Classroom Games: The Allocation of Renewable Resources Under Different Property Rights and Regulation Schemes

The authors describe a renewable resource allocation game designed to stimulate students' interest in and understanding of market failure associated with open-access types of resource use. They also use the game to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of various property rights and regulation schemes. Because this exercise demonstrates the power of unregulated and regulated economic incentives, many types of students may benefit from this game, including undergraduates enrolled in the standard introductory and in more advanced microeconomics classes, as well as courses in environmental economics and natural resource economics. This game was specifically designed so that noneconomics majors in natural resource management and environmental courses could also benefit.     

Farmer Brown v. Rancher Wyatt: Teaching the Coase Theorem

The Coase Theorem is a fundamental tenet of environmental economics and is taught to thousands of principles of microeconomics students each year. Its counterintuitive conclusion, that a Pareto optimal solution can result between private parties regardless of the initial allocation of property rights over a scarce resource, is difficult for students to understand. By using a mock trial that centers on a property dispute, students can be taught how the Coase Theorem works in practice with minimal preparation. The strong assumptions on which the Coase Theorem relies also can be included to show why the theorem may not hold. By using a unique, active learning technique, students will be more engaged and may have a better understanding of a difficult but seminal theory of economics.     

The role of location choice in strategic export promotion policy: capital liberalization incentives of exporting countries

We study an international capital liberalization game where exporting countries choose either to open the domestic market for capital inflow or not. We clarify that if the cost difference is large enough, the less productive country is indifferent between closing or opening for inward direct investment, and the more productive country never has an incentive to open. International coordination to open markets is not always necessary in our capital liberalization game since it may deteriorate the welfare of the more productive country and will make world welfare worse off. The earlier version of this paper is Kiyono and Wei (2002).     

An experimental analysis of cooperation and productivity in the trust game

In the standard trust game the surplus is increased by the risk taking first mover while cooperation by the second mover is a one-to-one transfer. This paper reports results from experiments in which the reverse holds; the first mover’s risky trust is not productive and the second mover’s cooperation is productive. This subtle difference significantly lowers the likelihood of trust but increases the likelihood of cooperation conditional on trust. Evidence is presented that the change in trust is consistent with first movers failing to anticipate the later result. Drawing upon the analogy that the trust game represents a model of exchange, the results suggest that markets should be organized so that the buyer moves first and not the seller as in the original trust game.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

原制造商与第三方再制造商知识产权共享路径研究

研究原制造商和第三方再制造商知识产权共享路径,协调双方知识产权关系,推动再制造产业有序快速发展。从经济和法律两个角度研究废旧产品中含有的知识产权归属问题,理顺原制造商和再制造商的知识产权关系;构建原制造商对再制造商进行知识产权许可的博弈模型,研究如何促进原制造商同意对再制造商进行知识产权许可和吸引再制造商从事再制造行为;构建再制造商向原制造商缴纳知识产权使用费的博弈模型,研究如何促进再制造商同意向原制造商缴纳知识产权使用费。最后,提出了原制造商和再制造商之间的知识产权共享路径,制定了动态的知识产权保护力度原则,为双方实现正向协同效应提供指导,推动再制造产业有序快速发展。     

农民住房财产权抵押能否激发农村金融市场*——基于银行贷款数据的实证分析

扩展抵押品范围是缓解农村金融困境的重要途径。在这一思路下，农民住房财产权抵押被寄予厚望，成为近年来农村政策改革的重要方向。本文使用2010—2016年1 024家农信社和农商行的数据，利用2015年12月国务院在天津市蓟州区等59个试点县（市、区）开展为期两年的农民住房财产权抵押贷款试点这一“准自然实验”，对农民住房财产权抵押对涉农贷款供给的影响进行了检验。本文认为，现阶段农民住房面临着价值评估难、抵押物处置难的问题，抵押效果不佳。实证结果显示，农民住房财产权抵押没有显著增加涉农贷款供给，对农村金融的供给作用有限。本文在考虑了农民住房财产权抵押对其他担保方式的替代作用、农地经营权抵押和“三块地”改革的影响之后，上述结果依然稳健。本文的政策启示是，政府应着力做好农房抵押贷款改革的配套措施，推动宅基地制度改革，探索扩大农民住房财产权的受让范围，充分挖掘住房财产权的价值潜力，缓解抵押物处置难问题。     

Wealth Distribution and Imperfect Factor Markets: A Classroom Experiment

The author presents a simple exercise to demonstrate how initial property distribution can affect final wealth patterns in developing areas of the world. The simulation is a variant of the Monopoly board game in which students role play different members of a market in which they each face different rules of credit access and salary patterns. The property distribution and new mortgage rules reflect the reality of many developing areas. The simulation can be completed in one full class period and has proven successful in making students more sensitive to wealth distribution issues. Students have suggested several variations of this simulation to make it applicable across more settings.     

