ANALYTICAL MARXISM

Abstract This paper provides a comprehensive survey of the literature on Analytical Marxism (AM) and analyses its relevance for social theory. AM is precisely defined and distinguished from Rational Choice Marxism (RCM). The different substantive implications of the two approaches are discussed: according to RCM, the role of Marxism in the social sciences is exhausted, whereas AM has reconstructed a set of propositions that aim to provide the foundations of a distinctive approach in social theory. The methodological debate around and within AM is analysed and the shortcomings of methodological individualism and rational choice theory are stressed, raising doubts on the claim that RCM is the only scientific approach to Marx's theory. Yet, wholesale rejections on a priori methodological or exegetical grounds are questioned. A focused, immanent critique of RCM is developed, which emphasizes the lack of an adequate analysis of structural constraints and endogenous preferences in RCM models. It is argued that the analysis of endogenous preferences and structural constraints is consistent with an anti‐reductionist AM approach and it may provide the outline of a fertile, distinctive research programme in explanatory social theory that builds on the core of Marxism identified by AM.     

Communities and social inefficiency with heterogeneous groups

We present a model where society is partitioned into groups, or communities, whose preferences may conflict. In particular, the actions of members of a certain group can inflict negative spillovers on members of other groups. We show that, on one hand, coordination at the group-level may be Pareto inefficient. However, on the other hand, by using a replicator equation approach where there is some moral pressure from co-members, we show that substantial compliance to group׳s norms arises endogenously. Our framework can also account for “cultural maladaptations”, i.e., the persistence of cultural traits which are harmful for community members, and for the society as a whole.     

An empirical study of other‐oriented and rational self‐interest leadership approaches

Other orientation is defined as “the extent to which individuals are concerned with the welfare of others” (Meglino & Korsgaard, 2007, p. 59). Other‐oriented leaders focus their attention on organizational objectives coupled with a human resource emphasis, whereas rational self‐interested leaders concern themselves with organizational objectives coupled with self‐emphasis. This quantitative study examines philanthropian and servant leadership, which are other‐oriented leadership approaches, and transactional leadership, which is a rational self‐interested leadership approach, to determine the effectiveness of the approaches in the 21st century. This study further examines the results of a hermeneutic phenomenological study of philanthropian leadership that introduced a new other‐oriented leadership model. This study focuses on leadership preferences of leaders, employees, and third‐year undergraduate business students to determine if there is a significant difference between preferences among groups for other‐oriented and rational self‐interest‐oriented leadership approaches.     

Recruitment,Training, and Career Concerns

We examine training and recruitment policies in a two‐period model that nests two forms of production, “routine” work where ability and effort are substitutes and “creative” work where they are complements. Alternative ways of improving average ability have opposite implications for agents' career concerns. Although teaching to the top (training complementary to ability) or identifying star performers increases agents' career concerns, teaching to the bottom has the opposite effect. The paper also makes more general comments relating to models of reputation.     

Disentangling preferences and limited attention: Random-utility models with consideration sets

This paper presents a model of choice with limited attention. The decision-maker forms a consideration set, from which she chooses her most preferred alternative. Both preferences and consideration sets are stochastic. While we present axiomatisations for this model, our focus is on the following identification question: to what extent can an observer retrieve probabilities of preferences and consideration sets from observed choices? Our first conclusion is a negative one: if the observed data are choice probabilities, then probabilities of preferences and consideration sets cannot be retrieved from choice probabilities. We solve the identification problem by assuming that an “enriched” dataset is observed, which includes choice probabilities under two frames. Given this dataset, the model is “fully identified”, in the sense that we can recover from observed choices (i) the probabilities of preferences (to the same extent as in models with full attention) and (ii) the probabilities of consideration sets. While a number of recent papers have developed models of limited attention that are, in a similar sense, “fully identified”, they obtain this result not by using an enriched dataset but rather by making a restrictive assumption about the default option, which our paper avoids.     

What Public Choice and Philosophy Should Not Learn from One Another

ABSTRACT . Lomasky offers accounts of public choice and of political philosophy, in which these disciplines have complementary theories of motivation, and suggests that each discipline can learn something from the other. This note argues that these two theories of motivation share a common weakness: an a priori, non‐empirical mode of analysis. Political philosophy models human beings as rational moral agents; public choice theory treats individuals as rationally self‐ interested. Neither theory is concerned with the psychology of actual human motivation. This common feature facilitates the transfer of ideas between the two disciplines, but it limits the usefulness of both. There is more to political motivation than can be captured by theories of reason.     

