Discriminating “Schumpeterian” from “Austrian” informal investors—an empirical assessment

This study proposes a theoretically informed typology of international informal investors. This means that the Schumpeterian type is contrasted with Austrian informal investors. The governing paradigm in the neoclassical framework is economic equilibrium. However, the creation of disequilibrium is central to Schumpeterian entrepreneurship. This is unlike Austrian entrepreneurship, which regards movement toward economic equilibrium. Hence, Schumpeterian-type investors are perceived to facilitate disequilibrating change, whereas Austrian-type investors promote equilibrating change. Employing a two-group discriminant analysis with robust data from Norway, the findings support the concept that Schumpeterian and Austrian-type investors differ with regard to their selection of investment proposals, monitoring, and, not least, their backgrounds. The data suggest that Schumpeterian-type investors invest more actively, into the “early stage” category of new firms than Austrian-type investors. Schumpeterian-type investors are more highly educated than their counterparts and monitor their firms more actively by financial reports and stockholder meetings. By contrast, Austrian-type investors appear to have more experience than their Schumpeterian counterparts. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Born globals – presence,performance and prospects

The concept born global firms has gained a spectacular increase in interest from both academic and political circles. Rigorous quantitative treatment of born global firms are however rare in the international business/economics literature. Implementing unique data on all Swedish start-ups during 1998–2008 in the manufacturing sector, we conclude that born global firms are a very rare event, that their prevalence seems invariant to time, and that they perform similar to other matched “twin” firms with regard to profitability and productivity but report a considerably higher growth in employment and sales. These results are robust to a wider definition of born global firms and to the timing of performance measurements.     

Publicly traded venture capital funds: implications for institutional “fund of funds” investors

Institutional investors supply the bulk of the funds which are used by venture capital investment firms in financing emerging growth companies. These investors typically place their funds in a number of venture capital firms, thus achieving diversification across a range of investment philosophy, geography, management, industry, investment life cycle stage and type of security. Essentially, each institutional investor manages a “fund of funds,” attempting through the principles of portfolio theory to reduce the risk of participating in the venture capital business while retaining the up-side potential which was the original source of attraction to the business. Because most venture capital investment firms are privately held limited partnerships, it is very difficult to measure risk adjusted rates of return on these funds on a continuous basis.In this paper, we use the set of twelve publicly traded venture capital firms as a proxy to develop insight regarding the risk reduction effect of investment in a portfolio of venture capital funds, i.e., a fund of funds. Measurements of weekly total returns for the shares of these funds are compared with similar returns on a set of comparably sized “maximum capital gain” mutual funds and the daily return of the S&P 500 Index. A comparison of returns on an individual fund basis, as well as a correlation of daily returns of these individual funds, were made. In order to adjust for any systematic bias resulting from the “thin market” characteristic of the securities of the firms being observed, the Scholes-Williams beta estimation technique was used to reduce the effects of nonsynchronous trading.The results indicate that superior returns are realized on such portfolios when compared with portfolios of growth-oriented mutual funds and with the S&P 500 Index. This is the case whether the portfolios are equally weighted (i.e., “naive”) or constructed to be mean-variant efficient, ex ante, according to the capital asset pricing model. When compared individually, more of the venture funds dominated the S&P Market Index than did the mutual funds and by much larger margins. When combined in portfolios, the venture capital funds demonstrated very low beta coefficients and very low covariance of returns among portfolio components when compared with portfolios of mutual funds. To aid in interpreting these results, we analyzed the discounts and premia from net asset value on the funds involved and compared them to Thompson's findings regarding the contribution of such differences to abnormal returns. We found that observed excess returns greatly exceed the level which would be explained by these differences.The implications of these results for the practitioner are significant. They essentially tell us that, while investment in individual venture capital deals is considered to have high risk relative to potential return, combinations of deals (i.e., venture capital portfolios) were shown to produce superior risk adjusted returns in the market place. Further, these results show that further combining these portfolios into larger portfolios (i.e., “funds of funds”) provides even greater excess returns over the market index, thus plausibly explaining the “fund of funds” approach to venture capital investment taken by many institutional investors.While the funds studied are relatively small and are either small business investment companies or business development companies, they serve as a useful proxy for the organized venture capital industry, despite the fact that the bulk of the funds in the industry are institutionally funded, private, closely held limited partnerships which do not trade continuously in an open market. These results demonstrate to investors the magnitude of the differences in risk adjusted total return between publicly traded venture capital funds and growth oriented mutual funds on an individual fund basis. They also demonstrate to investors the power of the “fund of funds” approach to institutional involvement in the venture capital business. Because such an approach produces better risk adjusted investment results for the institutional investor, it seems to justify a greater flow of capital into the business from more risk averse institutional investment sources. This may mean greater access to institutional funds for those seeking to form new venture capital funds. For entrepreneurs seeking venture capital funds for their young companies, it may also mean a lower potential cost of capital for the financing of business venturing. From the viewpoint of public policy makers interested in facilitating the funding of business venturing, it may provide insight regarding regulatory issues surrounding taxation and the barriers and incentives which affect venture capital investment.     