农民住房财产权抵押能否激发农村金融市场*——基于银行贷款数据的实证分析

扩展抵押品范围是缓解农村金融困境的重要途径。在这一思路下，农民住房财产权抵押被寄予厚望，成为近年来农村政策改革的重要方向。本文使用2010—2016年1 024家农信社和农商行的数据，利用2015年12月国务院在天津市蓟州区等59个试点县（市、区）开展为期两年的农民住房财产权抵押贷款试点这一“准自然实验”，对农民住房财产权抵押对涉农贷款供给的影响进行了检验。本文认为，现阶段农民住房面临着价值评估难、抵押物处置难的问题，抵押效果不佳。实证结果显示，农民住房财产权抵押没有显著增加涉农贷款供给，对农村金融的供给作用有限。本文在考虑了农民住房财产权抵押对其他担保方式的替代作用、农地经营权抵押和“三块地”改革的影响之后，上述结果依然稳健。本文的政策启示是，政府应着力做好农房抵押贷款改革的配套措施，推动宅基地制度改革，探索扩大农民住房财产权的受让范围，充分挖掘住房财产权的价值潜力，缓解抵押物处置难问题。     

产权管制放松与制度绩效变迁——来自广东经济非均衡转轨的证据

过去大量的研究强调政策、区域、禀赋等对广东经济转轨绩效的影响,论文从产权管制放松的角度出发,构建了一个简单的博弈论模型,旨在分析广东政府放松对资源配置权利的管制对经济转轨产生的制度效应。研究发现,广东各级地方政府放松对资源配置权利的管制,大幅节约了租金耗散,并衍生出更多给予经济个体发挥比较优势的获利空间,扩展了市场范围,从而促进了地区经济均衡转轨。论文对于理解广东经济转轨问题提供了一个新的视角和框架,它尤其有助于揭示产权管制放松与经济绩效变迁二者之间的内在机理和制度逻辑。     

我国旅游资源产权安排:一个新的分析框架

随着旅游产业的发展,旅游资源的外延逐渐扩大,旅游资源产权问题越发复杂.如果依然笼统地实行僵化的旅游资源管理模式,不但会使资源的利用效率降低,而且会对资源本身造成极大的危害.本文基于产权的角度,在对旅游资源重新进行分类的基础上,构建新的旅游资源产权体系,进而根据不同产权的有效性条件,提出了调整旅游资源的具体管理、运行制度的思路.     

集体林权制度改革的经济学分析

运用产权理论分析了我国新一轮林改前集体林权制度存在产权主体模糊、产权边界不清、收益权实现机制不合理、林木交易选择权被剥夺等现象,林改有助于产权主体的明晰、产权边界的界定、处置权的落实及收益权的确保。运用激励理论说明了对集体林权制度作进一步的合理安排应紧紧围绕利益杠杆,采取切实有效的激励措施以激发林农营林的积极性。国家具有＂经济人＂特性,运用国家理论论证了建立产权清晰、责权利明确的林业经营制度有助于其＂经济人＂富民兴林目标的实现。     

A regression discontinuity approach to measuring the effectiveness of oil and natural gas regulation to address the common-pool externality

Oil and natural gas reservoirs typically span multiple productive leases so that no owner has rights to the entire stock of resource, resulting in production externalities. Previous literature has examined the effectiveness of government regulation in Texas and Oklahoma in abating these externalities, finding Oklahoma to be more successful in unifying common pools and securing property rights. Using regression discontinuity design, we quantify the impact of regulatory difference between the two states. We find that Oklahoma produces an average of 3361 more barrels of oil over the life of a well, relative to Texas. Given the maturity of the fields in question, the result underscores the continuing importance of addressing common pool externalities even after the primary phase of recovery has largely been completed.     

Spontaneous (non)emergence of property rights

The paper analyses preferences of private owners over the degree of property rights protection. It is shown that inequality in resource ownership and/or relative inefficiency of production technologies could make wealthier agents favour less than full protection of property rights. If such agents control the choice of a property rights regime, fully secured property rights will not emerge from the grassroots. This conclusion is consistent with the failure to create an efficient property rights system in Russia.     