Bayesian Estimation of Willingness‐to‐pay Where Respondents Mis‐report Their Preferences*

We introduce a modified conditional logit model that takes account of uncertainty associated with mis‐reporting in revealed preference experiments estimating willingness‐to‐pay (WTP). Like Hausman et al. [Journal of Econometrics (1988) Vol. 87, pp. 239–269], our model captures the extent and direction of uncertainty by respondents. Using a Bayesian methodology, we apply our model to a choice modelling (CM) data set examining UK consumer preferences for non‐pesticide food. We compare the results of our model with the Hausman model. WTP estimates are produced for different groups of consumers and we find that modified estimates of WTP, that take account of mis‐reporting, are substantially revised downwards. We find a significant proportion of respondents mis‐reporting in favour of the non‐pesticide option. Finally, with this data set, Bayes factors suggest that our model is preferred to the Hausman model.     

Behavioural Economics: A Virginia Political Economy Perspective

Behavioural economics offers a critique of modern neoclassical economics by providing empirical evidence that the model of rational choice does not accurately describe human decision‐making processes. The existence of cognitive biases, what we might term ‘agent failure’, becomes reason to doubt the efficacy of unhampered markets, and is seen by some as a sufficient condition for government intervention. This article offers a critique of this argument from an Austrian and public choice theory comparative institutions perspective. Agent failure arguments are analogous to market failure arguments of the mid‐twentieth century and the same kinds of responses made against the latter are applied to the former. Behavioural economics arguments for intervention ignore the cognitive biases of political actors, neglect the comparative perspective that results from such biases, and do not examine the ways in which markets are superior to politics in providing the information and incentives actors need to become aware of their errors and correct them. The existence of imperfectly rational agents, like the existence of imperfect markets, is therefore not a sufficient condition for government intervention into the market.     

The Vanity of the Economist: A Comment on Peart and Levy's The “Vanity of the Philosopher”*

Abstract . In the Vanity of the Philosopher, Sandra Peart and David Levy reconsider “postclassical” economics from the vantage point of Adam Smith's “analytical” egalitarianism. Analytical egalitarianism is assumed, not proved; and Peart and Levy's criticisms of many 19^th‐ and early 20^th‐century economists, as well as eugenics in general, depend on equivocating between analytical and substantive egalitarianism. They fail to provide a non–question‐begging critique of eugenics.     

Evolutionary stability of prospect theory preferences

We demonstrate that in simple 2×2 games (cumulative) prospect theory preferences can be (semi-)evolutionarily stable, in particular, a population of players with prospect theory preferences is stable against more rational players, i.e. players with a smaller degree of probability weighting. We also show that in a typical game with infinitely many strategies, the “war of attrition”, probability weighting is (semi-)evolutionarily stable. Finally, we generalize to other notions of stability. Our results may help to explain why probability weighting is generally observed in humans, although it is not optimal in usual decision problems.     

A preliminary exploration of the effects of rational factors and behavioral biases on the managerial choice to invest in corporate responsibility

We explore a possible decision‐making process in which mixes of rational and non‐rational factors affect the choice made by a firm's management to invest in corporate responsibility. We propose that the rational factors affecting the decision‐makers' investment choice are: (a) moral choice; (b) risk management; (c) consequential changes that would be required in corporate structure or production processes; and (d) long‐term versus short‐term considerations. The non‐rational behavioral biases that we suggest affecting the decision‐makers' investment choice are: (a) attitude to risk, (b) status quo bias, (c) subjective discounting, and (d) myopic loss‐aversion. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Habit formation and wage determination

We analyse the implications of habit formation relating to wages in a multiperiod efficiency‐wage model. If employees have such preferences, their existence provides firms with incentives to raise wages and reduce employment over time. Greater intensity does not necessarily have the same consequences, because wage adjustments counteract the initial level impact. The firm's response additionally depends on the wage dependency of dismissal costs, because such costs make an increasing wage profile over time more attractive and mitigate the effects of greater intensity of habit formation. We further show that short‐lived productivity shocks have long‐lasting wage and employment consequences. Moreover, habit concerns by firm owners reduce wages.     

