Bank Competition: Measurement,Decision‐Making,and Risk‐Taking

This paper investigates whether greater competition increases or decreases individual bank and banking system risk. Using a new text‐based measure of competition, and an instrumental variables analysis that exploits exogenous variation in bank deregulation, we provide robust evidence that greater competition increases both individual bank risk and a bank's contribution to system‐wide risk. Specifically, we find that higher competition is associated with lower underwriting standards, less timely loan loss recognition, and a shift toward noninterest revenue. Further, we find that higher competition is associated with higher stand‐alone risk of individual banks, greater sensitivity of a bank's downside equity risk to system‐wide distress, and a greater contribution by individual banks to downside risk of the banking sector.     

Dynamics and Heterogeneity of Inter‐ and Intranational Risk Sharing

This study extends the empirical model of incomplete risk sharing developed by Crucini ( 1999 ) by allowing unequal income pooling and explores the implications of using an alternative measure for aggregate risk. Based on samples from Canadian provinces, G‐7, and OECD countries spanning the years 1961–2008, we show that the empirical procedure used by Crucini tends to overstate the average degree of risk sharing and understate the dispersion of risk sharing, when compared to our unequal income pooling model. The empirical results from our unequal pooling model show that (i) the degree and dispersion of risk sharing across Canadian provinces, G‐7 countries, and OECD countries remain stable over time; (ii) the degree of risk sharing across Canadian provinces is higher than that across the G‐7 and OECD countries; and (iii) the degree of risk sharing seems positively related to equity and trade diversification.     

Cream Skimming: Innovations in Insurance Risk Classification and Adverse Selection

We demonstrate how innovations in insurance risk classification can lead to adverse selection, or cream skimming, against insurers that are slow to adopt such pricing innovations. Using a model in which insurers with insufficient pricing data cannot differentiate between low‐ and high‐risk policyholders and therefore charge both the same premium, we show how innovative insurers develop new risk classification data to identify overcharged low‐risk policyholders and attract them from rival insurers with reduced prices. Less innovative insurers thus insure a growing percentage of high‐risk customers, resulting in adverse selection attributable to their informational disadvantage. Next, we examine two cases in which “Big Data” innovations in risk classification led to concerns about cream skimming among U.S. auto insurers. First, we track the rapid adoption of credit‐based insurance scores as pricing variables in personal auto insurance markets. Second, we examine the growing popularity of usage‐based insurance programs like telematics, plans in which insurers use data on policyholders’ actual driving behavior to set prices that attract low‐risk customers. Issues associated with the execution of such pricing strategies are discussed. In both cases, we document how rival insurers quickly adopt successful innovations to reduce their exposure to adverse selection.     

Monetary Policy and the Asset Risk‐Taking Channel

How important is the risk‐taking channel for monetary policy? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a quantitative monetary DSGE model where banks choose excessively risky investments, due to an agency problem that distorts banks' incentives. As the real interest rate declines, these distortions become more important and excessive risk taking increases, lowering the efficiency of investment. We show theoretically that this novel transmission channel generates a new monetary policy trade‐off between inflation and real interest rate stabilization, whereby the central bank may prefer to tolerate greater inflation volatility in order to lower excessive risk taking.     

“逆向选择”风险与非财务因素分析——兼议信贷市场准入资格调查

信贷市场中的买卖双方是一种博弈关系,信贷营销中存在“逆向选择”风险。作为银行客户经理如何判断,分析“逆向选择”风险,其中重要的信息采集来自于非财务因素分析。非财务因素分析要准确采集来自目标企业的相关信息,并着重从行业风险、经营风险、管理风险等方面来进行,并要紧抓重点,依靠对会计政策的熟练掌握来感知企业。     

Financing Shipping Companies and Shipping Operations: A Risk‐Management Perspective

Shipping has always been a volatile and cyclical business. The extreme changes in revenues, operating cash flows, and asset values during the recent financial crises have upset the usual means of financing shipping companies. While bank debt will remain important in the future, the new regulatory environment has been forcing shipping banks to shift these risks from their balance sheets to capital markets through instruments such as loan securitization. As a result, the shipping industry will increasingly look to capital markets for external funds. And shipping banks are likely to change from being commercial bank lending institutions to becoming more like investment banks that arrange a variety of financing solutions, including high yield bonds or public equity. Risk management will be central to shipping companies in this new environment. Shipping companies can manage their own risks by modifying operations, employing freight and vessel price derivatives, or adjusting their capital structures. To arrive at the value‐maximizing combination of these three basic methods, they must decide which risks to bear, which to manage internally, and which to transfer to the capital markets. These decisions require shipping financial managers to assess the effect of each risk on firm value, understand how each contributes to total risk, and determine the most cost‐effective way to limit that risk to an acceptable level.     