Cooperation in the commons

This paper delineates circumstances in which a first-best cooperative solution can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium in a dynamic common property renewable resource game. In a game with nonlinear resource stock effects on cost, we characterize a worst perfect equilibrium that supports cooperation for the widest range of parameter values for the discount rate, resource growth rate, harvest price, and the number of resource exploiters. The strategy profile that we propose is consistent with human behavior observed in experiments and common property resource case studies.We thank seminar participants at the University of Minnesota, the Heartland Environmental and Resource Economics Conference at Iowa State University, Keio University, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Rapacious Resource Depletion,Excessive Investment and Insecure Property Rights: A Puzzle

For a country fractionalized in competing factions, each owning part of the stock of natural exhaustible resources, or with insecure property rights, we analyze how resources are transformed into productive capital to sustain consumption. We allow property rights to improve as the country transforms natural resources into capital. The ensuing power struggle about the control of resources is solved as a non-cooperative differential game. Prices of resources and depletion increase faster than suggested by the Hotelling rule, especially with many competing factions and less secure property rights. As a result, the country substitutes away from resources to capital too rapidly and invests more than predicted by the Hartwick rule. The theory suggests that power struggle boosts output but depresses aggregate consumption and welfare, especially in highly fractionalized countries with less secure property rights. Also, adjusted net saving estimates calculated by the World Bank using market prices over-estimate welfare-based measures of genuine saving. Since our theory suggests that genuine saving is zero while empirically they are negative in resource-rich, fractionalized countries, we suggest ways of resolving this puzzle.     

Competing or cooperating to host mega events: A simple model

Using game theory tools, this paper analyzes strategic interactions between two candidate countries in bidding for the hosting rights for a certain mega event. The dynamic modeling reveals that competition may lead to an inefficient Nash-equilibrium, indicating welfare loss for both parties. Using a concrete version of a differential game function, and from the aspect of total benefit maximization that is Pareto-efficient, the paper derives an explicit solution to the game. The model developed has both practical relevance to policy makers and theoretical potential to be applied to other kinds of international biddings.     

On the Origins of Property Rights: Conflict and Production in the State of Nature

I analyse the emergence of property rights in a model of conflict and production in the absence of institutions of enforcement. The population of agents evolves dynamically through conflicts for possession of factor goods among pairs of randomly matched agents. Conflicts are incomplete information wars of attrition with an agent's type consisting of his or her independently drawn valuation of the prize and cost of competing for it. I prove equilibrium existence and show that in the steady state of the game, the population sorts into two stable groups (resource "haves" and "have-nots") in accordance with a known function of their primitive types.     

水权概念和体系的探析——基于资源水与产品水的划分视角

水权是水产权制度的简称,是建立水权市场体系的基础。当前我国面临的水资源短缺与水环境污染危机迫切要求建立有效的水权制度和水权市场体系,以保护和有效配置水资源。为此,法学界和经济学界分别从物权和产权的角度对水权进行阐释和建构。但现有研究对水权的把握过于抽象,难以明确经济主体在用水行为中的损益边界。而以水质变化和用水方式的竞争性、排他性为依据,具体区分资源水和产品水两种水资源形态,能够较为合理地界定和把握水权概念,有针对性地建构水权体系,建立水权市场,从而有助于从微观上定义经济主体的行为边界,从宏观上明确政府与市场的作用边界,为实现水资源的合理配置与可持续发展以及相关立法提供理论依据。     

生态产权制度建设与我国生态环境保护

文章认为,我国生态资源效率低下根源于＂公＂权,但提高其效率的出路未必就在于＂私＂权化。因此,在我国生态产权制度改革中,既要引入激励性机制,建立市场化的生态环境公共产权规制,又要打破传统＂公有＂—＂公用＂—＂公营＂中的＂公用＂、＂公营＂生态资源运行范式,把使用权和经营权按生态资源公共性、外部性做技术性分离,明确使用权和经营权各自的权能,引入民营企业、外资企业等非国有企业参与生态产权的经营和竞争,使国有企业从部分生态资源的经营领域退出,形成多元化、市场化的生态资源经营制度和生态产权混合型管理模式,实现我国生态环境的有效保护。     

当代大学生依法维权的思考

近年来,大学生维权现象被越来越多的人所关注。由于大学生群体的特殊性,其参与的维权活动有着自身的特点和困难。在依法治国的时代背景下,大学生的维权活动理应依法展开。站在法治的视角,从为什么维权、维什么权和怎么维权三方面入手,阐述了大学生维权的必要性、维权的重点内容和维权的方式方法等问题,在分析中结合大学生、学生会、高校三者间的关系,以求为大学生依法维权提供新的路径。