Tournament incentives and match outcomes in women's professional tennis

Our research examines the effect of prize money differentials in women's professional tennis tournaments on the probability that the favoured player wins the match. This study adds to the existing literature on tournament theory through its focus on Rosen's (1986) elimination-style, match play tournament model. We estimate a standard probit model using a unique data set containing detailed information on prize money, player-specific characteristics, and match play outcomes for all tournaments played during the 2004 tour sponsored by the Women's Tennis Association (WTA). Our results support predictions by Rosen's tournament model. Larger prize money differentials have a positive, statistically significant effect on the favoured player's probability of winning the match. In addition, the number of stages remaining has a significant, negative effect on winning, consistent with tournament theory predictions associated with the number of contestants in a tournament.     

MARCH MADNESS: NCAA TOURNAMENT PARTICIPATION AND COLLEGE ALCOHOL USE

While athletic success may improve the visibility of a university to prospective students and thereby benefit the school, it may also increase risky behavior in the current student body. Using the Harvard School of Public Health College Alcohol Study, we find that a school's participation in the NCAA Basketball Tournament is associated with a 47% increase in binge drinking by male students at that school. Additionally, we find evidence that drunk driving increases by 5% among all students during the tournament. (JEL I12, I23, Z28)     

Round‐Robin Tournaments with a Dominant Player

We analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of the round‐robin tournament with one strong (dominant) and two weak players, and we compare this tournament and the one‐stage contest with respect to the players' expected payoffs, expected total effort, and their probabilities of winning. We find that if the contest designer's goal is to maximize the players' expected total effort, then – if the asymmetry between the players is relatively low – the one‐stage contest should be used. However, if the asymmetry is relatively high, then the round‐robin tournament should be used.     

DOES ATHLETIC SUCCESS INFLUENCE PERSISTENCE AT HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS? NEW EVIDENCE USING PANEL DATA

This study examines the relationship between athletic success and student persistence toward a degree. We build an updated panel of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I institutions and utilize within‐institution variation to identify the effects of athletic success. Using a ranking of all institutions, we find that having more successful men's basketball and football teams has a significant positive effect on first‐year retention rates. We also find some evidence that improved basketball rankings increase graduation rates, and that success in the NCAA tournament may have a sizable impact on retention. Although the estimated effects are generally modest in scale, we find rather limited evidence of other institutional factors affecting persistence, suggesting that athletics can be one avenue for institutions of higher education to engage and retain students. (JEL I23, Z20, L83)     

Another Graphical Proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Arrow's (1951) Impossibility Theorem is the idea that, given several well-known assumptions, the social orderings of particular alternatives that are meant to reflect individuals' preferences must match the preferences of an arbitrary individual (the dictator). A social-choice rule other than dictatorship is impossible. Following from Fountain (2000), the author presents another graphical proof of the theorem that is intended to be more accessible to students and teachers of economics. The principal strength of this approach is that the patterns of agreements and conflicts over all possible combinations of two individuals' rankings of alternatives are transparent; appreciating these patterns is the key to intuitively understanding Arrow's theorem. A self-test for readers (or a classroom exercise for students) is included.     

Rising Powers in Complex Regimes: South African Norm Shopping in the Governance of Cross-Border Investment

ABSTRACT

This article offers a critical engagement with the literature on contemporary global power shifts and the phenomenon of ‘regime complexity’. It does so by focusing on South Africa's role in the governance of cross-border investment, and using this case to explore the strategies used by rising powers to pursue their strategic aims in institutionally complex and fragmented global governance regimes. This article situates an understanding of regime complexity within a critical constructivist literature that highlights the ambiguity of international norms and the relationship between power and strategic rhetorical action. It argues that complex regimes create space for agency and strategic action by states and highlights one specific strategy – norm shopping – that rising powers can use to legitimate their actions and challenge dominant norms in complex regimes.     

Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments

We study an elimination tournament with heterogenous contestants whose ability is common-knowledge. Each pair-wise match is modeled as an all-pay auction. Equilibrium efforts are in mixed strategies, yielding complex dynamics: endogenous win probabilities in each match depend on other matches’ outcome through the identity of the expected opponent in the next round. The designer seeds competitors according to their ranks. For tournaments with four players we find optimal seedings for three different criteria: (1) maximization of total tournament effort; (2) maximization of the probability of a final among the two top ranked teams; (3) maximization of the win probability for the top player. We also find the seedings ensuring that higher ranked players have a higher winning probability. We compare our predictions with data from NCAA basketball tournaments.     

