamic recapitalization policy as a function of firm-specific characteristics. We find that even small recapitalization costs lead to wide swings in a firm's debt ratio over time. Rather than static leverage measures, we use the observed debt ratio range of a firm as an empirical measure of capital structure relevance. The results of empirical tests relating firms' debt ratio ranges to firm-specific features strongly support the theoretical model of relevant capital structure choice in a dynamic setting.     

西方新资本结构理论综述

资本结构理论所研究的基本问题是企业资本结构与企业价值的关系。西方经济学界围绕这一基本问题展开了全面深入的研究,形成了许多不同的资本结构理论。20世纪70年代以来,随着信息经济学、委托代理理论等现代分析工具引入资本结构分析,资本结构理论研究获得了新的发展,一系列解释资本结构问题的新观点便应运而生,其流派众多,具有代表性的理论有以下几种:代理成本理论、信号传递理论和优序融资理论等。     

资本结构理论及其对解决中小企业融资困难的启示

中小企业融资难的问题是制约国民经济健康持续发展的重要因素,对此理论界和企业界给予了极大关注,也进行了广泛的研究,提出了一些政策建议。但是,问题的解决要注重主要矛盾。本文从资本结构理论的分析入手,对中小企业融资方式的优序进行了探讨,指出解决中小企业权益性资本需求是关键,并提出了相关的政策建议。     

国外资本结构代理成本理论综述

企业不同的融资方式形成不同的利益格局,不同的利益格局势必导致不同的利益冲突,不同的利益冲突导致了不同的融资方式的代理成本.围绕着融资方式的代理成本的研究形成了蔚为壮观的现代资本结构的代理成本理论.     

Screening,Market Signalling,and Capital Structure Theory

This paper develops an equilibrium model in which informational asymmetries about the qualities of products offered for sale are resolved through a mechanism which combines the signalling and costly screening approaches. The model is developed in the context of a capital market setting in which bondholders produce costly information about a firm's a priori imperfectly known earnings distribution and use this information in specifying a bond valuation schedule to the firm. Given this schedule, the firm's optimal choices of debt-equity ratio and debt maturity structure subsequently signal to prospective shareholders the relevant parameters of the firm's earnings distribution.     

资本结构影响因素：理论和证据

国外研究表明，资产结构、公司规模、非债务税盾、成长性、财务困境成本、投资额、独特性、产生内部资源能力等因素影响资本结构的选择。实证分析显示，除了财务困境成本因素外，影响国外公司的特征因素几乎也可以同样的方式影响中国上市公司的资本结构。     

Bank Capital and Lending Relationships

This paper investigates the mechanisms behind the matching of banks and firms in the loan market and the implications of this matching for lending relationships, bank capital, and credit provision. I find that bank‐dependent firms borrow from well‐capitalized banks, while firms with access to the bond market borrow from banks with less capital. This matching of bank‐dependent firms with stable banks smooths cyclicality in aggregate credit provision and mitigates the effects of bank shocks on the real economy.     

A Theory of Capital Structure Relevance under Imperfect Information

Firms raise debt and equity capital to finance a positive net present value project in perfectly competitive capital markets; firm insiders know the function generating the random firm cash flow but potential capital suppliers do not. Taking into account the incentives of insiders to misrepresent their firm type, capital suppliers attempt to design financing mixes of debt and equity that eliminate the adverse incentives of insiders and correctly price securities. Necessary conditions for a costless separating equilibrium are developed to show that the amount of debt used by a firm is monotonically related to its unobservable true value.