An Insurance Market Simulation With Both Adverse and Advantageous Selection

The theory of adverse selection predicts that high‐risk individuals are more likely to buy insurance than low‐risk individuals if asymmetric information regarding individuals’ risk type is present in the market. The theory of advantageous selection predicts the opposite—a negative relationship between insurance coverage and risk type can be obtained when hidden knowledge in other dimensions (e.g., the degree of risk aversion) is present in addition to the risk type. Using the heterogeneity of insurance buyers in either risk type or risk aversion, we first introduce a classroom‐based insurance market simulation game to show that adverse selection and advantageous selection can coexist. We then explain the underlying concepts using two methods: a mathematical framework based on expected utility theory and an empirical framework based on the results of the game itself. The game is easy to implement, reinforces textbook concepts by providing students a hands‐on experience, and supplements current textbooks by bringing their content up to date with current research.     

Value Relevance of Environmental Provisions Pre‐ and Post‐IFRS

The purpose of this paper is to compare the value relevance of environmental provisions as recorded under Canadian/U.S. GAAP and IFRS accounting frameworks with consideration of the impact of voluntarily issuing stand‐alone sustainability reports. The value relevance of environmental provisions is tested using a modified Ohlson (1995) model. We exploit IFRS reconciliations as a quasi‐experimental setting to conduct this comparison. Results indicate that environmental provisions recorded under either framework only act as liabilities for oil and gas firms that release stand‐alone sustainability reports. For other firms in the oil and gas industry, and the mining industry, the liability nature of these provisions appears to be discounted by the market. Furthermore, for firms in the oil and gas industry that do not have stand‐alone CSR reports, provisions appear to be interpreted by the market as a costly signal about future growth. Instead of downwardly affecting market values, this information is associated with higher market values. In terms of the transition to IFRS, we find that, while the IFRS provisions are significantly higher than under former GAAP, they do not improve value relevance for investors. Accounting standard setters should consider examining the changes in the current standards from the original Canadian environmental provision reporting requirements under Capital Assets section 3060.39, as it was rightfully shown to be a relevant proxy for unbooked liabilities (Li and McConomy, 1999; Bewley, 2005) rather than earnings expectancy. The study builds upon prior research to examine the value of accounting standards that have gone through significant changes.     

The Risk‐Taking Channel of Monetary Policy: Exploring All Avenues

The literature on the risk‐taking channel of monetary policy grew quickly, leading to scattered evidence. We examine this channel through different angles, exploring detailed information on loan origination and performance. Ex ante riskier borrowers receive more funding at the extensive margin when interest rates are lower. Ex post performance is independent of the level of interest rates at origination. Still, loans granted in periods of very low and stable interest rates show higher default rates once interest rates start to increase. Risk‐taking is stronger among banks with lower capital ratios, suggesting that this channel may be linked to managerial incentives for risk‐shifting.     

Background Risk and the Performance of Insurance Markets under Adverse Selection

Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk.     

On the High‐Frequency Dynamics of Hedge Fund Risk Exposures

We propose a new method to model hedge fund risk exposures using relatively high‐frequency conditioning variables. In a large sample of funds, we find substantial evidence that hedge fund risk exposures vary across and within months, and that capturing within‐month variation is more important for hedge funds than for mutual funds. We consider different within‐month functional forms, and uncover patterns such as day‐of‐the‐month variation in risk exposures. We also find that changes in portfolio allocations, rather than in the risk exposures of the underlying assets, are the main drivers of hedge funds' risk exposure variation.     

What Doesn't Kill You Will Only Make You More Risk‐Loving: Early‐Life Disasters and CEO Behavior

The literature on managerial style posits a linear relation between a chief executive officer's (CEOs) past experiences and firm risk. We show that there is a nonmonotonic relation between the intensity of CEOs’ early‐life exposure to fatal disasters and corporate risk‐taking. CEOs who experience fatal disasters without extremely negative consequences lead firms that behave more aggressively, whereas CEOs who witness the extreme downside of disasters behave more conservatively. These patterns manifest across various corporate policies including leverage, cash holdings, and acquisition activity. Ultimately, the link between CEOs’ disaster experience and corporate policies has real economic consequences on firm riskiness and cost of capital.     

Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk‐Taking Channel: Evidence from the United States

We present evidence of a risk‐taking channel of monetary policy for the U.S. banking system. We use confidential data on banks’ internal ratings on loans to businesses over the period 1997 to 2011 from the Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms of Business Lending. We find that ex ante risk‐taking by banks (measured by the risk rating of new loans) is negatively associated with increases in short‐term interest rates. This relationship is more pronounced in regions that are less in sync with the nationwide business cycle, and less pronounced for banks with relatively low capital or during periods of financial distress.     

Morgan Stanley's Risk‐Reward Views: Unlocking the Full Potential of Fundamental Analysis

Since 2008, Risk‐Reward Views have been the basis for the recommendations on all the stocks covered by Morgan Stanley's equity research analysts globally. The firm's analysts use this systematic approach to communicate a broader range of fundamental insights about expected returns and risks, and to articulate more clearly the logic underlying their price targets and calls, and the level of conviction associated with them. The rationale for this approach is to align the firm's research product with its clients' thinking and investment discipline while also creating a link between traditional equity analysis and widely accepted principles of modern portfolio management. Too many sell‐side analysts still try to manifest expertise and conviction with one‐sided investment theses backed by single‐point estimates and “table pounding.” That does a disservice to investors who are looking to sell‐side analysts for an ongoing dialogue about the future with experts on company fundamentals. Risk‐Reward Views are designed to produce a more complete view of the risk‐reward trade‐off in a given stock. They are meant to supplement the use of quant‐only risk models that, while offering at least the illusion of precision, are also often opaque and backward looking. The approach aims to increase transparency while avoiding unnecessary complexity by focusing on a handful of critical uncertainties and modeling a manageable number of coherent scenarios that are relevant to investor debates and cover a full range of plausible outcomes. This article focuses on the theoretical underpinnings of the department's Risk‐Reward initiative. For a more detailed discussion of the institutional setting and the processes followed to implement these ideas, readers are referred to the recently published Harvard Business School case study, “The Risk‐Reward Framework at Morgan Stanley Research” (Harvard Business School Case N9–111–011).     

Dealers' Adverse Selection Costs and the Evaluation of Alternative Measures of the Earnings Release Signal

This study investigates the relationship between over-the-counter dealers' adverse selection costs and alternative measures of the earnings release signal to evaluate the quality of the signal. The measure of the earnings release signal most associated with dealers' adverse selection costs is suggested as being the least noisy measure of the information impounded in security prices during earnings release periods. The results suggest that the seasonal Box-Jenkins earnings expectation model known as the Brown-Rozeff “premier” model generates the signal most consistent with the information impounded in security prices during earnings release periods.     

Incentivizing Calculated Risk‐Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers

We conduct an experiment with commercial bank loan officers to test how performance compensation affects risk assessment and lending. High‐powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending decisions. This effect is muted, however, by deferred compensation and limited liability, two standard features of loan officer compensation contracts. We find that career concerns and personality traits affect loan officer behavior, but show that the response to incentives does not vary with traits such as risk‐aversion, optimism, or overconfidence. Finally, we present evidence that incentives distort the assessment of credit risk, even among professionals with many years of experience.     

Stealing Deposits: Deposit Insurance,Risk‐Taking,and the Removal of Market Discipline in Early 20th‐Century Banks

Deposit insurance reduces liquidity risk but can increase insolvency risk by encouraging reckless behavior. Several U.S. states installed deposit insurance laws before the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and those laws applied only to some depository institutions within those states. These experiments present a unique testing ground for investigating the effect of deposit insurance. We show that deposit insurance removed market discipline constraining uninsured banks. Taking advantage of World War I's rise in world agricultural prices, insured banks increased their insolvency risk and competed aggressively for deposits. When prices fell after the war, the insurance systems collapsed and suffered high losses.     

Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection and Yaari's Dual Theory of Risk

Under Yaari's dual theory of risk, we determine the equilibrium separating contracts for high and low risks in a competitive insurance market, in which risks are defined only by their expected losses, that is, a high risk is a risk that has a greater expected loss than a low risk. Also, we determine the pooling equilibrium contract when insurers are assumed non-myopic. Expected utility theory generally predicts that optimal insurance indemnity payments are nonlinear functions of the underlying loss due to the nonlinearity of agents' utility functions. Under Yaari's dual theory, we show that under mild technical conditions the indemnity payment is a piecewise linear function of the loss, a common property of insurance coverages.