The Manufacturing Sector’s Environmental Motives: A Game-theoretic Analysis

What motivates manufacturing companies to make costly investments in producing in an environmentally clean manner? The traditional argument is that such behaviour is value reducing, and that therefore, firms must be forced by regulation to invest in “green” production processes. A counter-argument is that firms have an incentive to make environmental investments in an attempt to attract “green” consumers and investors, hence gaining competitive advantage over their rivals. In this paper, we employ a game-theoretic approach that demonstrates that competing firms’ incentives to make voluntary investments in environmental “clean-up” are affected by the size of the investment costs and the extent of consumer and investor “green” awareness. We argue that an increase in green behaviour can be induced by a combination of governmental subsidies for firms that invest in environmentally clean production processes, together with an education program that promotes “green” awareness amongst consumers, investors and the managers themselves.     

Innovative Internationalisation in New firms: Born Globals–the Swedish Case

During the past few years, the phenomenon of Born Globals has been highlighted in many studies. Such firms adopt a global approach right from their inception or very shortly thereafter. This behaviour challenges the traditional internationalisation models of slow and gradual development with respect to geographical markets and market entry modes. In this paper a conceptual framework is developed from earlier research and includes the factors: globalisation, entrepreneurs, networks, and industry. A survey showed that Born Globals were still very uncommon in Sweden. However, four Born Global firms were identified and analysed with the framework. It was concluded that the ongoing globalisation has made it easier to conduct Born Global strategies. However, active entrepreneurs, who recognised the global opportunities, were crucial for the implementation of these strategies, in which personal networks were used as tools.     

Emerging strategies in the venture capital industry

This article reports a study of the future direction of the venture capital industry by examining the basic strategies and strategic assumptions of a broad sample of venture capital firms. There are three main sets of results:First, the once homogeneous venture capital industry is rapidly dividing into several different “strategic groups.” Members of these “groups” are increasingly distinguishing themselves from other groups on four basic dimensions followed by member firms: 1. Financial Resources—Equity capital comes from a greater variety of sources (five major sources) resulting in fundamentally different demands on the mission of the receiving venture capital firm. 2. Staff Resources—The way venture capital firms use staff resources, particularly regarding investee management assistance, is becoming increasingly varied across different groups. Some firms provide fewer than 2-days per year, while others provide up to 450 man-days per year per client. 3. Venture Stages—While the overall industry retains a primary interest in stage 1,2, and 3 investment, specific firms vary considerably in the distribution of investment emphasis across these three stages. 4. Use of Financial Resources-Firms in the industry are becoming increasingly differentiated in the size of minimum investments they make ($100 M to $1000 M) and in their role as a direct investor versus a “broker” for institutional funds. Practicing venture capitalists should make use of this first set of findings in two ways. First, they may find it useful to compare their firm's orientation along these four strategic dimensions with those of the firm's that comprised this study. Second, they may seek to use these four strategic dimensions as a basis on which they might examine, clarify, and/or redefine the marketing strategy pursued by their firm.A second set of results identified three goals and priorities of venture capital firms that have neither changed over time nor across increasingly different strategic groups. Annualized, after-tax return on investments of between 25% and 40% remain the most common objective across all firms. A 5-to-6 year investment time horizon and a major emphasis on the quality of the management team in evaluating new deals were universal priorities across diverse venture capital firms.A third finding in this study was that venture capital firms profess greater “certainty” about the future direction of the venture capital industry than the direction of their firm. The most notable example of this is a strong sense that industry-wide rates of return are headed downward yet few senior partners expect their firm to experience this decline.Practicing venture capitalists may be interested to peruse these results to see what trends are predicted within the venture capital industry by this subsample of that industry. Second, they should consider the finding that industry-wide rates of return are headed downward in light of the first two sets of findings to develop their own opinion about the future performance of different strategic groups within the industry.It is important to note that the sample of venture capital firms on which this study was based did not include most of the larger, older funds. Some of these funds would be characterized as “industry leaders, pace-setters, and innovators.” The sample provides a solid representation of the “broad middle” of the venture capital industry and newer entrants into the industry. While larger, older funds are under represented, their impact on future trends and strategies in the industry is captured to some extent in the set of questions about “future direction of the venture capital industry.“Finally, the emerging strategic groups in the venture capital industry that were identified by this study may be useful information for investors as well as users of venture capital. For investors, the opportunity to participate in venture capital activity should become more clearly understood and varied. Basically, this study should help investors differentiate the strategic posture of different venture capital firms and funds on four factors rather than simply industry/geographic considerations.For users of venture capital, the results of this study suggest a possibility for multiple options that are both more accessible and more catered to specific needs. Users of venture capital should find a clearer basis on which to differentiate venture capital firms in terms of venture stage priorities, staff utilization orientations, sources and uses of financial resources. This should make for more informed “shopping” among different venture capital sources and provide a basis on which to “shop” for the most compatible firm.     

