Supply,wealth effects,negative multipliers,and stability

This paper is concerned with the Blinder-Solow contention that negative government expenditures multipliers are trivial inasmuch as the resulting equilibrium is unstable in a conventional IS-LM model with constant prices. An aggregate supply side, which features progressive taxation of labor income and a real balances effect in the labor supply equation, is added to the model, and it is shown that negative multipliers are not necessarily inconsistent with local asympototic stability.     

Economic Growth, Inequality, Democratization, and the Environment

We augment the Stokey (1998) model by allowingagents to differ with respect to environmentalquality and income in order to analyze theimpact of income and environmental inequality,and of democratization on aggregate pollution.We find that the impact of a more equal incomedistribution depends on the degree ofdemocracy. In a complete democracy a more equalincome distribution generates, ceterisparibus, less pollution, which is consistentwith indirect empirical evidence, whereas theopposite is the case if democratic rights arehighly restricted. Furthermore, ademocratization is argued to typically lowerboth the income and the environmental qualityof the median voter. In this case, if, inutility terms, the fall in environmentalquality is worse than the fall in consumptionthe median voter decides to tightenenvironmental legislation so that aggregatepollution decreases.     

HOUSEHOLDS, GOODS, AND WELL-BEING

Household economies translate goods into well-being through production, co-operation, and distribution. Between market goods to households and well-being to persons, value is added. Income is a measure of goods, consumption well-being is measured by equivalent income. An absolute interpretation of equivalent income is argued as the value to persons of consumption well-being after household economies. Guidance is suggested on the choice of equivalence scales, and for the measurement of well-being and inequality.     

Lying,Integrity, and Cooperation

While talk is cheap to some, it is expensive to others for whom moral considerations come into play. We employ a simple two-stage modified prisoner's dilemma game where integrity is endowed on a continuum to analyze when agents will lie in random economic interactions. If there is sufficient integrity in the population, all agents make a promise in the first stage to cooperate in the second. Some agents always lie, some always tell the truth, and some behave conditionally. Enhanced cooperation is a byproduct of integrity. In a second random interaction without the possibility of exit, some agents “switch” their behavior, that is, some who lied in the first period now tell the truth in the second (they've “reformed”), and some who told the truth in the first period now lie in the second (they've become “cynical”).     

Promises, trust, and contracts

A transaction involving a buyer and a competitive seller isstudied under the hypothesis that individuals may have a certaintendency to keep promises. The parties can choose a completecontract where costly arrangements are made so that it is verifiablewhether the seller has delivered a certain quality. Alternatively,they can choose an incomplete contract where the quality agreedupon by the two parties is unverifiable, and one party is giventhe residual right to decide whether the quality is indeed delivered.Although complete contracts are always available, it may beoptimal to use incomplete contracts, and social surplus canincrease in contract costs. Social surplus is higher when thebuyer has the residual right if under this arrangement incompletecontracts are optimal; and social surplus is higher when theseller has the residual right if only under this arrangementincomplete contracts are optimal.     

Search, Money, and Prices

It is well known that models in which money is used as a medium of exchange to lubricate trading, frictions display multiplicity of equilibria. I show that the amount of activity varies as the value of money differs across these equilibria when production opportunities involve random fixed costs. When money has high value, trade is more profitable; therefore, there will be more agents engaged in trade relative to equilibria in which money has lower value. The higher-activity equilibria display higher production not only because more is produced and exchanged per transaction but also because more transactions occur per period. This Diamond-style result is obtained without increasing returns in the matching technology.     

Collectives,communes, and incentives

A model of individual-worker incentives in alternative economic organizations—collective, communal, capitalist—is developed. It is demonstrated that, ceteris paribus, incentives are much higher in collectives than in communes, and are likely higher in collectives than in comparable capitalist organizations. The effect on incentives of changes in prices, rent, and organization size is examined, and it is shown that individual incentives in a collective increase with the scale of the organization. The impact of various parameters on hours worked is examined in the framework of utility maximization. The results are compared to those of Domar, Ward, and Vanek.     

Anarchy, efficiency, and redistribution

This paper develops a contractarian theory of the state and the existence of redistribution. The existence of rules of redistribution is explained without any recourse to the risk-aversion of agents. No veil of ignorance is needed. This avoids obligational problems inherent in most other contractarian theories of justice. Hence, this paper departs from the standard legitimization of redistribution as fundamental insurance and interprets it as stemming from a principle of reciprocity in trade. Since this paper deals with an anarchic society, the implementation of redistributional rules is constrained by the assumption of self-enforcement. We show that this assumption changes the interpretation of the state: the state is characterized by a particular design of equilibrium strategies, not by the existence of enforcement agencies.     

Updating,self-confidence,and discrimination

In this laboratory experiment, we show that people incorporate irrelevant group information when evaluating others. Individuals from groups that perform badly on average receive low evaluations, even when it is known that the individuals themselves perform well. This group-bias occurs both in a gendered setup, where women form the worse performing group, and in a non-gendered setup.The type of discrimination that we identify is neither taste-based nor statistical; it is rather due to conservatism in updating beliefs, and is even more pronounced among women. Furthermore, self-confident men overvalue male performers. When our data is used to simulate a job promotion ladder, we observe that women are driven out quickly.     

