Oligopoly with a large number of competitors: asymmetric limit result

We address how profitable innovation is in a competitive market by investigating the asymmetric oligopoly model in which 1 firm (innovator) has a cost advantage that is not drastic enough for her to become a monopolist, and by inducing asymmetric limit outcomes when the number of the other firms (laggard firms) goes to infinity. If the innovator is the Stackelberg leader, two cases can arise: (i) the innovator behaves as in the competitive market or (ii) she occupies the entire market but cannot make the price. If we consider Cournot competition, the innovator becomes the partial monopolist. An erratum to this article can be found at     

The Nobel Prize Economics Lectures as a Teaching Tool

Because Nobel Prize economics lectures are written for various purposes and cover a range of topics at different levels of difficulty, the author uses them to add rigor and relevancy to an economics course.     

Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly

This paper examines the nature of optimal managerial incentives in the context of a duopoly marked by competition between the firm's managers in a dynamic production environment. If the marginal cost of production falls moderately over time or remains unchanged, there exists an equilibrium where one owner requires her manager to maximize profit, whereas the rival-owner requires her manager to maximize sales revenue. The profit-maximizing manager turns his firm into a Stackelberg-leader, while the sales-revenue-maximizing manager turns his firm into a Stackelberg-follower. Further, the profit-maximizing manager may generate a larger firm profit relative to the sales-revenue-maximizing manager.     

Women's Roles in the Economy: Teaching the Issues

This examination of some current issues of controversy concerning the roles of women in our economy will provide teachers with background information and students with reading material that can be used as a basis for lively and instructive class discussion.     

On a master-slave Bertrand game model

A master-slave Bertrand game model is proposed for upstream and downstream monopolies owned by different parties, in which the upstream monopolist's output is used as the main factor of production by the downstream monopolist who is a small purchaser of the upstream monopolist's output. The bifurcation of the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is analyzed with Schwarzian derivative. Numerical simulations are employed to show the model's complex dynamics by means of the largest Lyapunov exponents (LLEs), bifurcation, time series diagrams and phase portraits. With the modified straight-line stabilization method, chaos control is used to improve the aggregate profits of the two oligopolists. Lastly the welfare impacts of price fluctuations and chaos controls are briefly discussed.     

The Use of Course Evaluation Scores to Influence Teaching and Research Activities

The issue of course and teacher evaluations is one which continues to engender great interest. In this article, Paul Kipps comments on the Hansen-Kelley model as presented in the Fall 1973 issue of this journal, and then presents his own modifications and extensions of the model. These modifications deal mainly with the shape of the indifference curves and the slope of the output possibilities curve. The Kipps analysis casts doubts on the effectiveness of efforts to make significant improvements in the teaching output of research-oriented professors, and in the research work of teaching-oriented faculty members through voluntary incentive systems.     

Teaching Nash Equilibrium and Dominance: A Classroom Experiment on the Beauty Contest

Abstract: The authors' aim in this article was to show how the use of classroom experiments may be a good pedagogical tool to teach the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. The basic game is a version of the beauty contest game (BCG), a simple guessing game in which repetition lets students react to other players' choices and converge iteratively to the equilibrium solution. The authors perform this experiment with undergraduate students with no previous training in game theory. After four rounds, they observe a clear decreasing tendency in the average submitted number in all groups. Thus, the findings show that by playing a repeated BCG, students quickly learn how to reach the NE solution.     

The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs

We study Stackelberg games in which the follower faces a cost for observing the leader's action. We show that, irrespective of the size of the cost, the leader's value of commitment is lost completely in all pure-strategy equilibria. However, there also exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium that fully preserves the first-mover advantage. In this type of equilibrium, the probability that the follower looks at the leader's action is independent of the cost of looking.     

Cournot Competition and Hit-and-Run Entry and Exit in a Teaching Experiment

Instructors can use a computerized experiment to introduce students to imperfect competition in courses on introductory economics, industrial organization, game theory, and strategy and management. In addition to introducing students to strategic thinking in general, the experiment serves to demonstrate that profits of a firm fall as the number of competitors is increased in a market and that firms enter profitable markets. The authors have used the experiment in undergraduate classes on strategy and management as well as in master of business administration courses with great success.     

Using a Simple Contest to Illustrate Mechanism Design

This article describes a simple classroom activity that illustrates how economic theory can be used for mechanism design. The rules for a set of contests are presented; the results typically obtained from these contests illustrate how the prize structure can be manipulated in order to produce a particular outcome. Specifically, this activity is designed to show how changing the prize structure can impact both the contestants’ average efforts and the effort level of the hardest-working contestant. The activity can be run in a 50-minute class, has instructions that fit on a single piece of paper, and, although it can be run in large classes, requires only six students.     