Leading for Long‐Term Performance: Matching the Behavior to the Situation

Is there one right way to lead, or does it all “depend?” The right answer will inform the right leadership development strategy. A recent study by McKinsey & Co. using survey data collected from 165 organizations and over 365,000 respondents globally suggests that the answer is both. Two types of behavior sets emerged from organizations that enjoyed higher member perceptions of leadership effectiveness and attained higher levels of organizational health (the latter predicts long‐term financial and operational performance). We combined these into a model that prescribes a set of “baseline” behaviors that should always be evident, complemented by another set of behaviors (“situational behaviors”) that should be differentially emphasized depending on the level of organizational health. Both the content of the behavior and its relative emphasis are critical to either set. The current paper combines these into a model of organization‐wide leadership and concludes with action implications for organizations’ leadership development strategy.     

All of work? All of life? Reconceptualising work‐life balance for the 21st century

This paper argues that the study of work‐life balance to date has, in the main, adopted a restricted conception of both “work” and “life”, which does not take account of recent developments in life worlds, working arrangements and employment relationships. “Life” has hitherto been viewed as largely comprising caring activities for dependent children, whereas “work” has been premised largely on a traditional model of work, characterised by full‐time, permanent employment with one employer and a conventional understanding of what work involves. This means that extant research and theory only provides a partial view of the work‐life needs and experiences of the workforce. In the paper, we propose extending conceptions of both work and life to incorporate different life worlds and social groups and different working arrangements and employment relationships.     

The Making of the Institutional Theory of Social Costs: Discovering the K. W. Kapp and J. M. Clark Correspondence

This article reconstructs the making of the often “overlooked” institutional theory of social costs based on the unexploited correspondence between John Maurice Clark and Karl William Kapp. The reconstruction demonstrates that the institutional argument on social costs was developed as a critique of neoclassical economics and of post‐WWII neoliberalism.     

Theorizing Financial Crimes as Moral Actions

Abstract

The paper maintains that all acts of financial crimes can be explained within a general theory of moral action and analyzed as such. In this regard, the paper presents such a theory – Situational Action Theory (SAT) – and argues that acts of financial crimes result from a perception-choice process involving rational deliberation and experimental habituation, themselves being the outcomes of interactions between individuals and their environments. To examine this argument, the paper draws on two recent high-profile fraud cases to critically discuss the extent to which these crimes should be meaningfully and innovatively analyzed as moral actions and the moral context in which they occur. The findings indicate that the feature most relevant to a criminogenic is its moral context in relation to the opportunities and frictions that it generates. As such, environmental factors along with psychosocial processes of moral education become particularly important in the explanation of why certain moral contexts emerge in particular kinds of settings at a particular point in time. In this regard, SAT can be used as a powerful overarching framework to gain a more comprehensive understanding of peoples’ choice processes to breach moral rules and devise effective crime prevention strategies to combat fraud.     

When Hard Heads Collide

ABSTRACT . In this article, Loren Lomasky begins with a firsthand account of some of the people he interacted with at the Center for the Study of Public Choice in Blacksburg and some of what he learned there. Aside from the revealing personal anecdotes, we learn something of the culture clash he experienced as a visiting fellow at the Center and about his introduction to intellectual activity as “blood sport.” Lomasky then reviews some of the strengths and weaknesses of public choice theory from a philosophical point of view and offers some suggestions. These primarily concern the theory's narrow focus on the material nature of interests. Finally, Lomasky offers techniques for including moral interests in the deliberations of decision makers.     

Exploring the dynamics of value and fit: Insights from project management

The strategic management literature has struggled with how to recognize, measure, and even understand the concept of “fit” between strategy, structure, and environment. Nevertheless, the concept of fit was fundamentally important from the beginning of the Value of Project Management project. In this article, we compare the “fit” construct defined by Miles and Snow (1984) with our concerns with value direction (Thomas & Mullaly, 2008). A comparative analysis of these two constructs provides insights into how both dimensions improve overall organizational understanding. We demonstrate that while each of these dimensions independently provides useful information, it is their intersection that provides a means of interpreting not just current realities but appropriate future actions.     

Diversification preferences in the theory of choice

Diversification represents the idea of choosing variety over uniformity. Within the theory of choice, desirability of diversification is axiomatized as preference for a convex combination of choices that are equivalently ranked. This corresponds to the notion of risk aversion when one assumes the von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility model, but the equivalence fails to hold in other models. This paper analyzes axiomatizations of the concept of diversification and their relationship to the related notions of risk aversion and convex preferences within different choice theoretic models. Implications of these notions on portfolio choice are discussed. We cover model-independent diversification preferences, preferences within models of choice under risk, including expected utility theory and the more general rank-dependent expected utility theory, as well as models of choice under uncertainty axiomatized via Choquet expected utility theory. Remarks on interpretations of diversification preferences within models of behavioral choice are given in the conclusion.