The Economics Student Reexamined: Male-Female Differences in Comprehension

This paper adds to the growing literature investigating the relative performance in economics courses between female and male students. The authors review the results of a large-scale study of essay and objective test results, learning rates, and the influence of precollege courses.     

农民投资、沉淀成本与制度安排

在我国经济体制转轨时期,农民逐渐成为真正的市场经济主体,自负盈亏,自主经营。在一定程度上,农民的经济活动不仅直接影响我国农业的可持续发展,而且还影响农民的收入水平及其在国民经济中的基础地位。这里运用一个动态的投资模型,分析沉淀成本对农民投资行为的影响,并提出解决"三农"问题的根本处方:力争完善市场制度和非市场制度,提高农业生产要素的流动性,降低其沉淀成本。     

马克思对沉淀成本概念的分析及其意义

虽然马克思没有使用沉淀成本这一概念,但已认识到沉淀成本的本质特征——成本补偿或价值实现问题。因此,从马克思价值实现角度扩展西方学者对沉淀成本概念的理解,不仅突破了西方学者沉淀成本概念仅仅与资产特征和市场交易成本相关的局限性,而且将沉淀成本和生产过程与产品价值实现联系起来,从而纳入社会再生产运动过程中。从马克思价值实现角度出发,再次回到投资生产上来,充分理解影响沉淀成本的诸多因素,为政府制定政策或制度安排提供一种新的分析视角,在于避免出现沉淀成本,形成良好的再生产过程。     

沉淀成本与政府管制政策

新古典一般均衡理论的假设前提是完全的产品和要素市场,这是一个没有沉淀成本的经济模型。一旦我们放松新古典经济学资源流动性的假设前提,引入沉淀成本概念,就会发现,沉淀成本不仅导致要素市场失灵,造成进入壁垒,而且还为政府管制奠定了理论指导。为了提高市场绩效,政府管制必须将沉淀成本管制（进入壁垒）、产权管制（外部性）和信息不完全管制（交易成本）有机结合起来。     

Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach

Two bargaining parties play the Nash Demand Game to share a pie whose size is determined by one party's investment decision. Various investment levels are subgame-perfect. Adding the investment decision to Young's evolutionary bargaining model yields the following long-run outcome: efficient investment prevails and the investor's share of the pie approximates die maximum of (i) the smallest share that induces efficient investment, even if the investor expects to appropriate the available pie from every inefficient investment, and (ii) half of the pie. The result favors forward induction to subgame consistency and equity theory to hold-ups. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, L14.     

The Optimizing Method of Equipment Renewal Opportunity Based on Dynamic Sunk Cost

This article brings forward a new conception of dynamic sunk cost, and then constructs a systematic model that could be used in analyzing equipment renewal opportunity. This model will do much help in solving problems refer to optimizing equipment renewal opportunity in right way.     

道德风险、沉淀成本效应与软预算约束

作者从事后信息不对称--道德风险角度,借助于沉淀成本效应再次解释政府对大型国有企业软预算约束行为,从而扩展了公有产权结构、动态承诺不一致,以及政策性负担等经济解释,进一步认识到解决软预算约束根本在于消除沉淀成本效应,而克服委托代理情况下的道德风险行为是最为根本的,因而设计恰当的制度安排显得十分重要.     

Endogenous Sunk Costs, Flexible Manufacturing and the Productivity Effects of International Trade

The paper addresses the productivity effects of international trade in the presence of flexible manufacturing and endogenous sunk costs (cost-reducing R&D). It shows that international trade raises R&D expenditures, but this will not necessarily boost productivity because of possibly counteracting market structure effects. The analysis is conducted in general equilibrium so that implications for real wages and welfare can also be addressed. Both can fall when trade leads to excessive R&D investment.     

Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.     

高新技术产业投资、沉淀成本与补偿制度创新

高新技术产业投资对我国国民经济发展具有重要的作用和潜在的扩张力,但由于没有充分利用高新技术产业投资,严重影响国民经济的整体发展.为此,本文从沉淀成本角度出发,使用一个动态的投资模型,探讨高新技术产业投资所面临的障碍以及提供刺激高新技术产业投资的基本原则,在于完善投资成本补偿机制:一方面,需要大力完善市场制度;另一方面,更需要大力完善非市场制度,同时,政府折旧和税收政策等也是不可替代的.     

沉淀成本、跨国公司与政府经济政策选择

如果跨国公司投资没有沉淀成本，无论东道国实行什么样的经济政策，跨国公司都会很自由地进出该国；但如果跨国公司投资有沉淀成本，尽管东道国实行硬经济政策获取大部分经济剩余，但跨国公司就会将产品的生产与销售转移到软经济政策的国家。在现实生活中，由于跨国公司的投资具有沉淀性，此时，国家之间为了吸引跨国公司的投资在经济政策方面的竞争将会促进跨国公司的发展，从而带来整个世界经济福利水平的提高。     

The Costs of Inflation Revisited

Neoclassical treatments of inflation understate the costs associated with inflation, even at very low levels. A comparative institutions perspective that recognizes the epistemological properties of prices and the institutional process by which inflation takes place, reveals the costs of inflation to be both larger and more widespread than standard treatments suggest. This paper makes use of insights from Austrian economics, public choice theory, and the new institutional economics to argue that inflation imposes costs by undermining the coordinative properties of the price system. Not only are there the direct costs of increased economic error, but actors also divert resources away from direct want-satisfaction into attempts to either prevent or cope with the increased degree of uncertainty inflation imposes. These resource costs are best understood from a comparative institutions perspective, as traditional measures of economic well-being, such as GDP, cannot distinguish between exchanges that directly satisfy wants, and exchanges that are attempts to correct or prevent utility-diminishing activities. The analogy between these coping costs and rent-seeking behavior is explored. In addition, inflation imposes costs by undermining the coordinative properties of markets and inducing actors to, on the margin, prefer to seek wealth or allocate resources through the political process.     

