SUNK COSTS OF CAPITAL AND THE FORM OF ENTERPRISE: INVESTOR‐OWNED FIRMS AND WORKER‐OWNED FIRMS*

ABSTRACT ** : This paper examines implications of sunk costs of capital for efficient forms of enterprise. It is assumed that firm owners and outside traders are asymmetrically informed of venture risks, and that there are sunk costs associated with investment in physical and human capital. We then make an efficiency comparison between investor‐owned and worker‐owned firms. We find that the firm is efficient when it is owned by the input supplier (the investor or worker) who incurs large sunk costs. This is because such an input supplier can credibly signal to the other input supplier that he in fact has a safe project. An empirical study based on the Japanese manufacturing industry seems to support the theoretical result.     

Average-cost pricing: Some evidence and implications

We present new survey evidence on pricing behavior for more than 14,000 European firms, and study its macroeconomic implications. Among firms that are price setters, roughly 75% respond that their prices are set as a markup on total costs, a business practice termed “full cost pricing”. Only 25% set prices as markups over variable or marginal costs. Moreover, using industry data for the U.S., we find that the correlation between changes in output prices and changes in variable input prices is significantly lower when fixed costs are likely to be more important.Since our results are similar to the findings in the classic and controversial paper of Hall and Hitch (1939) and subsequent survey evidence, we believe it worth studying the implications of full cost pricing for macroeconomics. We first propose a problem for the firm where full cost pricing can arise as optimizing behavior. We embed this problem, featuring an occasionally binding constraint, into a simple general equilibrium model. We show that when the model is hit by a shock that makes the constraint binding, the response of endogenous variables is amplified significantly more than it would be under the unconstrained regime.     

The shadow of death model revisited with an application to French firms

This article provides an empirical model of the shadow of death in which the exit probability of a firm depends on the firm’s productive performance and the firm’s level of sunk costs, which are viewed as barriers to exit. The shadow of death effect is treated by assuming a relationship between the propensity to exit and both the contemporaneous and lagged values of efficiency and sunk costs. To estimate the unobserved productive efficiency, we use the Ackerberg et al. (2006) estimator extended by the addition of a correction for selection bias. We use an unbalanced sample of approximately 100 000 French firms over the period 1997 to 2002. Our results indicate that the probability of exit is negatively affected by unobserved individual efficiency and the level of sunk costs. The shadow of death effect applies mainly in manufacturing, where both productive efficiency and sunk costs decrease during several years before exit. In service sectors, the exit process seems to occur more suddenly.     

Efficiency properties of binary ecolabeling

We investigate efficiency properties of binary ecolabels in a homogeneous good market with heterogeneous consumers. Faced with the minimum technology standard, firms make endogenous entry, certification, and price/quantity decisions. We consider both perfect and imperfect competition with or without sunk fixed costs. Our findings are as follows. Ecolabeling alone does not achieve the first-best outcome and, to achieve the second best, may need to set the standard less strict than the efficient level. Without sunk fixed costs, ecolabeling can achieve the first-best outcome provided that both the technology standard and the complementary pollution tax are set at efficient levels. With sunk fixed costs, however, differential excise taxes that would restore allocative efficiency induce more entry than optimal, and thus, can be even welfare decreasing relative to no tax outcome. Tightening the technology standard may ameliorate such an adverse effect of the corrective tax system by reducing excessive entry and pollution per output by the certified firms.     

信誉的价值:基于淘宝数据对我国电子市场的特色解释

为了解释信誉在我国特色电子市场中的价值,本文基于2008年3月下旬淘宝网上三个电子产品的相关数据,分析卖方的长短期肯定信用度和否定信用度、运费、剩余时间、消费者保障服务及价格等对其销售价格、售出概率、售出数量及售出价格的影响。实证分析发现:信誉度对卖方销售及售出行为存在一定的显著影响;价格对销售等行为没有显著相关作用,而只有价格升水对售出概率存在调节作用;剩余时间会正向影响卖方的销售价格,运费却只对卖方售出概率存在负向影响,而消费者保障尚不能显著影响卖方的销售及售出行为。     

Are sunk costs in exporting country specific?

