Corporate ventures into industrial markets: Dynamics of aggressive entry

This article reports a study of the effect of aggressive entry by firms venturing into new industrial markets. There are three main sets of results:First, there is a significant correlation between the competitive attractiveness of the target industry and the initial share objective set by the corporation venturing into that industry.Second, the downstream share objective, set at the launch of the venture is significantly correlated with several key marketing strategy and investment strategy options made by the firm at the start of operations.Third, if most of these key strategy decisions are made under the assumption that a high share position will rapidly be achieved, their resulting performance, in terms of both market share and ROI, is superior to firms which enter with less aggressive share aspirations.These results are particularly appealing to the large established firm which has the resources and thus can both afford to absorb the cost of failure and afford to make significant front-end investments in aggressive initial marketing expenses and investments in initial plant capacity. For such firms a feasible strategy for a new venture into an industrial market could be to: if possible (but not essential) seek industries/markets to enter which are less likely to provoke rivalrous responses; set aggressive market share targets; invest aggressively in initial plant capacity; develop aggressive sales force, sales promotion, advertising, service quality, and/or pricing programs relative to competitors, as appropriate to the particular industry being entered.The reason we suggest that the programs be aggressive as appropriate is that different strategic options are likely to be more effective in one industry than another. For instance, aggressive advertising and sales promotions could be more effective for consumables, while aggressive sales calling programs and superior service delivery could be the more effective route for capital goods businesses.     

Women business owners in traditional and non-traditional industries

Small businesses continue to grow in importance to the national economy. According to the Small Business Administration, America's 22 million small businesses generate more than half of the nation's Gross Domestic Product and are the principal source of new jobs. The National Foundation for Women Business Owners reported that between 1987 and 1994, the number of women-owned businesses grew by 78% and women-owned firms accounted for 36% of all firms. Although the growth in the number of women-owned businesses is encouraging, the size of such businesses remains small in terms of both revenues and number of employees, especially in comparison to male-owned businesses. One explanation for this disparity is that female business ownership is concentrated primarily in the retail and service industries where businesses are relatively smaller in terms of employment and revenue as opposed to high technology, construction, and manufacturing.One of the most fruitful streams of research in women's occupational choice has been based on social learning theory. Specifically, self-efficacy has been found to relate to both type and number of occupations considered by college men and women, and with regard to traditional and non-traditional occupations. Entrepreneurship researchers have also used social learning theory to study entrepreneurial intentions. This study builds on that background of women's career development and entrepreneurial intentions to examine differences between traditional and non-traditional women business owners. We examine 170 women business owners in various traditional and non-traditional businesses in Utah and Illinois. Questionnaires were the primary method of collecting data, in addition to 11 in-depth interviews from a sample of the survey respondents. Using a careers perspective, based on social learning theory, we hypothesized that women in these two different categories of industries would differ on levels of self-efficacy toward entrepreneurship or venture efficacy, their career expectations and their perceived social support. A second analysis was also done that explored the relationship between the same independent variables and success or performance of the business. The results offer support for using this integrative model to understand differences between women in traditional and non-traditional industries. The first analysis revealed that significant differences exist between the two groups on several of the independent variables. Traditional business owners had higher venture efficacy for opportunity recognition, higher career expectations of life balance and security and they reported that the financial support received from others was more important to them than those in non-traditional businesses. On the other hand, the non-traditional owners had higher venture efficacy for planning and higher career expectations for money or wealth than the traditional group.The second analysis explored whether success, as measured by sales, was affected by differences in venture efficacies, career expectations, or perceived support received by women in traditional businesses as compared to those in non-traditional ones. This analysis revealed that traditional women business owners might have different factors that contribute to their success than non-traditional owners. Specifically, for the traditional owners, venture efficacies for opportunity recognition and economic management as well as the career expectation of autonomy and money (or wealth) were positively related to sales. For the same group efficacy toward planning and the need for security were negatively related to sales. For the non-traditional women, venture efficacy toward planning and the career expectation of autonomy were positively related to sales while the expectation of money or wealth was negatively related. Also for the same group, the perceived importance of the emotional and financial support was negatively related to sales.In the past, most of the entrepreneurial research has used predominantly male samples of entrepreneurs. Those that include women entrepreneurs generally are comparative, between men and women. This study's comparison of two groups of women entrepreneurs offers a unique contribution to the field.Future research is recommended to further understand how venture efficacy and career expectations affect the decision to start a new business in a particular industry. It would be particularly beneficial to study venture efficacy and career expectations of prospective women entrepreneurs prior to the start of the business. Similarly, greater attention should be given to understanding how venture efficacy develops in different individuals.     

