成都创建国家环境保护模范城市的启示

成都市创建国家环境保护模范城市活动进一步改善了城市创业环境和人居环境,全面提升了城市服务功能与综合价值,提高了公众生活质量,使成都市初步走上了环境和经济相互促进,人与自然和谐共生的可持续发展道路,呈现出经济快速发展、环境清洁优美、生态良性循环的良好态势。从成都创建国家环境保护模范城市实践中,我们可以得到以下启示:创建国家环境保护模范城市是构建和谐社会,落实科学发展观,全面建设小康社会,提高城市综合实力与城市竞争力的前提;创建国家环境保护模范城市必须承担发展经济和保护生态的双重任务,并且需要建立持续增长的投入机制;国家环境保护模范城市建设更需要注重生态型社会的建设。     

An economic theory of leadership turnover

In an infinite-horizon stochastic model, a coup not only disciplines a dictator's policy towards a group of “kingmakers”, but also enables a kingmaker to become a dictator. Greater competition for the dictator's position, a lower impact of the dictator's policy on the kingmakers, or lower risks of staging a coup raises the benefit of a coup relative to its opportunity cost and so raises the probability of a coup. Since periodic shocks affect the efficacy of the dictator's policy, a bad enough shock makes it too costly for even talented dictators to avert a coup. More talented dictators are able to survive more negative shocks, so the worst shock in a dictator's reign is informative about the probability of a coup. Conditional on the worst shock, the probability of a coup is independent of a dictator's duration in office. The unconditional probability declines with duration.     

Nonlinear stochastic effects of substitution — an evolutionary approach

Technological innovations have been investigated by means of substitution and diffusion as well as evolution models, each of them dealing with different aspects of the innovation problem. In this paper we follow the well known research traditions on self-organisation models of complex systems. For the first time in the literature we show the existence of a specific niche effect, which may occur in the first stage of establishment of a new technology. Using a stochastic Master equation approach, we obtain analytical expressions for the survival probabilities of a new technology in smaller or larger ensembles. As a main result we demonstrate how a hyperselection situation might be removed in a stochastic picture and thresholds against the prevailing of a new technology in a step-by-step process can be overcome.     

Growth,Distribution, and External Constraints: A Post-Kaleckian Model Applied to Brazil

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to analyze whether the Brazilian economy behaved under a wage-led or profit-led regime between 1960 and 2011, considering a Post-Kaleckian model in a context of external constraints. The time span is limited by data availability (i.e., 2011). To answer the question of whether the Brazilian economy works under a wage-led or profit-led regime, we propose a simple Post-Kaleckian model. The model suggests that a profit-led regime is more probable for Brazil. Moreover, a wage-led regime occurs when a balance of payments constrained growth model is taken into consideration. Likewise, the real exchange rate has a positive impact on economic growth through the export channel. This result is a novelty in the recent literature about the relationship between real exchange rate and economic growth within a Post-Kaleckian model. The Brazilian economy was chosen as it is one of the biggest economies in Latin America.     

Emission taxes for genuine altruistic firms

This article develops a theoretical model that explores firms' abatement choices. The main results are: First, in a market comprised of a not sufficiently large number of heterogeneous firms always there exists a subset of firms that are willing to undertake abatement activities, if their marginal altruistic cost of emissions is positive. Second, a low emission tax induces abatement when a firm is egoistic or if its altruistic cost of emissions has a concave structure. In contrast, if the firms’ altruistic cost of emissions has a convex structure, then intermediate emission taxes are required. Third, the effect of firms’ altruistic cost of emissions on the emission tax that induce the socially optimum abatement is also conditional on the genuine altruistic preferences and finally, the social planner has an incentive to impose a Pigouvian emission tax when firms are profit maximizers. Otherwise, a lower tax suffices.     

Opinion convergence in location: A spatial version of the Delphi method

This paper proposes a modified version of the Delphi method, starting from the assumption that in many situations the convergence of opinions can be considered in a spatial context. The Spatial Delphi we suggest is based, like the classical Delphi, on the judgments of experts, and it is useful in the consultations for decision and/or forecast purposes, provided that they concern matters of spatial location. The basis for the questionnaire is a map, on which each expert provides, as answer(s), one or more opinion-points, i.e., locations that, according to their opinion, are best for a specific purpose. We propose a method for narrowing the area of convergence along a multi-step procedure so that the final result of the consultation is a small portion of the initial territory with respect to the initial area considered. Besides a simulation study, we report also a prototype application with a panel of twelve experts.     