Abstract Previous studies have shown that there are significant sunk entry costs in exporting. However, the empirical literature has not addressed whether these costs are global or country specific. In this paper, I show that both are present and estimate that country‐specific costs are about three times the magnitude of global costs. Furthermore, I show that international standards harmonization has strong positive effects on imported variety in small and remote markets. Calibration of a modified Chaney (2008) model indicates that these markets will gain access to 3–4% more imported varieties when global costs increase by 10%, holding total entry costs constant.     

Market thickness,sunk costs,productivity, and the outsourcing decision: an empirical analysis of manufacturing firms in France

Abstract This paper presents an empirical analysis of outsourcing behaviour by French manufacturing industries. It focuses on the effects of market thickness, sunk costs, and the productivity of firms on the outsourcing decision. I estimate a dynamic probit model where outsourcing decision is linked to past outsourcing behaviour. The results show that outsourcing is a persistent strategy adopted by large firms and suggest the presence of significant sunk costs associated with outsourcing. The results also show that market thickness reduces search costs and enhances the establishment of outsourcing relationships.     

Searching for the sunk cost fallacy

We seek to isolate in the laboratory factors that encourage and discourage the sunk cost fallacy. Subjects play a computer game in which they decide whether to keep digging for treasure on an island or to sink a cost (which will turn out to be either high or low) to move to another island. The research hypothesis is that subjects will stay longer on islands that were more costly to find. Eleven treatment variables are considered, e.g. alternative visual displays, whether the treasure value of an island is shown on arrival or discovered by trial and error, and alternative parameters for sunk costs. The data reveal a surprisingly small sunk cost effect that is generally insensitive to the proposed psychological drivers. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . Jel Classification C91, D11     

沉淀成本与政府管制政策

新古典一般均衡理论的假设前提是完全的产品和要素市场,这是一个没有沉淀成本的经济模型。一旦我们放松新古典经济学资源流动性的假设前提,引入沉淀成本概念,就会发现,沉淀成本不仅导致要素市场失灵,造成进入壁垒,而且还为政府管制奠定了理论指导。为了提高市场绩效,政府管制必须将沉淀成本管制（进入壁垒）、产权管制（外部性）和信息不完全管制（交易成本）有机结合起来。     

Hangovers

This paper analyzes a process by which a market boom brought on by a temporary increase in the flow of buyers, can subsequently lead to a collapse of liquidity (speed of sale), prices and production to levels lower than before the onset of the boom. I consider a general model of markets subject to search frictions in the matching of buyers and sellers, where the entry of buyers and sellers (through production) are subject to adjustment costs. The resulting co-movement between unemployment, inventories and sales with the production cycle matches the stylized facts.     

Sunk Costs,Firm Heterogeneity,Export Market Entry and Exit: Evidence from India

This paper analyses the role of sunk costs and firm heterogeneity in firm decision to enter and exit export markets. Employing rich firm-level data on Indian manufacturing firms, the study points out that sunk costs in terms of previous export experience significantly explain entry and exit decisions of firms in the export market. The first set of analysis involves estimation of dynamic discrete choice model using random effects probit correcting for initial conditions problem. We find evidence that previous export experience (sunk costs) matters for export decision. However, importance of sunk costs is found to depreciate rapidly. Further, analysis across sub-sample of firms accounting for firm heterogeneity factors like size and product level information supports the hypothesis of sunk costs. Second set of analysis involving firm survival in export markets using discrete-time hazard models shows evidence of negative duration dependence. We observe that those firms which continue to export for few years are less likely to exit from export markets.