Informal Investment in Transition Economies: Individual Characteristics and Clusters

This paper investigates the factors driving informal investment in Croatia, Hungary and Slovenia. Using Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data, we find that the low rates of informal investment activity and the small amounts of investments in these countries are driven by entrepreneurial behaviors consistent with limited market economy experience. We extend prior studies by investigating the role of business ownership, and identify significant differences between individuals with and without business ownership experience in terms of having start-up skills, knowing an entrepreneur and fearing failure. Cluster analysis identifies seven distinct groups of informal investors, and reveals the heterogeneity in terms of investors’ age, gender, level of education, amount of investment, start-up skills, ownership status, income, opportunity perception and country of residence.      

International entrepreneurial capability: The measurement and a comparison between born global firms and traditional exporters in China

This study presents the development and application of a new measure of international entrepreneurial capability. The data were collected from manufacturing firms in China, both traditional exporters and born global firms. Five key dimensions of international entrepreneurial capability were identified from the capability and entrepreneurship literature. After scale purification and validation, this new measure was used to examine the relationship between international entrepreneurial capability and global market performance. Born global firms are statistically different from traditional firms along three dimensions: international learning capability, international networking capability, and international experience. Implications and future research directions are then provided.     

The asymmetric effect of warranty payments on firm value: The moderating role of advertising,R&D,and industry concentration

Changes in firms’ warranty payments are informative signals that enable investors to form timely expectations about potential changes in product quality. The authors’ survey shows that warranty payments affect potential investors’ product quality assessments and stock investment likelihood. Their quantitative analysis reveals an asymmetric stock market reaction: unanticipated increases in warranty payments (which signal quality “losses”) lower stock returns but unanticipated decreases do not affect stock returns. Two important factors moderate this relationship. First, boosting advertising spending attenuates the negative stock return effect of unanticipated increases in warranty payments. Second, unanticipated decreases in warranty payments, which signal quality “gains”, translate into higher stock returns when the industry has become less concentrated. Interestingly, changes in R&D spending do not moderate investors’ response to unanticipated increases or decreases in warranty payments. The authors advise firms to use advertising to lessen the harm from warranty payment increases and to strongly communicate warranty payment decreases in the face of intensified competition. The authors also caution that offering warranties in general does not ensure greater firm value as declining quality firms that myopically offer warranty programs experience lower firm value than those that do not provide warranties.     

Venture capital investor type and the growth mode of new technology-based firms

Independent venture capital (IVC) investors have more powerful incentives than corporate venture capital (CVC) investors to take actions that signal their capabilities (i.e. to “grandstand”). We argue that this should engender differences in the treatment effect of IVC and CVC on the mode of growth of portfolio companies. Short-term sales growth of IVC-backed firms in the period that immediately follows the VC investment should outpace that of CVC-backed firms, while we expect no difference in employment growth. We find support for these theoretical predictions on a sample of 531 Italian new technology-based firms, using several panel estimators to control for endogeneity of IVC and CVC.     