关于城市化的理性思考

城市化是人类社会经济发展的共同趋势。中国要在未来加快城市化进程首先要正确认识城市化,城市化不是一个可有可无的过程,也不是一个人为可以随意控制的过程。加快城市化进程既是解决中国当前社会经济发展中所存在的各种问题的一个关键性问题,又是中国在２１世纪保持续稳定发展的一种重要因素。城市化是一自然经济过程,是一个经济、空间和人口相互协调的过程,是一个资源在空间优化配置的过程,它是经济城市化、空间城市化和人口     

Strategy-proof Location on a Network

We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a road network) based on agents' single-peaked preferences. First, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, onto rules when the graph is a tree. Such a rule is based on a collection of generalized median voter rules (Moulin, 1980) satisfying a consistency condition. Second, we characterize such rules for graphs containing cycles. We show that while such a rule is not necessarily dictatorial, the existence of a cycle grants some agent an amount of decisive power, unlike the case of trees. Rules for this case can be described in terms of a subclass of such rules for trees. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D78.     

A coopetitive model for the green economy

The paper proposes a coopetitive model for the Green Economy. It addresses the issue of the climate change policy and the creation and diffusion of low-carbon technologies. In the present paper the complex construct of coopetition is applied at macroeconomic level. The model, based on Game Theory, enables us to offer a set of possible solutions in a coopetitive context, allowing to find a Pareto solution in a win–win scenario. The model, which is based on the assumption that each country produces a level of output which is determined in a non-cooperative game of Cournot-type and that considers at the same time a coopetitive strategy regarding the low technologies, will suggest a solution that shows the convenience for each country to participate actively to a program of low carbon technologies within a coopetitive framework to address a policy of climate change, thus aiming at balancing the environmental imbalances.     

On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.     

Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources

We define a new class of games, congestion games with load-dependent failures (CGLFs). In a CGLF each player can choose a subset of a set of available resources in order to try and perform his task. We assume that the resources are identical but that players' benefits from successful completion of their tasks may differ. Each resource is associated with a cost of use and a failure probability which are load-dependent. Although CGLFs in general do not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in every CGLF with nondecreasing cost functions. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium.     

Congestion with heterogeneous commuters

We study a congestion model where a continuum of heterogeneous commuters make a binary choice between riding a bus and driving private vehicles for their commutes. Formulating the model as a large game, we establish the existence and uniqueness of a nontrivial Nash equilibrium and analyze how a gasoline tax affects the allocation of commuters between public transportation and private vehicles at the equilibrium. Based on the analysis, we provide a sufficient condition under which a gasoline tax is Pareto improving. We also prove the existence of a socially optimal policy that minimizes the aggregate loss to all commuters.     

A game-theoretic model of coalition formation among primates

This paper models the coalition formation process among primates as a sequential game. The population consists of individuals having distinct social ranks which is determined by the individual’s resource holding potential. Each member of the population is interested in gaining access to a food resource, either individually or via a coalition. At any given stage of the game, a player can either propose a specific coalition or he can be proposed to in order to join one. Hence, the strategy of a player consists of a sequence of decisions regarding who to propose to for the formation of a coalition and which proposals to accept or reject. We derive the preferences of the players over the various coalition structures under the assumption that the probability of a coalition to obtain the resource is given by a logistic distribution as a function of relative strengths of the players. We show that, given the primates’ strategic behavior, a variety of different coalition structures can emerge in equilibrium.      

Critical mass of users versus critical mass of services in a multiproduct information service system

In this paper we study the economic behaviour of the suppliers of a set of advanced telecommunications services with a joint adoption cost (common access facilities, learning process, etc.). In fixing the two-part tariffs for their services the suppliers have to share the burden of leaving to the users a surplus sufficient to cover the adoption cost. The lack of coordination in supplying a critical mass of services or in the pricing decisions has high changes to result in suboptimal or unviable diffusion of the new technology as a whole. We present a static optimization model of user behaviour, and derive access and usage demand with a two-part tariff and a joint adoption cost. We compare noncooperative and cooperative market equilibria in a duopoly with perfect information; finally we discuss the extension of our analysis to the case of imperfect information in a dynamic setting.     