Industry relatedness in trade sales and venture capital investment returns

We investigate relationships between the industry relatedness of venture capital-backed companies and their strategic acquirer in trade sales and the achieved investment returns of venture capitalists. Using a proprietary data set of 716 trade sales, we analyze return differences between lateral and synergetic trade sales, as well as between horizontal and vertical trade sales. We find that venture capitalists achieve higher returns with lateral rather than synergetic trade sales, and that the difference is greater for deals involving early stage companies characterized by strong information asymmetries. In addition, horizontal trade sales yield higher returns than vertical trade sales; however, in boom phases of the venture capital market, this effect reverses. Finally, we find that experienced venture capitalists are able to overcome disadvantageous situations in trade sales, resulting in comparable returns across all trade sale categories.     

Start‐up Motivations and Growth Intentions of Minority Nascent Entrepreneurs

Firm growth is widely considered to be a measure of success for entrepreneurial businesses. Data indicate that there are systematic differences between minority and nonminority‐owned firms with respect to growth. Black entrepreneurs are 50 percent more likely to engage in start‐up activities than white entrepreneurs, however, black‐owned firms are smaller and less profitable than their white‐owned counterparts. Following the effort–performance–outcome–logic of expectancy theory and using data from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), our paper investigates the differences between black and white entrepreneurs' motivations to start and intentions to grow a new venture. Findings indicate that there are significant differences in motivations between black and white entrepreneurs both in starting and in their intentions to grow the new venture. Implications for future research are discussed.     

Social ties and venture creation by returnee entrepreneurs

Recent years have witnessed the return of individuals of Indian or Chinese origin from developed markets to their home countries to start new ventures. Returnee Entrepreneurs (REs) facilitate both direct technology transfer and indirect technology spillovers to local firms, thus contributing to the technological development of emerging economies. Much previous work is based on the integration of ethnic entrepreneurs in their host countries or business activities of transnational entrepreneurs that traverse their host and home countries. This study explores the role of social ties in venture creation by REs. Based on twenty case studies in India, the findings show that (1) local ties are indispensable for venture creation, and (2) the heterogeneity in the way REs leverage social ties across the host and home countries is contingent on the location of their intention to start up and generation of idea for their venture. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Efficiency‐Seeking Emerging Market Firms: Resources and Location Choices

We study the efficiency‐seeking location choices of Indian software firms. In particular, we investigate the influence of heterogeneity in their resources on their location choices. The resource‐based view posits that firms face difficulties in transferring their resources in dissimilar host‐country environments. Prior research has investigated this phenomenon primarily for market‐seeking motives of multinational firms. With the help of hierarchical linear modeling, we analyze 650 location choices of Indian software firms and find that efficiency‐seeking firms face difficulties in locating in host countries with dissimilar and challenging labor environments. We find that the firms with core competence manifested through capability maturity model integration (CMMI) accreditation are able to overcome issues related to resource fungibility in dissimilar host‐country environments. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The role of venture capital in financing small business