A Simple Test of a Screening Procedure for Economics Faculty: A Note

This article discusses a graphical framework for classroom presentation of interactions between balance-of-payments flows and foreign exchange market equilibrium.     

Voice matters in a dictator game

We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of communication in a dictator game, while maintaining subjects’ anonymity. In the experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for his/her share before the dictator dictates his/her offer. We found that the independence hypothesis that voice does not matter is rejected. In particular, if the request is for less than half of the pie, the dictator’s offer increases as the recipient’s request increases. Additionally, there is no dictator who is other-regarding and, at the same time, does not react to the recipient’s request.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

Altruistic behavior in a representative dictator experiment

We conduct a representative dictator game in which students and random members of the community choose both what charity to support and how much to donate to the charity. We find systematic differences between the choices of students and community members. Community members are much more likely to write in their own charity, community members donate significantly more ($17), on average, and community members are much more likely (32%) to donate the entire $100 endowment. Based on this evidence, it does not appear that student behavior is very representative in the context of the charitable donations and the dictator game.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with Fixed Capacity

We focus on a class of market entry games in which a newly emergent market opportunity may be fruitfully exploited by no more than a commonly known, exogenously determined number of firms. Our results show significant effects of the parameters manipulated in the study, namely, the market capacity, entry fee, and method of subject assignment to groups (fixed vs. random). In contrast to previous market entry games with linear payoff functions, we find no evidence of convergence to equilibrium play on the aggregate level. Shifting the focus of the analysis from the aggregate to the individual level, four clusters of subjects are identified. The patterns are: (1) choice of the same action that is independent of the parameters of the game or the outcome of previous presentations of the same game; (2) random choices with probabilities prescribed by the equilibrium solution for risk-neutral players; (3) random choices with probabilities equal to the individual observed overall proportion of entry; and (4) sequential dependencies that violate any model that assumes randomization. Subjects in the fourth and largest category are shown to adjust their choices in accordance with a simple principle of strategic reasoning.     

Debt as a collusive device in an oligopoly supergame

This paper explores the impact of debt holdings on the output decisions of firms in an oligopoly supergame with stochastic demand fluctuations. It is demonstrated that when perfect collusion is not feasible then there exist circumstances in which increased debt holdings may facilitate tacit collusion. This occurs because higher debt levels act as a credible commitment device which lowers the payoffs accruing to a firm when it defects from the tacitly collusive equilibrium. It is further shown that in these circumstances firms may have an incentive to hold debt for strategic purposes which promote collusion.     

Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth approach

Summary. With few exceptions, the literature on the role of capacity as a strategic entry deterrent has assumed Cournot competition in the post-entry game. In contrast, this paper studies a model in which the incumbent and entrant sequentially precommit to capacity levels before competing in price. Interesting deterrence effects arise because firms need time to build, that is, cannot adjust capacity instantaneously in the post-entry game. This approach produces a simple and intuitive set of equilibrium behaviors and generates clear predictions about when these different outcomes are likely to arise. Our model also departs substantially from the existing literature in concluding that sunkness of capacity costs is neither necessary nor sufficient for capacity to have precommitment value. Received: August 25, 1999; revised version: October 15, 1999     

At the mercy of a prisoner three dictator experiments

We test male juvenile prisoners on a dictator game with another anonymous co-prisoner as recipient. Prisoners give more than students, but less than nonstudents of their age. They give more to a charity than to another prisoner. In one of two experiments, those convicted for violent crime give more than those convicted for property crime.     

On the Use of Exchange Rates as Trading Rules in a Bilateral System of Transferable Discharge Permits

The use of a system of transferable discharge permitsto control the harmful effects of non-uniformly mixedpollutants requires the application of trading rulesin order to prevent permit trading among sources fromviolating environmental standards. The elements andproperties of bilateral trading rules can be analyzedmore easily once formulated as exchange rates, whichwould convert, in a cost-effective way, the emissionright potentially given up by the seller into an offsetting emission right acquired by the buyer. Inthis article, a new expression for such exchange ratesis proposed and then analyzed to infer someunexplored properties of the system.     

HRM as a Significant Factor for Achieving Competitiveness through People: The Croatian Case

This paper evaluates the quality of human resource management (HRM) in Croatia because excellent human resource (HR) policies, programs and activities enable enterprises to maximize their workforce productivity. The research was conducted in enterprises with more than 200 employees. The value of HRM was assessed using the HR audit approach. Fifty-five HR indicators were analyzed from the top 10 Croatian HR enterprises to serve as benchmarks for the final sample of 80 enterprises. Results indicate Croatian enterprises have deficient HR practices, on average. Independent sample t-tests showed 61.82% of HR indicators were significantly better in the benchmark firms. Consequently, HRM in Croatia can not be considered solid ground for achieving competitiveness through people.