Price Strategies for Idiosyncratic Goods—The Case of Housing

We determine the mechanism that a rational, profit-maximizing seller would use to revise his reservation price for a heterogeneous or infrequently exchanged good. For instance, while one dimension of a home's quality may be easily determined in competitive markets (e.g., the valuation of floor size, location, etc.), other dimensions of quality may be idiosyncratic (unit specific) and unobservable by the seller (e.g., aesthetics of the home). Here, a seller of a new or infrequently exchanged housing unit may use sales success information to revise his expectation of the unit's market-determined value and hence revise his reservation price. The rational seller will, upon arrival of the first buyer inspecting the unit, determine a sequence of reservation prices for this and expected subsequent buyers. This price sequence falls for subsequent buyers and starts from a lower initial price if the first buyer arrives later than expected. Through this mechanism, we offer an explanation for price dispersion and vacancy durations in housing markets. While we explicitly model the real estate market here, this price revision mechanism is also applicable to rental markets, labor markets, used car markets, and other markets characterized by heterogeneity and infrequent sales.     

A Simple Search and Bargaining Model of Real Estate Markets

This paper examines the impact of brokers on buyers' and sellers' search behavior and on the transaction prices in real estate markets. It is shown that the seller and the buyer search less intensively if the house is listed with a broker. The seller gets a higher price when he employs a broker, but the increase in price is smaller than the commission fee. More specifically, the portion of the commission covered by the increase in price is directly related to the bargaining powers of the buyer and the seller. In the special case where the price is determined according to the Nash bargaining solution, the increase in price is shown to be half of the commission fee. It is also shown that an increase in the commission rate increases the equilibrium price but decreases the equilibrium search intensities.     

Rational Expectations, Market Fundamentals and Housing Price Volatility

This paper derives a forward-looking rational expectations house price model and empirically tests its ability to explain short-run fluctuations in real house prices. A novel approach to proxying the imputed rents of owner-occupied housing, as a function of observable housing market fundamentals, is combined with a housing market arbitrage relation to derive a present value model for real house prices. Tests of the rational expectations, nonlinear cross-equation restrictions reject the joint null hypothesis of rational expectations and the asset-based housing price model for quarterly, single-detached house prices in the city of Vancouver, British Columbia from 1979–1991. The model fails to fully capture observed house price dynamics in two real estate booms but tracks real house prices well in less volatile times, suggesting that prices may temporarily deviate from fundamental values in real estate price cycles.     

The Strategic Role of Listing Price in Marketing Real Estate: Theory and Evidence

The seller of a real estate property and his broker have two primary goals: to sell the properly for as high a price as possible and as quickly as possible. While these are separate objectives, they are closely related through the listing price of the seller. The listing price affects how long it takes to find a buyer (i.e., Time On the Market = TOM), and TOM influences the price that results from the bargaining between the seller and the buyer. This leaves the seller and his agent with an important question: What is the optimal price to be asked for the property? The objective of this research is to provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of listing price on TOM and the transaction price.     

Modeling Spatial Variation in Housing Prices: A Variable Interaction Approach

The absolute location of each real estate parcel in an urban housing market has a unique location-value signature. Accessibility indices, distant gradients and locational dummies cannot fully account for the influence of absolute location on the market price of housing because there are an indeterminable number of externalities (local and nonlocal) influencing a given property at a given location. Furthermore, the degree to which externalities affect real estate values is not only unique at each location but highly variable over space. Hence, absolute location must be viewed as interactive with other determinants of housing value. We present an interactive variables approach and test its ability to explain price variations in an urban residential housing market. The statistical evidence suggests that the value of location, as embodied in the selling price of housing units, may not be separable from other determinants of value. It is recommended that housing valuation models, therefore, be specified to allow site, structural and other independent attributes to interact with absolute location—{ x , y } coordinates—when accounting for intraurban variation in the market price of residential housing. This approach is especially useful when estimating the value of housing for geographic areas where very little is known a priori about the neighborhoods or submarkets.     

基于灰色综合评价法的住宅开发项目研究

随着我国经济的快速发展,房地产市场由卖方市场向买方市场转变,住宅开发项目也面临着越来越多的挑战.为了让房地产开发企业在这种经济环境下能够健康持续发展,所开发的住宅项目满足市场需求不造成资源浪费,企业必须了解客户需求.文章利用灰色综合评价法,从顾客的视角出发,找出最受顾客欢迎的住宅项目,对其加以分析.旨在让开发商在开发过程中可以充分考虑顾客的需要,重视顾客最关注的因素,借此提升开发企业的竞争力并塑造良好的品牌形象.     