Venture capital is a primary and unique source of funding for small firms because these firms (with sales and/or assets under $5 million) have very limited access to traditional capital markets. Venture capital is a substitute, but not a perfect substitute, for trade credit, bank credit, and other forms of financing for small firms. Small businesses are not likely to be successful in attracting venture capital unless the firms have the potential to provide extraordinary returns to the venture capitalist.This study provides an analysis of a survey of venture capital firms that participate in small business financing. The survey participants are venture capital firms that were 1986 members of the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), the largest venture capital association in the United States.The average size of the venture capital firms responding to the survey is $92 million dollars in assets, with a range from $600 thousand to $500 million. Twenty-three percent of the respondents have total assets below $20 million, and 27% have assets above $100 million.The venture capitalists' investment (assets held) in small firms delineate the supply of venture capital to small firms. Sixty-three of the 92 venture capitalists' have more than 70% of their assets invested in small firms.The venture capitalists were asked how their investment plans might change with changes in the tax law that were projected in the spring of 1986. Fifty-four percent expected to increase their investments in small firms, and 38% did not expect to change these activities.Venture capitalists are very selective in allocating their resources. The average number of annual requests that a venture capitalist receives is 652, and the median number is 500: only 11.5 of the respondents receive more than 1,000 proposals per year.     

Orchestrating boundaries: The effect of R&D boundary permeability on new venture growth

While established firms can efficiently manage their resource portfolio, new ventures must construct resource boundaries by assembling resources. In doing so, new ventures are often pushed to utilize resources that are owned by other actors. These inter-organizational relationship strategies do not expand organizational boundaries, but rather create permeable boundaries. We theorize that boundary permeability confers greater access to resources, but limits control over them. Therefore, new ventures face a risky option: utilize fewer but fully controlled resources or access a broader range of resources under limited control. We examine the effects of R&D boundary permeability across growth dimensions of sales, profitability, and employees using a sample of young knowledge intensive ventures. In doing so, we explore early stage boundary management decisions and reveal opportunities and threats to opening venture boundaries.     

Firm Resources and Corporate Venturing Investment

Corporate venturing (CV) in which established firms invest in new entrepreneurial businesses involves identifying opportunities and creating new combinations of resources to seize opportunities. Moving beyond literature that has focused predominantly on the consequences of CV, we adopt a resource‐based view to examine how knowledge‐based and organizational‐slack resources relate to the level of firm CV. The implications of the findings for future research are discussed. Copyright © 2011 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An examination of the substitutability of founders human and financial capital in emerging business ventures

Undoubtedly, access to financial capital and other resources is an important antecedent of new venture performance. Indeed, inadequate financial resources often are cited as a primary reason why emerging businesses fail (Barren 1989; McQueen 1989; Otterbourg 1989; Rujoub, Cook, and Hay 1995). Yet, there is some feeling among scholars that competent founders will find a way of coming up with necessary resources and capital Chandler and Hanks 1994, Timmons 1990, Thorne 1989. In this study, we seek to better understand and provide insight into the factors that determine the amount of money needed to start a business, and the factors that drive the decisions of whether such funding should come from founder savings or from outside sources.We explore two questions: (1) What factors are associated with the amount of initial capital raised? and (2) What factors determine the mix of founder savings versus financial capital from outside sources that create the initial capital structure? We seek to answer these questions using a sample of 102 manufacturing and service firms between 3 and 7 years of age. These firms were categorized as manufacturing, retail, wholesale, and business services. In general, the evidence supports our hypotheses. The amount of financial capital at start-up varies by industry. Of key importance in this study, human and financial capital appear to be substitutable. The analysis shows that, on average, firms with high levels of founder human capital and low levels of initial financial capital perform similarly to firms that have low levels of founder human capital and high levels of financial capital. Subgroup analysis provides insights into the degree of substitutability. This finding suggests that founders with strong background experience may be able to start businesses that survive and thrive with less financial capital than their less experienced counterparts.The proportion of initial capital provided by the founder differs significantly across industry types. In more capital intensive industries, founders provide a smaller proportion of the start-up capital. Interestingly, the amount of initial capital provided by the founder does not vary significantly across industry types. This suggests that the amount of initial capital provided by the founder may result from contributing all they can give to the business, which appears to be similar across business types. Finally, founders’ perceptions of their ability to recognize and take advantage of opportunity are positively related to the proportion of initial capital provided by the founder. This research provides insights into the factors that appear to drive the initial capital intensity and structure. To provide better understanding of this phenomenon, future research could investigate such practices as bootstrapping, asset sharing, or other techniques that allow founders to control resources without requiring ownership.     