垄断、分工与市场

中国的国有企业一直面临着垄断的指责,但这种指责却是极其模糊和偏颇的。本文从时间与空间对垄断的概念进行界定,认为垄断是一种相对而非绝对的状态,其基础源于分工,是一个在与市场的相互作用下不断扩张的过程。笔者认为,从这种理论概念的澄清上可以看出,对于国有企业而言,绝大部分对于垄断的指责是偏颇的,也是不符合现实的。     

基于成本视角的企业外包研究

用生产成本、交易成本和沉淀成本可以解释外包存在的经济理性。与新建企业自行生产与购买决策不同,在企业内部生产的情况下,外包被视为一种外部购买行为;交易成本和沉淀成本的存在会减少对外包的需求。这种分析框架比较好地解释了企业外包行为。当前,我们应大力完善市场制度、企业内部决策机制及网络治理结构等,以减少企业的沉淀成本,推进企业外包。     

Sunk Costs, Market Access, Economic Integration, and Welfare

The nature of the equilibrium that arises after economic integration is shown to depend crucially on how initial entry costs are divided along two separate dimensions: market access versus technology costs, and fixed versus sunk costs. There are three post-integration equilibrium regimes: a traditional trade theory regime which arises when both market access costs and fixed costs are small, a new trade theory regime which arises when market access costs are small but fixed costs are high, and a market access regime which arises when market access costs are high. While the first two regimes have already appeared in the literature, the third is new. The sign, magnitude, and qualitative behavior of the welfare effects of integration across all three regimes depend on the configuration of these costs.     

沉淀成本、通货紧缩与国企战略退出

文章在放松新古典竞争理论假设前提的基础上,结合我国体制转轨的初始条件--产业结构扭曲的特点,通过引入生产要素沉淀成本来分析通货紧缩产生的原因.由于我国大型国有企业自身缺乏比较优势,在竞争中也很容易产生亏损,同时又因国有企业的固定资本投资的沉淀成本显著而无法退出市场,造成过度竞争,进而使价格下降,利润率下降,投资减少,形成我国当前的通货紧缩,因此从沉淀成本角度提出治理有关通货紧缩的政策处方,能有效地实施国有企业的战略退出以及降低沉淀成本数量.     

中国商业银行信贷业务经营中的贷款定价问题研究

近年来中国商业银行信贷业务快速扩张势头尤为强劲,但与其相适应的信贷业务经营收益水平却未随之同步提高,由此凸现出信贷业务快速扩张背后贷款定价问题的困扰。提高中国商业银行的贷款定价能力,从而在信贷业务经营过程中,卡准信贷资金成本与收益的啮合点,做到信贷业务经营成本的可控性,提高信贷业务经营收益水平是解决困扰之选择。     

企业债券期限结构研究——基于交易成本和代理成本视角

发行长期债券可以降低交易成本．但债券期限越长，代理成本就越高。企业在发行新债券时必须对交易成本和代理成本进行权衡．寻求最优债券期限结构。模型证明，发行企业债券时运用提前赎回条款、卖回条款、偿偾基金条款和转换权等债券契约条款可以同时达到降低发债总成本和延长企业债券融资期限的目的。     

历史沉淀成本与经济转型的路径依赖及其超越

本文旨在突破新古典理性选择的经济转型研究方法,再次阐述计划经济体制下历史沉淀成本对经济转型的锁定效应。由新古典经济理论和规范决策理论可知,以前投资的历史或沉淀成本已经支付过了,因其不构成机会成本,所以不应该影响当前或未来的经济转型决策。然而,在经济转型时期,决策者并不能够根据经济转型的预期边际收益和边际成本进行理性决策,不仅需要考虑因资产专用性,以及由此产生的交易成本的阻碍影响,还需要考虑过去发生的历史沉淀成本的阻碍影响。因此,为了加快计划经济体制向市场经济体制转型的进程,制度或政策制定的基本原则应着眼于历史沉淀成本管理,从而切断路径依赖。     

Regulating the United States Railroads: The Effects of Sunk Costs and Asymmetric Risk

The Surface Transportation Board (STB) applies the theory of contestable markets to regulate dominant railroad freight movements. The STB bases its determination whether railroad revenues are excessive if they would be more than sufficient to support investment in a hypothetical stand-alone railroad designed to handle the at-issue traffic efficiently. The STB regulatory approach does not take correct account of the importance of sunk costs and irreversible investments in the railroad industry. We estimate how large the mistakes can be by applying a real options approach that takes into account the effect of sunk costs, irreversible investment, and asymmetric returns.