Warranty,Seller Reputation,and Buyer Experience: Evidence From EBAY Used Car Auctions

Using data from the eBay car auction market, we test several predictions regarding warranties, seller reputation and buyer experience in the determination of the final price. We find that the presence of a warranty generates a price premium, but that its magnitude decreases when the seller has a more established reputation. Compared to private sellers, professional dealers, who are ‘repeated‐game players’ in the market, benefit less from a warranty and its substitutability for seller reputation is relatively small. In addition, a buyer with greater experience tends to pay less for a warranty or for a professional dealership.     

Asset Price Persistence and Real Estate Market Illiquidity: Evidence from Japanese Land Values

We develop an overlapping generations model of the real estate market in which search frictions and a debt overhang combine to generate price persistence and illiquidity. Illiquidity stems from heterogeneity in agent real estate valuations. The variance of agent valuations determines how quickly prices adjust following a shock to fundamentals. We examine the predictions of the model by studying price depreciation in Japanese land values subsequent to the 1990 stock market crash. Commercial land values fell much more quickly than residential land values. As we would posit that the variance of buyer valuations would be greater for residential real estate than for commercial real estate, this model matches the Japanese experience.     

The Housing Market and Real Estate Brokers

The major development in this paper concerns the failure, in earlier studies, to consider interaction between alternative methods of arranging sales in the housing market. A seller may market a house by direct negotiations with buyers, without the intermediation of real estate brokers, or by listing the house with a broker. A rational seller would choose the option which offers the higher expected return on the house. In a sequence of models we argue that the seller's option of a method of sale induces competitive pressure in the choice of the commission rate by the broker. We also consider the split rate in a multiple listing system, ease of entry of brokers and the cartel hypothesis as applied to brokers. We conclude that the competitive pressure of direct negotiations between sellers and buyers, relative free entry of brokers and the inappropri-ateness of the cartel hypothesis cast serious doubt about a general consensus of opinion that the brokerage system is characterized by price fixing, excessive commissions and excessive marketing costs.     

论我国房地产市场供需价格差异的原因及对策

指出当前房屋供需价格差异原因在于开发商、购房者、政府三方利益不均衡;提出为解决矛盾,开发商应进行销售定位并努力降低成本,购房者应明确购房效用,政府应统一制定住宅性能评定指标体系、完善房地产市场等观点.     

Real Estate,the External Finance Premium and Business Investment: A Quantitative Dynamic General Equilibrium Analysis

This article studies the connection between the capital market and the real estate market. Empirically, we find that positive real house price shocks lower the external finance premium and stimulate nonresidential investment and real gross domestic product (GDP). Our theoretical framework is able to mimic the volatility of the external finance premium, the relative price of real estate and capital and the investment in real estate and capital. It also captures the cyclicality of the external finance premium and of real estate prices. The contribution of real estate price fluctuations to the variability of the external finance premium and the GDP is confirmed to be significant.     

Optimal reserve prices in sealed-bid auctions with reference effects

The reference effect and loss aversion are incorporated into the buyer’s utility in the symmetric independent private value models of sealed-bid auctions. The buyer’s equilibrium bidding strategy and the seller’s optimal reserve price are derived for the first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions. In both auction mechanisms, the seller’s optimal reserve price and expected revenue are increasing in the reference point. We compare the seller’s expected revenues as well as the optimal reserve prices in the two auctions. The results show that the seller will set a higher optimal reserve price but obtain lower optimal expected revenue in the second-price auction compared to the first-price auction. Further, we extend the model to the gain-seeking case, and endogenize the reference point as the ex-ante expected price of the item in equilibrium. In contrast to the loss-averse case, the seller will set a lower optimal reserve price but obtain higher optimal expected revenue in the second-price auction compared to the first-price auction if the buyers are gain-seeking. With an endogenous reference point, similar results are obtained in terms of revenue comparison between the two auctions.     

Determinants of Buyer Search in a Housing Market

Using data collected from specially-designed questionnaires, the duration of search by a house buyer is estimated. Duration is measured in two ways: in terms of time and in terms of the number of houses seen. To explain this data, several features must be added to a simple model when search models are applied to a housing market. Many of the statistically significant variables, such as prior information and the quality of information provided by a newspaper or a real estate agent, deal with the provision of information. The type of agency that employs the agent and the characteristics of the buyer have little effect.     

Mortgage Refinancing with Asymmetric Information

Information asymmetry exists between the lender and the borrower regarding the holding period of the mortgaged real estate; the lender does not know how long the borrower plans to own the house. This information asymmetry allows the cost of obtaining a mortgage to deviate from its value to the borrower. As a result, the exercise price of the option to refinance becomes the cost to the borrower of obtaining a new mortgage instead of the outstanding balance of the existing mortgage as used in previous models. The option to refinance is a sequential option; after the borrower refinances, a new option is obtained to refinance again in the future. A mortgage refinancing model is developed taking information asymmetry and sequential refinancing into account. The model is used to solve for (1) the value to the borrower of a callable mortgage and (2) the minimum interest rate differential between the contract rate of the existing mortgage and the market interest rate needed to justify refinancing.     