The effects of perceptions of risk, environmental uncertainty, and growth aspirations on new venture creation success

This study extends Xu and Reuf (Strateg Organ 2:331?C355, 2004) by exploring the strategic and non-strategic risk-taking propensity perceptions of nascent entrepreneurs as it relates to the subsequent likelihood of venture formation success. In addition, the moderating influences of perceptions of environmental uncertainty and venture growth aspirations are also examined. Findings from an analysis of data from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) I indicate that an entrepreneur??s risk-taking propensity has no relationship to the likelihood of successfully starting a business. Perceptions of environmental uncertainty and venture growth aspirations were positively related to non-strategic risk-taking propensity, yet none of these variables (strategic and non-strategic risk-taking propensity, environmental uncertainty and growth aspirations) had a significant effect on venture creation success. We suggest that risk-taking propensity, as measured in this study, does not play a significant role in differentiating between nascent entrepreneurs or others, or between those that are successful or unsuccessful at starting businesses.     

New evidence in the pursuit of locating new businesses

Finding good, generalizable samples has long been an Achilles heel for those interested in entrepreneurship-related phenomena. Practitioners, policy makers, and researchers frequently desire to take the pulse of entrepreneurial activity but struggle in doing so. For example, Friedman (1995) reported that California overestimated job loss by 2.4 times because of failure to account for newer, more robust firms. With the goal of being able to better identify new businesses, this research addresses the following questions: (1) Which sample sources best identify new businesses? (2) Are the characteristics of a sample drawn from one source similar to those drawn from a different source? (3) How accurate are the different sample sources in the information they report? and (4) How practical and cost effective are the different sample sources?We pursued answers to these questions by examining the state sales tax file and comparing it with the previously examined sources of the state unemployment insurance file (ES202) and Dun & Bradstreet's Dun's Market Indicator file (DMI) (Birley 1984; Aldrich et al. 1989). The phonebook was also used to examine its overlap with the three primary sources. In making these comparisons, we evaluate generalizability issues, accuracy of founding date, cost, practicality, and other auxiliary information.Sales Tax FileOur findings suggest that the sales tax file is a rich source for identifying generalizable samples. The accuracy of the founding data was correct over 70% of the time, and it appears to identify businesses very early in the start-up phase. The data also are available in machine readable format, give some helpful auxiliary information, and the cost of obtaining the file was negligible. Another advantage of the sales tax file is its ability to identify new businesses that do not have visible on-street locations. Thus, the sales tax file appears to be a very credible source for identifying firms early in the start-up process.ES202 File, DMI File, and Phone BookOur study affirms earlier studies that found major limitations with both the ES202 and DMI files. More specifically, this study found that both sources have substantial limitations in identifying new start-up firms, and they both appear to be slow in removing firms from their records once they have moved or gone out of business. As for the phonebook, as it is only issued annually, it takes some time for new businesses to be listed in the directory. Furthermore, because so many of the new businesses identified by the sales tax file initially operate out of the entrepreneur's home (58% in our survey sample), the enumeration/phonebook method would miss many new businesses unless they had a business phone listing and a business sign on their residential property. Thus, we do not consider the enumeration/phonebook method to be very practical, nor the best method for identifying new firms.In sum, these findings give renewed hope in locating generalizable samples of new businesses. Although the sales tax file is not a perfect source, it represents a very attractive alternative for those interested in identifying entrepreneurial firms early in the start-up phase. These findings should assist practitioners, policy makers, and researchers in making better sample selections, which should lead to more accurate indicators of new business start-ups, fewer sample biases, and ultimately, to a better understanding of the determinants of new venture failure and success.     

