Bertrand Price Undercutting: A Brief Classroom Demonstration

The author presents a brief classroom demonstration illustrating Bertrand price undercutting. The demonstration is appropriate for micro principles and intermediate- and upper-level undergraduate classes, as well as graduate classes in micro, industrial organization, and game theory.     

A Monopoly Classroom Experiment

The author uses a simple classroom experiment to develop the economic model of monopoly. As a pedagogical tool, the experiment introduces students to the nature of the monopoly problem and motivates them to think of the associated efficiency issues as a divergence between private benefits and social contributions. As a test of economic principles, the experiment highlights the role of information and fairness ideals in determining economic outcomes.     

Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games

This paper investigates cooperative play in prisoner's dilemma games by designing an experiment to evaluate the ability of two leading theories of observed cooperation: reputation building and altruism. We analyze both one-shot and finitely repeated games to gauge the importance of these theories. We conclude that neither altruism nor reputation building alone can explain our observations. The reputation model is inconsistent with play in both one-shots and finitely repeated games while the model with altruism is unable to explain observed play in the finitely repeated games.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C92.     

Price discrimination: A classroom experiment

In this article, the authors describe a classroom experiment aimed at familiarizing students with different types of price discrimination (first-, second-, and third-degree price discrimination). During the experiment, the students were asked to decide what tariffs to set as monopolists for each of the price discrimination scenarios under consideration. The objective was to allow the students to work empirically, through trial and error, selecting tariffs for each type of discrimination that would maximize a monopolistic entrepreneur's profits. The purpose of the exercise also was to enable the students to differentiate each type of price discrimination and to set tariffs in each case, as well to help them understand the repercussions in terms of welfare for each type of price discrimination.     

In-class Simulations of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game

The author developed a simple computer program for the in-class simulation of the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with student-designed strategies. He describes the basic features of the software and presents two examples for the use of the program in teaching the problems of cooperation among profit-maximizing agents.     

Local Residential Sorting and Public Goods Provision: A Classroom Demonstration

This classroom exercise illustrates the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis that residential sorting across multiple jurisdictions leads to a more efficient allocation of local public goods. The exercise places students with heterogeneous preferences over a public good into a single classroom community. A simple voting mechanism determines the level of public good provision in the community. Next, the classroom is divided in two, and students may choose to move between the two smaller communities, sorting themselves according to their preferences for public goods. The exercise places cost on movement at first, then allows for costless sorting. Students have the opportunity to observe how social welfare rises through successive rounds of the exercise, as sorting becomes more complete. They may also observe how immobile individuals can become worse off because of incomplete sorting when the Tiebout assumptions do not hold perfectly.     

Teaching Nash Equilibrium and Dominance: A Classroom Experiment on the Beauty Contest

Abstract: The authors' aim in this article was to show how the use of classroom experiments may be a good pedagogical tool to teach the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. The basic game is a version of the beauty contest game (BCG), a simple guessing game in which repetition lets students react to other players' choices and converge iteratively to the equilibrium solution. The authors perform this experiment with undergraduate students with no previous training in game theory. After four rounds, they observe a clear decreasing tendency in the average submitted number in all groups. Thus, the findings show that by playing a repeated BCG, students quickly learn how to reach the NE solution.     

价格歧视下的不可再生资源的开采问题研究

自Hotelling开始,不可再生资源开采问题引起了经济学家们的注意,在此过程中,产业组织理论被应用于不可再生资源的研究.文章分析了价格歧视对不可再生资源开采的影响,结果发现,当资源的垄断开采者面向多个市场时,价格歧视因素可能使资源开采偏离最优路径.     

Classroom Games: The Allocation of Renewable Resources Under Different Property Rights and Regulation Schemes

The authors describe a renewable resource allocation game designed to stimulate students' interest in and understanding of market failure associated with open-access types of resource use. They also use the game to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of various property rights and regulation schemes. Because this exercise demonstrates the power of unregulated and regulated economic incentives, many types of students may benefit from this game, including undergraduates enrolled in the standard introductory and in more advanced microeconomics classes, as well as courses in environmental economics and natural resource economics. This game was specifically designed so that noneconomics majors in natural resource management and environmental courses could also benefit.     

A Simple Test of a Screening Procedure for Economics Faculty: A Note

This article discusses a graphical framework for classroom presentation of interactions between balance-of-payments flows and foreign exchange market equilibrium.     

Competitive Equilibrium and Classroom Pit Markets

Efforts to show the relevance of economic concepts early in a student's education can prevent the “economics is not very useful” attitude from setting in. The author extends the work of Holt to describe a pit-market experiment used to illustrate the concept of competitive equilibrium. In addition to detailed instructions as to how to set up and conduct a pit-market experiment, the author discusses features of the data and provides accompanying materials, including software for the display of the data.     

Teaching Economic Principles Interactively: A Cannibal's Dinner Party

The author describes techniques that he uses to interactively teach economics principles. He describes an experiment on market entry and gives examples of applications of classroom clickers. Clicker applications include (a) collecting data about student preferences that can be used to construct demand curves and supply curves, (b) checking students’ knowledge of central concepts, and (c) playing interactive games that illustrate economic concepts.     

