Promising politicians,rational voters,and election outcomes

Overwhelming anecdotal evidence suggests that politicians often promise more during an election campaign than they are willing or able to deliver once elected. In this paper, we present two signaling models to explain this phenomenon. In the first model, two candidates maximize their share of the vote. In the second model both try to convince the median voter. In each model, candidates rationally distort their true policy position. Voters, however, are not fooled. Upon observing election promises, they can rationally infer the true position of each candidate. Hence, the election outcome is not affected.JEL Classification: D72, D82The author thanks Peter Kooreman, Wilko Letterie, Bert Schoonbeek, and two anonymous referees for useful comments. Financial support from The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics

Summary. We consider a model in which parties that differ in perceived valence choose how to allocate electoral promises (money, pork-barrel projects) among voters. The party perceived to be less valent has a greater incentive to “sell out” to a favored minority and completely expropriate a fraction of the electorate. By reducing the difference in perceived valence, campaign-finance regulations may reduce the extent of the expropriation and achieve a more equitable political outcome. We analyze various instruments of campaign-finance regulation from this perspective.Received: 20 Februay 2003, Revised: 25 January 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: D72, H2.Nicolas Sahuguet: Correspondence toWe thank Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, and Andrew Postlewaite for their comments. We also thank the editor Dan Kovenock and an anonymous referee. The second author is grateful to the National Science Foundation for financial support under grant SES-0078870.     

The likelihood of dubious election outcomes

Summary. A disturbing phenomenon in voting, which causes most of the problems as well as the interest in the field, is that election outcomes (for fixed preferences) can change with the way the ballots are tallied. This causes difficulties because with each possible choice, some set of voters can be dubious about whether it is the “correct” one. But, how likely are these settings allowing multiple election outcomes? By combining properties of the geometry of voting developed by Saari with a analytic-geometric technique created by Schlafli, we determine the likelihood that a three candidate election can cause these potentially dubious outcomes. Received: April 11, 1997; revised version: November 12, 1997     

Bidding between incumbent and entrant

Facing an informed incumbent who has cost advantages in two different states, the uninformed entrant bids cautiously due to the incumbent’s cost advantage in the low cost state. The incumbent bids aggressively, earning additional profits because of his cost advantages.     

Tax-mix, public spending composition and growth

This paper characterizes optimal fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model whose policy implications are consistent with the relationship between two stylized facts observed in a majority of OECD economies, namely the growth in the ratios of both government consumption to public investment and of direct to indirect taxation from 1970 to 2004. Assuming a continuation in the upward trend for the public consumption to output ratio consistent with that observed for this variable between 1970 and 2004 for most developed economies, we find that the optimal tax system becomes more intensive in income taxation relative to consumption taxation, and that public disbursements become less intensive in public investment, which is consistent with the co-evolution of these ratios over the last 40 years.     

Income taxes, spending composition and long-run growth

The focus of this paper is threefold. First, it reexamines the impact on long-run growth of changes in flat-rate income taxes when a fraction of total government expenditures is used to provide public services that affect the productivity of privately held inputs. Second, for a given tax policy, this paper studies the impact of government expenditure composition on the rate of economic growth. Third, since demographics follow an overlapping generations structure and fiscal policy affects the economy's productivity, the paper features the role of productivity as a means of redistributing income across generations. The economy is analyzed numerically and policy experiments are carried out.     

Political expenditure cycles and election outcomes: Evidence from disaggregation of public expenditures by economic functions

We analyze electorally motivated public spending using disaggregated expenditure data. Election cycles in total expenditures and in specific sub-categories mainly exist in newly democratized Eastern European countries. However, electorally motivated spending policies are ineffective means to enhance the re-election probability.     

资产净值、信贷扩张与投资支出

本文在对资产净值、信贷扩张与投资支出关系进行理论分析的基础上,运用Granger因果检验、VAR模型等方法实证分析了资产价格波动与我国信贷的关系,结果发现,房价变动率对我国贷款变动率有显著的正向影响,说明存在房价影响投资的资产负债表渠道.文章最后提出政策当局应注意资产价格波动对企业净值和银行信贷的影响,尤其要避免房价暴跌带来的"金融加速器"效应及随之而来的金融风险.     