The Effect of Venture Capital Investment—Evidence from China's Small and Medium‐Sized Enterprises Board

In this paper, we use a matched sample to empirically test the effect of venture capital investment on the companies listed on the Small and Medium‐Sized Enterprises Board in China. We find that Chinese venture capitalists neither add value to their invested firms in the initial public offering (IPO) process nor improve operating performance. Rather, compared with their non‐venture‐backed counterparts, venture‐backed firms are associated with a greater level of IPO underpricing and inferior operating performance both before and after IPO. Our findings in China support neither the certification/monitoring hypothesis nor the grandstanding hypothesis, but partly support the adverse selection hypothesis.     

Why do firms train? Empirical evidence on the relationship between training and technological and organizational change

We explore the relationship between training and innovation using key insights from the resource‐based approach, organizational learning and labour studies. By using data from 304 large enterprises in Italy, the study highlights a twofold role of training in favouring technological and organizational changes. First, training plays a role in allowing the acquisition and the assimilation of new knowledge. Consequently, firms in which the provision of training is part of a bundle of high‐performance management practices are more likely to undertake technological and organizational changes and to develop new competencies internally. Second, training supports firms in the assimilation of technological and organizational changes. Consequently, firms that undertake these changes exhibit a superior participation rate for employees and greater time intensity of their training programmes. Firms' inclination to develop new competencies internally does not affect, however, the intensity of training, thereby suggesting that organizational learning processes do not start by a broad involvement of employees in formalized training programmes.     

Organizational goals and resource allocation to overseas foreign direct investment

We investigate how organizational goal setting impacts slack resource allocation between markets at home and overseas, and argue that organizational goals, publicly announced, impact managers’ evaluations of resource allocation opportunities. Based on a sample of Chinese publicly listed manufacturing firms for the period 2010 to 2016, we find that when firms announce publicly a sales increasing goal as their priority, their attention will be focused on this goal with a tendency to invest the firm's slack resources locally. This tendency to invest slack resources locally is enhanced if the announced goal is not achieved, but is not achieved with a minor discrepancy. However, if the goal is not achieved, and with a major discrepancy, managers will likely conduct problemistic search and look to foreign locations to invest the firm's slack resources to achieve this goal. We also find the impact of organizational goal setting is more salient for SOEs and is dependent on levels of remuneration in the firm. As such, we revisit the importance of organization goals and the resource allocation decision in the firm which has not received the research attention one may have expected.     