The informal venture capital market: Aspects of scale and market efficiency

Risk capital is a resource essential to the formation and growth of entrepreneurial ventures. In a society that is increasingly dependent upon innovation and entrepreneurship for its economic vitality, the performance of the venture capital markets is a matter of fundamental concern to entrepreneurs, venture investors and to public officials. This article deals with the informal venture capital market, the market in which entrepreneurs raise equity-type financing from private investors, (business angels). The informal venture capital market is virtually invisible and often misunderstood. It is composed of a diverse and diffuse population of individuals of means; many of whom have created their own successful ventures. There are no directories of individual venture investors and no public records of their investment transactions. Consequently, the informal venture capital market poses many unanswered questions.The author discusses two aspects of the informal venture capital market: questions of scale and market efficiency. The discussion draws upon existing research to extract and synthesize data that provide a reasonable basis for inferences about scale and efficiency.Private venture investors tend to be self-made individuals with substantial business and financial experience and with a net worth of $1 million or more. The author estimates that the number of private venture investors in the United States is at least 250,000, of whom about 100,000 are active in any given year. By providing seed capital for ventures that subsequently raise funds from professional venture investors or in the public equity markets and equity financing for privately-held firms that are growing faster than internal cash flow can support, private investors fill gaps in the institutional equity markets.The author estimates that private investors manage a portfolio of venture investments aggregating in the neighborhood of $50 billion, about twice the capital managed by professional venture investors. By participating in smaller transactions, private investors finance over five times as many entrepreneurs as professional venture investors; 20,000 or more firms per year compared to two or three thousand. The typical angel-backed venture raises about $250,000 from three or more private investors.Despite the apparent scale of the informal venture capital market, the author cites evidence that the market is relatively inefficient. It is a market characterized by limited information about investors and investment opportunities. Furthermore, many entrepreneurs and private investors are unfamiliar with the techniques of successful venture financing. The author's scale and efficiency inferences, coupled with evidence documenting gaps between private and social returns from innovation, prompt questions about public as well as private initiatives to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market.The article concludes with a discussion of Venture Capital Network, Inc. (VCN), an experimental effort to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market. VCN's procedures and performance are described, followed by a discussion of the lessons learned during the first two years of the experiment.     

South Korean MNEs’ international HRM approach: Hybridization of global standards and local practices

This paper analyses the international Human Resource Management (HRM) approaches of Korean Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). Through a study of nine major Korean MNEs’ approaches to subsidiary-HRM, it is argued that the firms pursue hybridization through a blending of localization and global standardization across detailed elements in five broad HRM practice areas. Local discretion is allowed if not counter to global HRM system requirements and “global best practices” used as the template for global standardization of selected HRM elements. This strategic orientation appears to be part of a deliberate response to the “liabilities of origin” born by firms from non-dominant economies.     

Corporate governance,agency problems and international cross-listings: A defense of the bonding hypothesis

Why firms from around the world seek to cross-list their shares on overseas exchanges has intrigued scholars during the past two decades. A general dissatisfaction with the conventional wisdom about investment barriers segmenting global investors and how cross-listings overcome those barriers cleared the way for newer wisdom about informational problems and agency conflicts, and how firms could overcome weaknesses in corporate governance by listing on, and thus “bonding” to, overseas markets with stronger regulatory oversight, stringent reporting and disclosure requirements and investor protections. Critics have challenged the viability of the bonding hypothesis, which I answer in this review.     

Learning and innovation of Chinese firms along the paths of “Bring In” to “Go Global”

Over the past several decades, the “Bring In” and “Go Global” policies implemented in China have encouraged an unprecedented level of investment in and out of the country, creating unique opportunities for Chinese firms to learn and innovate along the paths of inward and outward internationalization. The international business (IB) literature has yet to satisfactorily explain what has been learnt by the Chinese firms and whether and how their learning and innovation have taken place over time. This special issue examines the specific content, nature, mechanisms, processes, and internal and external conditions and contexts of learning and innovation of Chinese firms during the course of inward and outward internationalization. We provide an overview of the “Bring In” and “Go Global” policies, assess the current state of the field, and explicate how the research articles in the special issue contribute to the understanding of learning and innovation of Chinese firms along the paths of inward and outward internationalization.     

Sales Training in a Dynamic Market

Abstract

The Singaporean hotel industry is examined, with particular emphasis on me differences between global and local sales force training. Empirical evidence indicates that there is a wide divergence between global and local practices. It appears that global firms perceive that sales training leads to greater sales force performance and view sales training as being part of their strategic marketing plan. Global firms also employ a more formal training curriculum, focus on “soft” competencies, and have an established training culture. Conversely, local firms rely upon “on-the-job training (OJT)” and appear not to understand that sales training programs can be a source of competitive advantage. Managerial implications and suggestions for future research are presented.     