Public spending, voracity, and Wagner's law in developing countries

An examination of the short- and long-term relation between government spending and output in 51 developing countries reveals evidence consistent with cyclical ratcheting and voracity reflected in a tendency for government spending to increase over time. The main components of government spending are procyclical in some 40% of countries. Output and government spending are cointegrated for at least one of the spending aggregates in 70% of countries, implying a long-term relationship between government spending and output consistent with Wagner's law. In contrast, prior studies have found only weak support for Wagner's law for developing countries, although somewhat stronger support for industrial countries.     

The Congressional budget process,aggregate spending,and statutory budget rules

This paper compares the Congressional budget process (instituted in 1974) and the piecemeal appropriations process that preceded it. Previous theoretical analysis using spatial models of legislator preferences finds no systematic difference in relative spending levels under the two regimes. This paper instead uses a model of interest group lobbying. A legislature determines spending on a national public good and on subsidies to sector-specific interest groups. In the “appropriations process,” the Appropriations Committee proposes a budget that, because of interest group influence, involves overspending on subsidies. In the “budget process,” the Budget Committee proposes an aggregate level of spending (the budget resolution); then, the Appropriations Committee proposes a budget. A free rider problem among the interest groups inhibits the lobbying of the Budget Committee to increase the aggregate budget. If each group is sufficiently small, it takes the budget resolution as given, and lobbies the Appropriations Committee. Aggregate spending is lower and social welfare is higher under the budget process; however, provision of the national public good is suboptimal. The paper also analyzes statutory budget rules that limit spending levels, but can be revised by a simple majority vote. Here, the free rider problem prevents the groups from securing the required changes to budget rules.     

Campaign War Chests, Entry Deterrence, and Voter Rationality

It is often claimed that the accumulation of "war chests" by incumbents deters entry by high–quality challengers in Congressional elections. This paper presents a game–theoretic analysis of the interaction between an incumbent, potential challengers, an interest group, and a representative (rational) voter, where the incumbent's "quality" (or "legislative effectiveness") is known to the interest group, but not to the voter or to potential challengers. Under certain conditions, a perfectly revealing equilibrium exists; the incumbent signals her quality by raising funds from the interest group to accumulate a war chest. The entry deterrence effect thus operates solely through the role of war chests in signaling incumbent quality.     

Women's representation and public spending

This paper studies whether the degree of women's representation in Swedish local councils affects local public expenditure patterns. To empirically address this question, I first analyze the differences in preferences between men and women expressed by elected local council representatives using survey data. This enables me to make precise predictions about the effects of women's representation on spending. The subsequent panel study on the composition of public spending supports the predictions that increased representation of women in the local council increases spending on childcare and education relative to elderly care.     

Effects of government spending shocks in China,Japan, and Korea

ABSTRACT

This study investigates the effects of government spending shocks on various key macro variables in China, Korea, and Japan using structural VAR models. The main empirical findings are as follows. Government spending multipliers of all three countries are far larger than 1 in recent years. The effectiveness of fiscal expansion has not changed markedly in China but substantially increased in Korea (after the Asian financial crisis) and Japan (during zero lower bound period). Increases in the effectiveness of fiscal expansion are associated with changes in the monetary and exchange rate policy regimes and institutions of these countries. Among the three countries, the government spending multiplier is relatively large in China but relatively small in Japan in recent years. Although the effects on exchange rate and trade balance vary across countries and sample periods, real exchange rate tends to depreciate, whereas trade balance tends to improve under flexible exchange rate regimes. Some empirical findings are consistent with standard theory, but others are not.