市场歧视、区际边界效应与经济增长

跨区域商品价格差被认为是研究国内区际贸易的有效替代指标,文章首先以我国12个样本城市六大类商品价格为考察对象,经回归分析认为:除了距离等控制因素外,"樊纲指数"和"政府支出占GDP的比率"较好地解释了我国六大类商品价格偏差的边界效应,说明市场化进程落后的地区更可能筑起商品贸易的政策壁垒,而具有"父爱"意识的政府在高财政支出比率情形下更有能力实施保护战略,从而验证了文章的边界效应假说.实证分析还获取了两个层次的边界效应(包括品类边界效应和省份边界效应),并作为市场一体化指标被纳入文章的经济增长方程进行回归;结果显示:地方保护壁垒造成的省份市场分割,影响到保护战略实施省份的自身经济绩效.     

Dictator monopolies and essential goods: experimental evidence

Monopolists set prices and if the good is unessential this may place the consumer in an uncomfortable position. But if the good is essential the consumer faces a pay-to-live or -die choice. Dictator and ultimatum games are superficially similar in that one game offers the right of refusal, while the other does not. The dictator monopoly is, however, not a game, and behaviour could be radically different in the market environment versus game environment. We recast the dictator game as a dictator monopoly experiment and find that the fairness characteristic of the game evaporates quickly as rounds progress.     

The micro-foundations of intertemporal price discrimination

Summary. This paper investigates the optimality of intertemporal price discrimination for a durable-good monopoly in a model where infinitely-lived households face an intertemporal budget constraint, and consume both durable goods and non-durable goods. We prove that the optimal price of the durable good is not constant, and may decrease or increase over time. Some households may choose to purchase the durable good at a later date, and pay lower or higher prices, since the gain in discounted utility of consuming more of the non-durable good more than compensates for the loss in utility from delaying the consumption of the durable good.Received: 12 March 2004, Revised: 7 January 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: D40, D42, D91.I would like to thank C.D. Aliprantis, the Editor, and an anonymous referee for their generous advice, and constructive comments and suggestions. I have also enjoyed discussions with John Quah on the subject. Research support from the Wharton-SMU Research Centre, Singapore Management University, is gratefully acknowledged.     

市场分割与汇率低估

文章基于市场分割探讨了不同市场的定价行为以及均衡汇率问题。文章从微观层面的市场定价机制出发,分析垄断企业的最优供给决策。由于存在市场分割,垄断企业根据市场需求定价,使高端产品在后进国家因需求少而价格较高,在先进国家因需求多而价格较低,从而导致市场分割下同一产品的价格存在巨大差异。进一步地,通过在巴拉萨—萨缪尔森效应模型中引入商品定价结构进行分析后指出,后进国家的汇率相对先进国家出现低估的原因,不仅在于相对劳动生产率差异,还有由于市场分割以及市场异质性存在而引起的价格歧视这一重要因素。文章最后以人民币/美元为例进行了初步的经验分析,发现1994年前后人均收入水平对汇率的影响出现了转折性的变化。     

Rental prices in Germany: A comparison between migrants and natives

This paper deals with the question of whether migrants pay a rent premium for apartments of comparable quality and neighborhood characteristics. We use a two-step selection-correction model augmented by a control function to account for nonrandom neighborhood choice. The estimation sample is a uniquely assembled panel comprising the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), information on household and apartment characteristics, as well as georeferenced data describing neighborhood quality. Our estimates reveal that people with migration backgrounds are not penalized in the German local rental market in terms of higher rental payments.     

Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Markets: A Classroom Experiment

Adverse selection as it relates to health care policy will be a key economic issue in many upcoming elections. In this article, the author lays out a 30-minute classroom experiment designed for students to experience the kind of elevated prices and market collapse that can result from adverse selection in health insurance markets. The students should come away from the experiment understanding why adverse selection leads to high prices on good quality insurance and why it forces healthy individuals into low quality plans. Additionally, the experiment helps students think about the market characteristics that make health insurance particularly vulnerable to problems of asymmetric information. Finally, the experiment connects the adverse selection problem with key features of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.     

A Rent-Seeking Experiment for the Classroom

Abstract: Recent research has demonstrated that active learning techniques improve student comprehension and retention of abstract economic ideas such as rent seeking. Instructors can reinforce the concept of rent seeking with a classroom game, particularly one involving real money. The authors improve upon a game first introduced by Goeree and Holt (1999) and later expanded upon by Bischoff and Hofmann (2002). The authors present a version of the game in which students participate in an all-pay auction, risking their own money, and discover first hand the potential inefficiencies of rent seeking. The authors suggest extensions of the rent-seeking game, including discussions of social welfare effects, equity, campaign finance reform, tax simplification, and congressional reforms designed to limit the influence of rent seeking in the economy.     

History-based price discrimination and entry in markets with switching costs: A welfare analysis

We analyze history-based price discrimination in an asymmetric industry, where an incumbent, protected by switching costs, faces an entrant who does not have access to information about consumers’ purchase histories. We demonstrate that consumer surplus is higher with uniform pricing than with history-based price discrimination. We find that the entry decision is invariant to whether the incumbent implements history-based pricing or uniform pricing. This implies that the potential abuse of market dominance imposed by history-based price discrimination is exploitation, not exclusion. Finally, we establish that the profit gain to the incumbent from history-based pricing exceeds the associated loss to consumers.