Poverty, voracity, and growth

This article investigates economic performance when enforceable property rights are missing and basic needs matter for consumption. It suggests a new view of the so-called voracity effect according to which windfall gains in productivity induce behavior that leads to lower economic growth. Taking into account that the rate of intertemporal substitution in consumption depends on the level of consumption, it is shown that “voracious behavior” is situation-specific. It occurs when an economy is in decline and sufficiently close to stagnation.     

Truth,self, and feminism

Humanistic economics is founded on the reality of human needs. One of those needs is for truth. According to the correspondence theory, that truth is a relation between statement and objective reality. This reality serves as a constraint on the (ego) self. Therefore, it can also be shown that self-interest is an independent principle from the commitment to truth, and that these two principles can clash. These two principles of the self, or the “higher” and “lower” self, constitute what we call the dual self. In a critique of humanistic economics from a feminist direction, Julie Nelson has claimed that such dualisms form a hierarchy that is sympathetic of patriarchal hierarchies. In a previous response to that criticism we showed that Nelson’s own work involved similar hierarchies. Here we attempt to show how Nelson's conception of value hierarchies involving the feminine and masculine and our conception can be resolved into one coherent framework.     

Basic income,liberal neutrality,socialism, and work

Liberal critics often object to basic income (BI) on the grounds that it violates reciprocity and is biased toward those who choose voluntarily to opt out of work and thus violate the principle of liberal neutrality toward conceptions of the good life. In the first part of this paper I argue that liberal neutrality favors BI. Marxist critics of BI are less likely to accept liberal neutrality, but I argue in the second part that the argument for BI in the first part applies with equal force to Marxist objections that BI is unfairly exploitative of workers. Marxists are also less likely to accept current labor market trends, seeing socialism as affording more opportunity for guaranteeing everyone a right to decent work, and suspecting BI of making the unfair inequalities of capitalism a little more palatable while diverting attention from a more equitable socialist alternative. I argue that BI is not incompatible with socialism or Marxism, and should not be opposed to but rather combined with strategies for full employment.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Money,government debt,q, and investment

The aim of this study is to analyze empirically the linkages among changes in money and federal debt, Tobin's q variable, and investment expenditures in the United States. The vector autoregressive modeling technique proposed by Hsiao and extended by Caines, Keng, and Sethi is employed. The patterns of Granger-causality from the estimated vector autoregression are consistent with the transmission mechanism outlined by Tobin. Both money and debt Granger-cause q; q in turn causes investment and money and debt's effects upon investment operate primarily through their effects on q. However, neither money nor debt are exogenous.     

Bargains,Barter, and Money

We examine a search money model in which there is a symmetric coincidence of wants in all barter matches. However, when bargaining outcomes are asymmetric across matches, the barter economy is inefficient. Then a robust monetary equilibrium exists provided that money holders enjoy adequate bargaining terms. Fiat money may be welfare improving. In contrast to the literature, it is the asymmetry in bargains across matches rather than asymmetry in demands that generates these results. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, E40.     

Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices Under Private Information

This paper presents a model of money and search where bargaining determines prices and the quality of goods is private information. It studies how a lemons problem affects the purchasing power of money. There are multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria. The superior equilibrium, where no lemons are produced, exists even if information about quality is relatively scarce. In other equilibria, there is price dispersion, and uninformed buyers pay higher prices than informed buyers for all goods. Taxing money balances (a proxy for inflation) makes buyers less selective, thus reducing the average quality of supply and the premium paid for known quality.     

Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness

If shortest (respectively longest) jobs are served first, splitting a job into smaller jobs (respectively merging several jobs) can reduce the actual wait. Any deterministic protocol is vulnerable to strategic splitting and/or merging. This is not true if scheduling is random, and users care only about expected wait.The Proportional rule draws the job served last with probabilities proportional to size, then repeats among the remaining jobs. It is immune to splitting and merging. Among split-proof protocols constructed in this recursive way, it is characterized by either one of three properties: job sizes and delays are co-monotonic; total delay is at most twice optimal delay; the worst (expected) delay of any job is at most twice the smallest feasible worst delay. A similar result holds within the family of separable rules,     

Urbanization,informal sector,and development

Urbanization is a universal phenomenon in the postwar world, but its qualitative nature is varied across countries. Some nations have experienced urbanization that accompanied skill upgrading, industrialization, and the expansion of the urban formal (modern) sector, but others urbanized without such modernization and underwent the expansion of the urban informal (traditional) sector simultaneously. The question that naturally arises is what are the underlying causes for the differences. The purpose of the paper is to tackle this question analytically based on a dynamic model of urbanization and development.     

Linkages, Thresholds, and Development

Growth is rarehistorically, with short expansions interspersed with long periodsof stasis. We examine how well this can be explained by a generalclass of Schumpeterian growth models that treat development asa progress through a space of commodities, from simple to morecomplex goods. This process of sequential innovation in a partiallyordered network of commodities is called linkage formation. The central result of this article is thatSchumpeterian growth models exhibit generic threshold behavior.Below a critical probability of linkage formation, developmentgradually ceases. Above the critical probability, innovationcontinues with probability one.     

Annuities, Bequests, and Portfolio Diversification

In this article, the diversification motives of the demand for annuities is analyzed. Using a model allowing for the uncertainty of both the human life length and the interest rate, the Decision Maker is supposed to choose an optimal portfolio to maximize a bequest. Conditions under which an increase in the risk of bond returns increase the demand for annuities are proposed and discussed. Moreover, it is shown that, contrary to previous claims, more risk adversion is associated with a lower demand for annuities.