Networking and growth of young technology-intensive ventures in China

More often than not, new ventures lack established products, known technologies, longstanding customer relations, experienced managerial teams, sufficient capital, and strong reputations. Almost by definition, small, new firms lack the resources of many larger, established firms. The task of an infant firm, and a measure of its success, is to make a transition from being resource weak to being resource strong.How can resources that are critical for profitable growth be acquired for the resource weak new venture? Researchers have found that entrepreneurs can gain access to valuable resources and they can seek to achieve competitive advantage through “networking activities.” Forming and utilizing available relationships with external organizations can allow entrepreneurs to build credibility, gain advice, financing, and customer access, build a positive image and obtain resources at below-market prices, and obtain channel access, information, and innovations. Business relationships with other organizations allow an entrepreneur to achieve desired business results through “asset parsimony.”A favorable view toward networking for new ventures leaves a number of unanswered questions, however. Relevant research questions might include, who should the entrepreneur seek as a business partner? Are all inter-organizational relationships equal, or are some types more valuable to new ventures than other relationships? Do firms relying on high levels of networking activities actually outperform firms that less actively seek resources through external organizational relationships?The present study provides a specific understanding of the concept of networking for entrepreneurs. We propose that networking can be understood in terms of “range,” the number of external relationships to obtain resources, and of “intensity,” the frequency of contact of and amount of resource obtained from these relationships. This research project evaluates the range and intensity of networking among high-growth and low-growth entrepreneurial ventures.Extensive interviewing with managers of six young technology-oriented firms in the People's Republic of China (PRC) affirmed the importance of entrepreneurial networking. Managers in the three high-growth firms reported greater range and intensity of business networking than did managers of three low-growth firms, matched by industry and age. Moreover, the relationship between networking activities and growth transcended the stage of firm development.Where networking range and intensity are deemed important in the growth process, new venture success may call for entrepreneurs to reach out deliberately to external organizations to capture needed resources. To a certain extent, such networking activities run counter to important entrepreneurial motivations of independence and autonomy. The concept of networking, and the results of this study, imply that entrepreneurs need to combine the spirit of independence with the reality of resource dependence, and they need to balance personal autonomy with strategic business relationships.This study also contributes to the understanding of entrepreneurship in our increasingly global economy, particularly in the PRC. Business relationships between the United States and the PRC have been expanding rapidly in the last decade. Many foreign businesses seek license agreements, joint venture partners, equity participation, or channel relationships with young ventures in that country. Do the same rules of networking apply in the PRC as the literature suggests apply in the United States? New ventures in this study were found to engage in processes of networking activities consistent with those in the West. Although networking activities may have different cultural roots, firm success appeared influenced by the same principles of networking.     

Exploring start-up event sequences

This research analyzed new venture start-up activities undertaken by 71 nascent entrepreneurs. Nascent entrepreneurs are individuals who were identified as taking steps to found a new business but who had not yet succeeded in making the transition to new business ownership. Longitudinal data for the study comes from a secondary data analysis of two representative samples, one of 683 adult residents in Wisconsin (Reynolds and White 1993) and the other of 1016 adult residents of the United States (Curtin 1982). These surveys were conducted between 1992 and 1993, and the nascent entrepreneurs were reinterviewed six to 18 months after their initial interview.Three broad questions were addressed: (1) What activities do nascent entrepreneurs initiate in attempting to establish a new business? (2) How many activities do nascent entrepreneurs initiate during the gestation of the start-up? and (3) When are particular activities initiated or completed?Between the first and second interview, 48% of the nascent entrepreneurs reported they had set up a business in operation. Over 20% had given up and were no longer actively trying to establish a business. Almost a third of the respondents reported they were still trying to establish a firm.As a way to summarize the results and as a springboard toward some insights into the implications of this research for practice and future research, we developed the following activity profiles of the three types of nascent entrepreneurs studied. These profiles are offered as a combination of both fact and some intuition about the findings.STARTED A BUSINESS. Nascent entrepreneurs who were able to start a business were more aggressive in making their businesses real. They undertook activities that made their businesses tangible to others: they looked for facilities and equipment, sought and got financial support, formed a legal entity, organized a team, bought facilities and equipment, and devoted full time to the business. Individuals who started businesses seemed to act with a greater level of intensity. They undertook more activities than those individuals who did not start a business. The pattern of activities seem to indicate that individuals who started firms put themselves into the day-to-day process of running an ongoing business as quickly as they could and that these activities resulted in starting firms that generated sales (94% of the entrepreneurs) and positive cash flow (50% of the entrepreneurs). What is not known is how successful or profitable these new firms will be over time. For example, 50% of the firms that were started had not reached positive cash flow and these firms may have been started by individuals who were foolhardy and rushed into operation of a business that would not be sustainable.GAVE UP. The pattern of activities for the group of entrepreneurs who gave up seem to indicate that these entrepreneurs discovered that their initial idea for their businesses would not lead to success. The finding that the activity of developing a model or prototype differentiated individuals who gave up from those who were still trying would suggest that those who gave up had “tested” their ideas out and found that they would not work according to their expectations. Nascent entrepreneurs who gave up seemed to be similar in their activity patterns compared with those who started their firms, that is, individuals who gave up pursued the activities of creating a business in an aggressive manner at the beginning of the process. But as the business unfolded over time, these entrepreneurs decreased their activities and then ceased start-up activities. This group of individuals might be seen as either having the wisdom to test their ideas out before jumping into something that might lead to failure or lacking the flexibility to find more creative ways to solve the problems that they were confronted with.STILL TRYING. It would seem that those who are still trying are not putting enough effort into the start-up process in order to find out whether they should start the business or give up. Those still trying had undertaken fewer activities than individuals in the other two groups. The still trying entrepreneurs were devoting their short-term efforts toward activities internal to the start-up process (e.g., saving money and preparing a plan) and less effort toward activities that would make the business real to others. The still trying entrepreneurs may be all talk and little action. Or these still trying entrepreneurs might be involved in developing businesses that take longer for these particular opportunities to unfold. (It should be noted that there was no industry effect across the three groups.)Our advice to individuals considering business start-up is that the results seem to provide evidence that nascent entrepreneurs should aggressively pursue opportunities in the short-term, because they will quickly learn that these opportunities will either reveal themselves as worthy of start-up or as poor choices that should be abandoned. Individuals who do not devote the time and effort to undertaking the activities necessary for starting a business may find themselves perennially still trying, rather than succeeding or failing.What entrepreneurs do in their day-to-day activities matters. The kinds of activities that nascent entrepreneurs undertake, the number of activities, and the sequence of these activities have a significant influence on the ability of nascent entrepreneurs to successfully create new ventures. This study suggests that the behaviors of nascent entrepreneurs who have successfully started a new venture can be identified and differentiated from the behaviors of nascent entrepreneurs who failed. We believe that future studies will more precisely identify the kinds of behaviors appropriate for certain new venture conditions. If such contingency information can be generated, entrepreneurship research is likely to have significant benefits for entrepreneurship practice, education, and public policy.     