Abbreviations: NK: New Keynesian VAR: Vector Autoregressive ZLB: Zero Lower Bound     

Government spending, interest rates, and capital accumulation in a two-sector model

This paper investigates dynamic impacts of a temporary fiscal expansion in a two-sector growth model. If the expansion falls on consumption-investment commodities, capital accumulation can be either promoted or reduced and the short-term interest rate unambiguously rises. If the expansion falls on consumption commodities, capital accumulation is crowded out and the short-term interest rate declines during the period of the fiscal expansion. It is also shown that fiscal spending on the consumption commodity can move the short- and long-term interest rates in opposite directions. JEL Classification: E43, E62, O41     

Government spending and the exchange rate

This paper investigates the effects of govenment spending on real and nominal exchange rates within the context of an open economy equilibrium rational expectations model. The model predicts that both real and nominal exchange rates appreciate in response to anticipated and unanticipated increases in government spending. Empirical evidence from Germany for the period 1975:2–1989:4 provides some weak support for the predictions of the model.     

Tax competition for foreign direct investments and the nature of the incumbent firm

We investigate tax/subsidy competition for foreign direct investments (FDI) between countries of different size when a domestic firm is the incumbent in the largest market and we study how the nature (public or private) of the incumbent firm affects policy competition. We show that, differently from the case of a private firm, the country hosting the incumbent always benefits from FDI if the domestic firm is a public welfare‐maximizing firm. We also show that the public firm acts as a disciplinary device for the foreign multinational that will always choose the efficient welfare‐maximizing location. An efficiency‐enhancing role of policy competition may then arise only when the domestic incumbent is a private firm, whereas tax competition is always wasteful in the presence of a public firm.     

Intergovernmental transfers and procyclical public spending

This paper tests the predictions that (i) sub-central government expenditures are procyclical and (ii) sub-central government expenditures are likely to be more procyclical than central government spending. The predictions are based on the importance of ‘voracity effects’ and on the proposition that they are systematically more pervasive if spending is financed by intergovernmental transfers. Evidence from 23 OECD countries between 1995 and 2006 indicates that sub-central government spending is more procyclical than central government expenditure.     

Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies

I introduce a microfounded model of campaign finance with office-seeking politicians, a continuum of voters, and a large number of heterogeneous lobbies. Lobbies make contributions to politicians according to a common agency framework. Politicians use contributions to finance their electoral expenditures. Voters are not fooled by electoral expenditures: they are influenced in a way that is consistent with the equilibrium behavior of lobbies and politicians. The model is used to: (i) determine the relation between campaign spending and the deviation from the median voter's preferred policy; (ii) show the informational value of lobbies' contributions; (iii) evaluate the welfare implications of restricting campaign spending; and (iv) interpret the empirical finding that campaign expenditures have a very low effect on election outcome. Although in equilibrium advertising provides voters with useful information, under reasonable parameter values, a ban on campaign contributions makes the median voter better off. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D72, D82, M37.     

言论自由、平等与美国选举财政

文章从自由与平等的关系的角度分析了美国的选举财政制度。在回顾了美国选举财政法一百多年的历史,特别是1970年以来现代选举财政制度的演变过程之后,文章着重分析了自由和平等价值对民主制度的重要性和意义,以及这两种价值在选举财政法中的体现及其矛盾。文章不赞成为了自由而完全牺牲平等,主张以兼顾两者的方式来看待和解决选举财政法中出现的争议问题。     

Campaign Contributions and Agricultural Subsidies

This article examines the influence of campaign contributions on agricultural subsidies. Empirical results revealed that rent-seeking works, i.e. contributions, influence agricultural subsidies in the manner they best serve contributors' economic interests. Eliminating campaign contributions would significantly decrease agricultural subsidies, hurt farm groups, benefit consumers and taxpayers, and increase social welfare by approximately $5.5 billion. Although contributions are not the only determinants of agricultural subsidies, investment returns to farm PAC contributors are quite high ($1 in contributions brings about $2,000 in policy transfers). In fact, the results are in sharp contrast to the "truthful contributions" assumption of the Grossman–Helpman model.