Incentive effects and overcrowding in tournaments: An experimental analysis

This study reports experiments that examine outcomes when agents choose between a payment scheme that rewards based on absolute performance (i.e., piece rate) and a scheme that rewards based on relative performance (i.e., a tournament). Holding total payments in the tournament constant, performance is higher when the tournament option is winner-take-all compared to a graduated tournament (i.e., second and third-place performers also receive a payment). Performance is higher in the winner-take all tournaments even among participants that choose the piece-rate option. While there is a modest amount of overcrowding, there are no significant differences in overcrowding across conditions. Entry rates into the tournament and the relative ability of tournament entrants (compared to non-entrants in the same condition) are higher in the graduated tournament condition than the winner-take-all conditions. Consequently, the winner-take-all tournament is more efficient than the graduated tournament (incentive effects are stronger and the overcrowding is about the same), but the graduated tournament provides a more effective mechanism to identify the most capable performer in a talent pool. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification D8 · J3 · L2     

“Success breeds success” or “Pride goes before a fall”?: Teams and individuals in multi-contest tournaments

We study the impact of progress feedback on players' performance in multi-contest team tournaments, in which team members' efforts are not directly substitutable. In particular, we employ a real-effort laboratory experiment to understand, in a best-of-three tournament, how players' strategic mindsets change when they compete on a team compared to when they compete individually. Our data corroborate the theoretical predictions for teams: Neither a lead nor a lag in the first component contest affects a team's performance in the subsequent contests. In individual tournaments, however, contrary to the theoretical prediction, we observe that leaders perform worse—but laggards perform better—after learning the outcome of the first contest. Our findings offer the first empirical evidence from a controlled laboratory of the impact of progress feedback between team and individual tournaments, and contribute new insights on team incentives.     

Student loans and the allocation of graduate jobs

Higher education is not just a costly signal of native talent but also a means of raising a person's ability to hold a graduate job (and at least a certain educational achievement is required to get one). Graduate jobs differentiated by quality are allocated to graduates differentiated by native talent and parental wealth through a tournament. Non‐graduates jobs pay a fixed wage to those who do not participate in the tournament. Assuming that credit is rationed, some poor school leavers will go straight into the non‐graduate labour market even if they are talented enough to get a higher education and participate in the tournament. Some others will buy the same amount of higher education and end up doing graduate jobs of the same quality as less talented but richer school leavers. We show that student loans improve job matching and bring educational investments closer to efficiency. If the size of the loan is not very large, some poor school leavers will still be liquidity‐constrained and thus buy the same amount of higher education as less talented but richer ones. In that case, the former will get a productivity bonus. But raising the size of the loan to such a level that nobody is liquidity‐constrained could be socially optimal only if social preferences were extremely egalitarian.     

Resisting Protectionism after the Crisis: Strategic Economic Discourse and the EU–Korea Free Trade Agreement

In 2006 the European Commission announced its Global Europe strategy, which proposed pursuing a series of ambitious Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) premised on exchanging the EU's remaining ‘pockets of protection’ for market access. The first of these agreements was signed with South Korea in October 2010. This article asks how the Commission's Directorate-General (DG) for Trade could successfully conclude this agreement in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis. Given a strong mobilisation of protectionists with access to policy-makers, this liberal policy outcome cannot be explained purely in terms of institutional insulation, as in much of the literature on EU trade policy, nor be simply ‘read off’ from the material interests of societal actors. This article, therefore, develops a constructivist framework which broadens our understanding of the power of strategically invoked economic discourses. By developing a novel analytical strategy to determine the intentional invocation of such discourses, it is able to show how DG Trade constructed an ideational imperative for liberalisation in Global Europe, enabling it to overcome opposition to the EU–Korea FTA. Beyond its contribution to constructivist scholarship, this article draws attention to the neglected dimension of ideas in trade policy and highlights the continued purchase of neoliberalism after the crisis.     

PERFORMANCE‐BASED FEE CONTRACT AND RISK‐TAKING STRATEGY IN ASSET MANAGEMENT TOURNAMENT

This paper investigates how performance‐based fee (PBF) contracts affect strategic risk‐taking behaviours of fund managers in an asset management tournament. In the perfect equilibrium, managers with better mid‐year performance will hold the risky asset with a higher probability in the remaining of the year, compared to managers with poorer mid‐year performance. If the volume of the cash flow into the winner fund is contingent on its level of success, the winning fund will take a more aggressive approach. When the PBF contract pays more heed to relative performance against the benchmark, managers are more likely to adopt aggressive strategies.     

Sorting and inequality in Canadian schools

A student's peers are often thought to influence his or her educational outcomes. If so, an unequal distribution of advantaged and disadvantaged students across schools (“sorting”) in a community will amplify existing inequalities. This paper explores the relationship between the degree of sorting across schools within a community and educational inequality as measured by the variance of standardized high school exam scores within the community. Cross-sectional OLS estimates suggest that the variance of test scores is related to sorting by ethnicity, but not to sorting by income or parental education. We then implement two strategies for addressing endogeneity in the degree of sorting: a standard unobserved effects (first-difference) approach, and a first-difference/instrumental variables approach in which the structure of school choice (number and relative size of schools) is used to construct instruments for the degree of sorting. The results from both approaches indicate that the variance of test scores is related to sorting by home language and parental education, but not to sorting by income. Our results also suggest that reducing sorting would have little effect on inequality of outcomes in the typical Alberta community, but would have substantial effects in the larger cities.     