Endogenous formation of coops and cooperative leagues

The labor-managed Mondragon cooperatives in the Basque country, and La Lega coops concentrated in North Central Italy, are grouped into leagues that enable them to reap economies of scale in key services such as R&D, marketing and finance. These leagues are relatively rare and there are fewer than a dozen of them globally. We develop a game-theoretic model of league formation to capture some of the strategic incentives behind the formation of labor-managed cooperatives (coops) and their agglomeration into a league. We then compare these incentives with those of conventional profit-maximizing firms to organize into a league. The main result of this paper shows that a divergence in these incentives stemming from their organizational differences may lead to the formation of a league of firms but not one of coops. This turns out to be true even though the coop has lower costs of production and the existence of a coop league would have been socially efficient. Anticipating the non-existence of a coop league then creates a disincentive for individual agents to form coops in the first place. This explains the relative rarity of coops, competing individually or as a part of a league, with conventional firms in imperfect markets.     

Targeting the biotechnology clusters in North Carolina and Israel: lessons from successful and unsuccessful policy making

This paper analyses the development of biotechnology clusters in North Carolina (NC) and Israel. In both NC and Israel, when the biotechnology was identified as a potential strategic priority, the framework conditions were suitable for successful policy-targeting. NC presents a case of a successful transition from a traditional manufacturing economy to a knowledge economy. The most successful part of this transition was a policy-led development of a biotechnology cluster in the Research Triangle. While Israel also presents a case of a successful transition from a low-tech economy to a knowledge-intensive economy, Israel failed to develop a successful biotechnology cluster. We suggest that this failure is mostly due to a failure to implement policy to encourage such development. We argue that the elements, which separate NC's success from Israel's failure, are: a clear vision and strategic planning; timely response, long-term commitment; strong leadership; cooperation between the government, private sector and academia, and an adjustable policy-making process.     

Participatory decision-making in land use planning: An application in Costa Rica

The economic, social and environmental implications of electricity generation for land use planning are a significant and complex problem in many countries. One reason for this complexity is the existence of several stakeholders with very different views or perceptions of the different criteria underlying the decision-making process. Therefore, the aggregation of individual stakeholder preferences into a single collective preference is a crucial problem. In this paper, this type of problem is addressed with the help of a methodology based upon the definition of a consensus within a distance-based framework. The methodology is applied to a case study in Costa Rica at two levels: at a national level and at a river basin level. The River Birrís was chosen because the conflict of interests between agricultural production and electricity generation are especially significant in this basin.     

Large-scale mortality shocks and the Great Irish Famine 1845–1852

This paper considers the consequences of a large scale mortality shock arising from a famine or epidemic for long run economic and demographic development. The Great Irish Famine of 1845–1852 is taken as a case-study and is incorporated as an exogenous mortality shock into the type of long-run unified growth theory pioneered by Galor and Weil (1999, 2000), and modelled by Lagerlöf (2003a,b) among others. Through calibration, the impact of such a mortality shock occurring on the cusp of a country's transition from a Malthusian to a Modern Growth regime is then depicted.     

Ex-ante evaluation of a targeted job program: Hypothetical integration in a social accounting matrix of South Africa

To analyze policy impacts of a targeted employment program calls for a new approach of estimation. This study proposes a simple modification to a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) in order to analyze the multiplier effects of a new sector. A different input composition, or technology, of the sector with targeted job provision makes a conventional analysis of final-demand injections on existing sectors invalid. Instead of a costly full-scale rebalancing, we apply the modification—so-called hypothetical integration—into a SAM to assess a proposed expansion of social care sector within the Expanded Public Works Program in South Africa.     

Fiscal stimuli in the form of job creation subsidies

This paper examines the effects of fiscal stimuli in the form of job creation subsidies in a DSGE model with search friction and endogenous job separation. We consider two types of job creation subsidies: a subsidy for the cost of posting vacancies and a hiring subsidy. This paper finds that the effects of job creation subsides on unemployment differ between models with and without endogenous job separation. While a positive job creation subsidy shock lowers unemployment in a model without endogenous job separation, it increases unemployment in a model with endogenous job separation. We also find that while qualitatively the effects of a vacancy cost subsidy on the economy are similar to those of a hiring subsidy, quantitatively they are different.