Why Do Vacant Houses Sell for Less: Holding Costs,Bargaining Power or Stigma?

This article introduces Nash bargaining into a search model to identify various channels through which vacancy affects selling price and liquidity in the resale market for houses. The model shows the various vacancy effects in the form of greater seller holding cost, lower seller bargaining power and unobserved negative attributes or stigma. We use a 20‐year data series on house transactions to test for these effects in a simultaneous model of price and liquidity, using the long data series to allow for variation across market phases. The robust vacancy effects on price and liquidity across all market phases primarily reflect greater seller holding cost and diminished bargaining power. Repeatedly, vacant houses also exhibit significant stigma effects in the rising market but not in stable or declining market phases. At the same time, vacant houses enjoy stronger shopping externality effects from surrounding houses for sale than do their occupied counterparts.     

A Model of Time‐on‐Market and Real Estate Price Under Sequential Search with Recall

This article develops a model and provides a closed‐form formula to uncover the theoretical relationship between real estate price and time on market (TOM). Our model shows a nonlinear positive price‐TOM relationship, and it identifies three economic factors that affect the impact of TOM on sale price. We demonstrate that conventional metrics for real estate return and risk, which are borrowed in a naïve fashion from finance theory, do not account for marketing period risk and tend to overestimate real estate returns and underestimate real estate risks. Our model provides a simple way to correct such bias. This theory helps to explain the apparent “risk‐premium puzzle” in real estate.     

Real Estate Brokers, Nonprice Competition and the Housing Market

Given a fixed commission rate and easy entry, economic profits must be competed away on some nonprice margin in the real estate brokerage market. This paper focuses on nonprice competition in the level or quality of services offered buyers and sellers in the market, examining the equilibrium adjustment process, comparative static predictions and efficiency implications. In contrast with earlier studies focusing on wasteful advertising, this paper demonstrates that higher commission rates can either increase or decrease deadweight loss, depending upon how broker services affect buyer and seller transaction costs.     

Search, Bargaining and Optimal Asking Prices

This paper analyzes a search-and-bargaining model in which the asking price influences the rate at which potential customers arrive to inspect the seller's house, and the buyer's valuation of the asset is not learned until after the seller makes his initial offer (the asking price). The optimal asking and reservation prices are characterized, and the existence of a subgame-perfect equilibrium asking-price—reservation-price strategy is established. Comparative-statics analysis illustrates how seller and buyer discount rates and the buyer's outside opportunity affect the optimal reservation and asking prices.     

House Search Duration in Hot and Cold Residential Markets

This study analyzes the determinants of house search duration of consumption‐driven buyers and individual investors in different housing market environments. We use data from surveys of recent house‐buyers in “hot” and “cold” housing markets in the 2000s housing bubble in California characterized by rising and declining residential house prices, respectively. The average house price and the surveyed geographical area are the same for both periods. Expected house ownership horizon is shown to be an important determinant of the realized search duration in addition to commonly considered housing and buyer characteristics. We find a statistically significant positive effect of it on the time until purchase in both housing price environments for consumption‐driven buyers. We also find that consumption‐driven house purchases were highly pronounced in coastal areas in the hot market and inland areas in the cold market. In contrast, long‐horizon investment activity leads that of consumption activity in those areas. Short‐horizon investors, on the other hand, concentrated their house search activity in inland areas in both housing market environments.     

Real Estate Returns and Risk with Heterogeneous Investors

This article develops a theoretical framework and formulates a unified risk metric that integrates both real estate price risk and uncertainty of time on market (TOM). We demonstrate that real estate sellers with different degrees of financial distress face not only different marketing period risks, but also receive different return distributions upon successful sales. The major findings of this article can be summarized as follows. First, we show that real estate return and risk, which account for both price and TOM risk, are investor specific, varying over investors with different financial circumstances and holding periods. Second, the traditional valuation of real estate return and risk, which is based solely on the return distribution of a successful sale without considering the uncertainty of TOM and the investor's financial circumstances, underestimates real estate risk and exaggerates real estate return. Third, our empirical applications in both residential and commercial real estate markets show that the Sharpe ratio estimated by the traditional approach is seriously overstated—to the largest extent for investors with high financial distress. In addition, we find that, given the typical 5‐ to 7‐year holding period for real estate, the Sharpe ratios estimated by integrating both price and TOM risk are much in line with the performance of financial assets. These findings can help to explain the apparent “risk‐premium puzzle” in real estate.