High‐Growth Women’s Entrepreneurship: Fueling Social and Economic Development

High‐growth firms, often referred to as “gazelles,” are equated with entrepreneurial success and celebrated as the key to growing economies, and women’s entrepreneurship is a vehicle of economic and social development. This special issue publishes papers that address the general lack of research on high‐growth women’s entrepreneurship. In this introduction paper, we offer an adapted framework for the factors driving high growth across multiple levels: individual (entrepreneur and entrepreneurial team characteristics), venture (strategy, organizational structures, and systems), resources, location, and environment. We also introduce the papers in this special issue and present an overview of the contributions to this issue.     

International versus domestic entrepreneurship: New venture strategic behavior and industry structure

International entrepreneurship is defined in this study as the development of international new ventures or start-ups that, from their inception, engage in international business, thus viewing their operating domain as international from the initial stages of the firm's operation.One hundred and eighty-eight new venture firms in the computer and communications equipment manufacturing industries are classified according to the percentage of their sales in the international market. Ventures with no sales derived from international activities are considered “domestic” new ventures, and ventures with sales from international activities comprising greater than 5% of total sales are considered “international” new ventures.The strategy and industry structure profiles of international new ventures are significantly different from domestic new ventures. The internationals pursue much broader market-based strategies, seeking a strategy of broad market coverage through developing and controlling numerous distribution channels, serving numerous customers in diverse market segments, and developing high market or product visibility. The internationals also emphasize a more aggressive entry strategy, building on outside financial and production resources to enter numerous geographical markets on a large scale. Securing patent technology is also an important component of their strategy. This suggests that the internationals compete by entering the industry on a large scale, seeking to penetrate multiple markets, with the recognition that external resources are necessary to support such an entry.Whereas both the domestics and the internationals characterize domestic competition as being relatively intense, the international new ventures compete in industries with higher levels of international competition. It is not clear from this research whether the new venture selects an industry with a high degree of international competition and therefore responds with an international orientation or, because the new venture has an international orientation, it perceives or recognizes a higher degree of international competition. Another industry structure difference is the internationals' perceived higher degree of restrictiveness due to government regulation. It is unclear whether this restrictiveness motivates new ventures to seek less-regulated international environments or if it indicates that when competing internationally, the new venture is confronted with increased regulatory requirements.Domestic new ventures are distinguished by their emphasis on a production expansion strategy and customer specialization strategy. The production specialization strategy consists of focusing on limited geographical markets, maintaining excess capacity, and pursuing forward integration. The customer specialization strategy incorporates the production of a specialty product that is purchased infrequently. Thus, for both of the domestic strategies, a consistent “closeness” between the producer and consumer is implied. This may be an important basis underlining the new venture's decision to compete in an exclusive domestic context.This study offers initial support for the notion of international entrepreneurship by its findings that there are significant differences between new venture firms competing domestically and new ventures choosing to also enter international markets.     