     

马克思对沉淀成本概念的分析及其意义

虽然马克思没有使用沉淀成本这一概念,但已认识到沉淀成本的本质特征——成本补偿或价值实现问题。因此,从马克思价值实现角度扩展西方学者对沉淀成本概念的理解,不仅突破了西方学者沉淀成本概念仅仅与资产特征和市场交易成本相关的局限性,而且将沉淀成本和生产过程与产品价值实现联系起来,从而纳入社会再生产运动过程中。从马克思价值实现角度出发,再次回到投资生产上来,充分理解影响沉淀成本的诸多因素,为政府制定政策或制度安排提供一种新的分析视角,在于避免出现沉淀成本,形成良好的再生产过程。     

Modelling economic hysteresis losses caused by sunk adjustment costs

Transition from one economic equilibrium to another as a consequence of shocks is often associated with sunk adjustment costs. Firm-specific sunk market entry investments (or sunk market exit costs) in case of a reaction to price shocks are an example. These adjustment costs lead to a dynamic supply pattern similar to hysteresis. In analogy to “hysteresis losses” in ferromagnetism, the authors explicitly model dynamic adjustment losses in the course of market entry and exit cycles. They start from the micro level of a single firm and use explicit aggregation tools from hysteresis theory in mathematics and physics to calculate dynamic losses. The authors show that strong market fluctuations generate disproportionately large hysteresis losses for producers. This could give a reason for the implementation of stabilizing measures and policies to prevent strong (price) variations or, alternatively, to reduce the sunk entry and exit costs.     

The economic burden of uncontrolled gout: how controlling gout reduces cost

Aim: To evaluate the burden of uncontrolled gout by examining estimated costs and cost drivers.

Materials and methods: Data from the 2012 and 2013?US National Health and Wellness Survey (NHWS; 2012 NHWS, n?=?71,157 and 2013 NHWS, n?=?75,000) were utilized in this study. Based on self-reported gout diagnosis and gout symptoms, respondents were categorized into three groups: controlled gout (n?=?344), uncontrolled gout (n?=?2,215), and non-gout controls (n?=?126,360). Chi-square tests and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVAs) were used to assess group differences on work productivity loss, healthcare resource utilization, and costs. Zero-inflated negative binomial regressions were used to assess the burden of uncontrolled gout on total costs after controlling for covariates.

Results: Patients with uncontrolled gout had higher presenteeism, overall work impairment, activity impairment, and number of emergency department visits than those with controlled gout or controls. Overall, uncontrolled gout patients had both higher indirect and total costs compared to patients with controlled gout. After controlling for confounders, those with uncontrolled gout had higher total costs than controlled gout respondents and non-gout controls; there was no significant difference in total costs between patients with controlled gout and non-gout controls.

Limitations: Results were based on cross-sectional, self-reported data, making causal inferences more uncertain. Additionally, sample size was small for controlled-gout respondents. Lastly, sampling weights were not used, thus potentially limiting generalizability.

Conclusion: Gout can be an expensive condition, particularly if it is not properly controlled. This study provides support that controlling symptoms (e.g. flares) can reduce the economic and societal burden of gout. Therefore, more attention needs to be paid to effective management of gout symptoms.     

Economic burden of hepatitis C-associated diseases: Europe,Asia Pacific,and the Americas

Abstract

Background:

Globally, hepatitis C virus (HCV) infects ～3% of the population. The objective of this study was to review published work and determine the direct medical costs for diseases associated with HCV infection globally, with the exception of the US.

Methods:

A systematic literature search was conducted to identify studies reporting the costs of hepatitis C sequelae between January 1990 and January 2011. Over 400 references were identified, of which 45 were pertinent. The costs were compiled, converted to US dollars, and adjusted to 2010 costs using the medical component of the consumer price index.