Misleading Disclosure of Pro Forma Earnings: An Empirical Examination

The Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act was passed in 2002 in response to various instances of corporate malfeasance. The Act, designed to protect investors, led to wide-ranging regulation over various actions of managers, auditors and investment analysts. Part of SOX, and the focus of this study, targeted the disclosure by firms of “pro forma” earnings, an alternate (from GAAP earnings), flexible and unaudited measure of firm performance. Specifically, SOX directed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to craft regulation which would reduce – and preferably eliminate – any pro forma earnings disclosure which might be “misleading”. Examining earnings press releases over a 3-year period, this study addresses three questions. Were firms disclosing pro forma in a potentially misleading manner, what was the nature of this potentially misleading disclosure, and did SOX affect the disclosure practices? We find the following. In 2001 (prior to SOX), 53 firms – over 10% of all U.S. S&;P 500 firms – were disclosing pro forma earnings in a potentially misleading manner. This was being done most commonly by using traditional GAAP terminology (e.g., “net income”) in the press release headline to describe what was later in the press release revealed to be a pro forma amount (i.e., “net income excluding special items”). By 2003 (subsequent to the SEC regulation), potentially misleading disclosure practices were seen in less than 1% of the earnings press releases of S&;P 500 firms. This significant reduction suggests that managers, prior to the regulation, were either careless in their pro forma reporting practice, or were intentionally – and unethically – attempting to mislead investors. Either way, we conclude that the SEC regulation was both necessary and effective.     

Evaluating Political Risk Forecasting Models: What Works?

Definitions of “political risk” abound, including with “assessments” or “analysis,” but even though ratings are widely used by investors, few understand either the theory behind particular instruments or what the ratings say about their potential investment. The assessment of political risk works backward from losses to foreign investors (not domestic) that could have been insured or protected, to a determination of how high the risk is, what the cost of the likely loss might be, the type of insurance coverage that might be necessary, and then to what an investor should be willing to pay to protect against that risk. A wide range of potential losses and potential causes of those losses is covered by the many political risk assessment firms and indices that are available to potential investors. BERI, the PRS Group, ICRG, the Eurasia Group, PERC (Hong Kong), and many others provide an array of ratings that investors can employ in making their choices. Few of these focus on the critical element of forecasting. Insurance doesn't relate to circumstances of the moment but rather those of the future. What will they be? Just a few of the risk assessments (PRS, BERI, ICRG) deal explicitly with the future, as good as that might be. Few also deal with the matter of risks to particular industries, companies, regions of a country, or external circumstances (what are the country's neighbors up to?). This article offers some suggestions on improving the political risk assessment business. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Investment Patterns of Informal Investors in the Alberta Private Equity Market*

This study identifies three main types of informal investors in private equity markets: relationship investors, opportunity‐based investors, and angel investors. We find evidence that the first two investor types are a major total source of capital and they prefer to invest smaller amounts close to home and in the context of existing relationships. With respect to angel investors, we find evidence of stratification in their desired investment amount which is consistent with a model where their investments evolve though a life cycle of investing. We also find evidence that changes to capital market regulations that allow for lower investment amounts by this type of investor increase the amount of capital available for early‐stage firms.     

Globalization and marketing strategies of Born Globals in SMOPECs

This research examines Born Global companies, which are facing tremendous entrepreneurial and managerial challenges related to instant or rapid globalization. A major research problem addressed is whether the strategies and processes of Born Globals differ essentially from those of other firms in respect to globalization and global marketing. Based on a literature analysis, we first examine the concept of Born Globals and then turn to a review of the research dealing with the globalization and marketing strategies of Born Globals. Survey results on 89 Finnish Born Globals from high‐tech, high‐design, high‐service, high‐know‐how, and high‐system business areas are presented. Their domestic stage lasts for an average of only 2.1 years. For conventional companies, the period is ten times longer. Furthermore, Born Globals can be classified on the basis of their development into three preliminary stages (research & development [RD], domestic, and entry) and into four major stages (starting, development, growth, and mature). The study then proceeds to examine the globalization and global marketing strategies of Born Globals through a multiple case study of 30 case companies representing the above development stages. Special attention is paid to the mature Born Globals, which were found to have passed quickly through the conventional internationalization stages, jumped over some stages, and, in some cases, even progressed in reverse order. After this, attention turns to a detailed examination of the challenges identified and their solutions for three particular interest groups: entrepreneurs, government policymakers, and academicians. The implications of the results for entrepreneurs should be of particular importance, as managerial, research and development, sales and marketing, and also financial challenges and solutions are covered in detail. Finally, this research concludes that although many of the Born Global findings deviate from the internationalization behavior of conventional companies, the holistic and company‐level stage models still seem to have a high degree of explanatory power for many companies originating in small and open economies (SMOPEC). © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.