Explaining the formation of international new ventures: The limits of theories from international business research

International new ventures (INVs) represent a growing and important type of start-up. An INV is defined as a business organization that, from inception, seeks to derive significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and the sale of outputs in multiple countries (Oviatt and McDougall 1994). Their increasing prevalence and important role in international competition indicates a need for greater understanding of these new ventures (Oviatt and McDougall 1994).Logitech, as described in a case study by Alahuhta (1990), is a vivid example of an INV. Its founders were from two different countries and had a global vision for the company from its inception. The venture, which produces peripheral devices for personal computers, established headquarters in both Switzerland and the U.S. Manufacturing and R&D were split between the U.S. and Switzerland, and then quickly spread to Taiwan and Ireland. The venture's first commercial contract was with a Japanese company.Using 24 case studies of INVs, we found that their formation process is not explained by existing theories from the field of international business. Specifically, neither monopolistic advantage theory, product cycle theory, stage theory of internationalization, oligopolistic reaction theory, nor internalization theory can explain the formation process of INVs. These theories fail because they assume that firms become international long after they have been formed, and they therefore highlight large, mature firms. They also focus too much on the firm level and largely ignore the individual and small group level of analysis (i.e., the entrepreneur and his or her network of business alliances).We propose that an explanation for the formation process of INVs must answer three questions: (1) who are the founders of INVs? (2) why do these entrepreneurs choose to compete internationally rather than just in their home countries? and (3) what form do their international business activities take?Who are the founders of INVs? We argue that founders of INVs are individuals who see opportunities from establishing ventures that operate across national borders. They are “alert” to the possibilities of combining resources from different national markets because of the competencies (networks, knowledge, and background) that they have developed from their earlier activities. Following the logic of the resource-based view of the firm, we argue that the possession of these competencies is not matched by other entrepreneurs. Only the entrepreneur possessing these competencies is able to combine a particular set of resources across national borders and form a given INV.Why do these entrepreneurs choose to compete internationally rather than just in their home countries? The founders of INVs recognize they must create international business competencies from the time of venture formation. Otherwise, the venture may become path-dependent on the development of domestic competencies and the entrepreneur will find it difficult to change strategic direction when international expansion eventually becomes necessary. As the founder of one INV explained, “The advantage of starting internationally is that you establish an international spirit from the very beginning” (Mamis 1989:38).What form do their international business activities take? Founders of INVs prefer to use hybrid structures (i.e., strategic alliances and networks) for their international activities as a way to overcome the usual poverty of resources at the time of start-up.This study has important implications for the practice of management. In financing decisions relating to INVs, venture capitalists and other venture financiers should look for entrepreneurs who have a global vision, international business competence, and an established international network. When entrepreneurs start INVs they should create hybrid structures to preserve scarce resources. Finally, given the path-dependence of competence development, founders of new ventures should consider whether establishing a domestic new venture with plans to later internationalize will be as successful a strategy as establishing a new venture that is international from inception.