Results:

The median cost of liver transplants was estimated at $139,070 ($15,430–$443,700), refractory ascites at $16,740 ($8990–$35,940), hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) at $15,310 ($3370–$84,710), decompensated cirrhosis at $14,660 ($3810–$48,360), variceal hemorrhage at $12,190 ($3550–$46,120), hepatic encephalopathy at $9180 ($5370–$50,120), diuretic sensitive ascites at $3400 ($1320–$7470), compensated cirrhosis at $820 ($50–$2890), and chronic hepatitis C at $280 ($90–$1860). The variation among studies was mainly due to the methodology used to assess cost, local cost and government reimbursement, and country-specific treatment protocols.

Limitations:

All costs were adjusted to 2010 US dollars using the US medical component of the consumer price index (CPI) which may not reflect the change in medical costs in other countries. In addition, the costs, in the local currency were converted to US dollars in the year of the study. However, medical expenses may not vary with exchange rate, leading to artificial variations. Finally, there was no assessment of the quality of individual studies, which resulted in the same weighting to all studies.

Conclusions:

Hepatitis C imposes a high economic burden globally. Knowing the burden of HCV sequelae is useful for policy decisions as well as serving as a basis for determining the value of HCV screening and treatment.     

THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF BANNING SMOKING IN WISCONSIN'S BARS AND RESTAURANTS

There is much debate as to whether or not the passage of no‐smoking laws has adverse consequences for businesses in the hospitality industry. In 2010, the state of Wisconsin implemented a law that banned smoking in all public places. Using a panel of county‐level employment data, I examine the relationship between the implementation of smoking bans in Wisconsin and the subsequent changes in bar and restaurant employment. Using variation in the timing of bans that occurred as a result of four counties that implemented local bans prior to the July 2010 statewide ban, I conduct a difference‐in‐differences analysis to measure the average treatment effect of implementing a smoking ban in Wisconsin. I find that restaurant employment is not affected and that bar employment is significantly reduced as a result of the smoking ban. I also find that counties with higher levels of smoking prevalence see greater reductions in bar employment when a smoking ban is enacted. Back‐of‐the‐envelope estimates suggest that even though there are employment losses, the benefits of the smoking ban outweigh the costs. (JEL L510, D780)     

Ambiguity and spurious precision in the modern microeconomic cost framework

The MMCF stresses ‘variable’ and ‘fixed’ costs; homogenizes the firm's output; and limits itself to a single period to gain insight into the way markets do and/or should behave. Simplifying thus, it confounds expenditures and costs; fixed facilities and fixed costs; time-incremental and output-incremental costs; fixed capital and sunk costs; and ‘drawing board time’ and chronological time. The apparent precision of conclusions following therefrom is of little use in classifying a firm's expenditures even in simple one-site activities, such as a power plant or a cinema; and as is apparent through four econometric studies, MMCF provides little guidance for cost or price policy in network activities, since variable and short-run marginal costs may be defined arbitrarily.     

Cartel Stability and Economic Integration

This paper revisits the notion that economic integration—modeled as a reduction of trade costs—may be anticompetitive, in the sense that it may reinforce the ability of an international cartel to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other’s markets. The paper is novel in terms of introducing ad valorem and fixed trade costs in addition to the customary unit trade costs. It is shown that an anticompetitive effect, found for reductions in unit trade costs, may disappear once trade costs are ad valorem or fixed.     

PRIVATIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION: COSTS AND BENEFITS IN THE PRESENCE OF WAGE-BARGAINING

ABSTRACT ** :  The most important economic motive for privatization and liberalization is to reduce costs, which are believed to be higher in a public monopoly for several reasons, including internal rent capture. We assume that there is wage-bargaining both before and after privatization and liberalization. Wages are then in most cases reduced by liberalization but not by privatization as such. Social welfare may increase after liberalization with decentralized wage-bargaining if many firms enter, if the employees' bargaining strength is high and if there is no need of vertical separation. However, the social costs of privatization and liberalization are more likely to dominate despite free entry if sunk costs are high, and will always dominate under central wage-bargaining or vertical separation.