Games superheroes play: Teaching game theory with comic book favorites

The valuable insights of game theory sometimes remain out of reach for students who are overwhelmed by the subject's complexity. Comic book applications of game theory, with superheroes as players, can facilitate enthusiasm and classroom interaction to enhance the learning of game theory. Drawing from content in superhero movies and books, the authors construct games to illustrate pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mixed strategies, sub-game perfection, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. To help instructors build students' skills in finding and interpreting game solutions, they translate comic book scenarios into specific game forms; however, not all scenarios are obvious so they suggest instructors help students develop their own game-theoretic judgments to determine what game forms, payoffs, and solution concepts might be appropriate for understanding a situation.     

Outsourcing and licensing strategies in small software firms: evolution of strategies and implications for firm growth,internationalisation and innovation

Current literature contains extensive results on the possibilities for capitalising different outsourcing strategies. However, previous research suffers from shortcomings on how these overall possibilities and benefits of outsourcing apply to the context of small and medium sized companies in several industries, and in particular, how the outsourcing strategies correlate to a firm's overall strategy during different phases of growth. Through the theoretical structuring and empirical analysis of six small and medium sized software companies and a total of 14 outsourcing or licensing projects, this article provides evidence and further develops the current theory-base on how small computer software companies are able to capitalise on and benefit from using external research-oriented product development related resources during different stages of their growth process. The results of this article are composed into a framework introducing propositions and testable hypotheses for future research.     

Men, women, and competition: An experimental test of behavior

This study reports a series of experiments that examine outcomes when agents are able to choose between a payment scheme that rewards based on absolute performance (i.e., piece rate) and a scheme that rewards based on relative performance (i.e., a tournament). We test for the presence and persistence of gender differences in performance and the rate of entry into the tournament option and whether these differences are sensitive to the structure of the tournament rewards. In the winner-take-all (WTA) condition, only the best performer in the tournament for each round received a payment ($4.50). In the graduated tournament condition, the same payment ($4.50) was divided among the first, second, and third finishers in the tournament. In the WTA condition, men showed significantly lower forecast errors than women. In addition, a clear sorting effect occurs in the WTA condition. In early rounds of the WTA condition, male entrants into the tournament show significantly lower forecast errors than female tournament entrants. However, the difference disappears over time. After controlling for forecasting skill, gender did not predict entry into the tournament for the WTA condition. However, lower forecasting skill reduced the probability of entry. In the graduated tournament, the situation was reversed. Men entered the tournament at significantly higher rates, even after controlling for skill. Forecasting skill had no impact on the decision to enter the tournament. While the average male entrant to the tournament had lower forecast errors than the average female entrant, the men entered at much higher rates. As a consequence, men were much more likely than women to enter the tournament too frequently.     

POSITIVE SELF‐IMAGE IN TOURNAMENTS*

This article analyzes the implications of worker overestimation of productivity for firms in which incentives take the form of tournaments. Each worker overestimates his productivity but is aware of the bias in his opponent's self‐assessment. The manager of the firm, on the other hand, correctly assesses workers' productivities and self‐beliefs when setting tournament prizes. The article shows that, under a variety of circumstances, firms can benefit from worker positive self‐image. The article also shows that worker positive self‐image can improve welfare in tournaments. In contrast, workers' utility declines due to their own misguided choices.     

Rank-order tournaments and selection

Rank-order tournaments are often presented as devices for aligning incentives in a principal-agent setting. In most of this literature agents are expected to be identical so that the principal is indifferent ex ante as to who wins the contest, implying that the selection properties of the tournament can be ignored. In this paper we consider a tournament which is not necessarily symmetric, and in which agent type is private information. The principal cares about who wins, but the basic tournament will not achieve perfect selection; the lower-type agent may sometimes win. In a two-player tournament we present a simple reward system in which the winner's reward depends upon which (if any) of two “test standards” is passed; conditions are presented under which this system allows the principal to choose the best agent. This system can be extended in a simple manner to rank types in ann-player tournament. We suggest that the theory can be applied to internal labor markets and research contests.     

In-class Simulations of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game

The author developed a simple computer program for the in-class simulation of the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with student-designed strategies. He describes the basic features of the software and presents two examples for the use of the program in teaching the problems of cooperation among profit-maximizing agents.     

Meanings and practices of learning from incidents: a social constructivist perspective of incident reporting systems

Incident reporting systems (IRSs) are used in many organisations as tools that promote safety by allowing to collectively learn from incidents. In this paper, we propose a social constructivist approach to learning from incidents, in which the focus is not purely on safety, but on the technology of incident reporting itself. We employ Wiebe Bijker’s work on the Social Construction of Technology to open up the analysis of a specific IRS in use at the Belgian Nuclear Research Center. For this purpose, we carried out 28 interviews with key local actors and collected documents and observation notes. Such social constructivist perspective provides detailed insight into the practices of reporting and the meanings of learning from incidents. Our research shows that various actors within the organisation frame the IRS differently. These framings each have their own implications for the vulnerability of the organisation.